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SUNLIGHT, SECRETS, AND SCARLET LETTERS:
THE TENSION BETWEEN PRIVACY AND DISCLOSURE
IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SETH F. KREIMERt

This isfar more dangerous than McCarthyism. At least McCarthy was elected.

1
-Justice Clarence Thomas

t Associate Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. I would be gravely
remiss in failing to acknowledge with thanks the support, insight, advice, and
encouragement I have received on this project from Michael Ausbrook, Ed Baker,
Charles Bosk, Owen Fiss, Michael Fitts, George Fletcher, Nancy Fuchs-Kreimer, Frank
Goodman, Howard Lesnick, Steven Morse, Gerry Neuman, Robert Post, and Linda
Wharton. Able research assistance from Gus Arnavat and Sean Halpin aided my
efforts immeasurably. Any errors of fact orjudgment, of course, remain my own.
1 Hearing of the Senate Judiciay Comm. on Thomas Supreme Court Nomination,
FEDERAL NEws SERV., Oct. 11, 1991 availablein LEXIS, Genfed Library, Nomine file
[hereinafter Hearingon Thomas].
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INTRODUCTION

A. The Constitution in an Age of Information
The night watchman state is dead in America, if indeed it ever
lived. Modern American government, like governments elsewhere,
has taken progressively greater responsibility for functions that
previously had been left to the market or other social structures. In
the late twentieth century, the bureaucrat-who dispenses benefits
and licenses, who hires and fires, who plans health care programs
or fiscal policy-has replaced the police officer, judge, or soldier as
the icon of government.
In the course of her job, the bureaucrat learns more intimate
details about citizens than would the police officer or the judge.
Implementation and .planning personnel have voracious appetites
for information, and every license, benefit, or exemption makes the
government privy to the details of a citizen's life. Information
gathered in one arena is available for use in others. Similarly, the
increasing rationalization and routinization of the private sector has
generated stores of information potentially available to the
government. Every employer accumulates information about her
employees, every granter of credit files data about her customers,
every transfer of funds leaves an increasingly accessible data trail, all
of which is susceptible to government subpoena or request. 2 The
2 See GARY I. MARX, UNDERCOVER: PoLicE SURVEILANCE IN AMERICA 208-11
(1988) (describing growth of data banks in credit card companies, insurance
companies, and fimancial institutions and the efforts of government to take advantage
of the fact that "[b]its of scattered information that in the past did not threaten
individual's privacy and anonymity now can be joined" by matching programs).
AT&T estimated in 1977 that it receives 100,000 subpoenas for toll call records
annually from law enforcement agencies alone. See PRIVACYJ., Nov. 1987, at 2. The

4
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farther pieces of data stray from an origin in personalized interaction, the less incentive the holders of data have to resist government
inquiry. Indeed, the government often intervenes to facilitate the
s
process by requiring private parties to compile records.
These trends have been accentuated by changes in information
technology. The capacities to gather, store, correlate, and retrieve
data have increased by orders of magnitude, as both public and
private data manipulation and storage has mushroomed. The ability
to uncover and manipulate the "informational traces of citizens has
exploded as government combines its own information with data
4
subpoenaed or scavenged from private sources.

rate has doubtless increased since that time. See Jeffrey Rothfelder, Is Nothing
Private?, Bus. WK., Sept. 4, 1989, at 74 (describing the 1987 Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) proposal to modernize the National Crime Information Center
(NCIC) by linking the FBI criminal data banks with the computerized records of
airline reservation systems, car rental companies, creditors, credit bureaus, insurance
companies, and phone companies); John Shattuck, In the Shadow of 1984: National
IdentificationSystems, Computer-Matching and Privacy in the United States, 35 HASTINGS
L.J. 991 (1984) (noting the introduction of increasingly intrusive computer matching
and identification systems).
3 See, e.g., Dole v. United Steelworkers, 110 S. Ct. 929 (1990). The Dole court
noted:
Typical information collection requests include tax forms, medicare forms,
financial loan applications, job applications, questionnaires, compliance
reports and tax or business records. These information requests share at
least one characteristic: The information requested is provided to a federal
agency, either directly or indirectly. Agencies impose the requirements on
private parties in order to generate information to be used by the agency in
pursuing some other purpose. For instance, agencies use these information
requests in gathering background on a particular subject to develop the
expertise with which to devise or fine-tune appropriate regulations,
amassing diffuse data for processing into useful statistical form, and
monitoring business records and compliance reports for signs or proof of
nonfeasance to determine when to initiate enforcement measures.
Id. at 933 (citations and footnote omitted); see also Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S.
281, 285 (1979) ('The expanding range of federal regulatory activity and growth in
the Government sector of the economy have increased federal agencies' demands for
information about the activities of private individuals and corporations.").
4 See DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY AND GOVERNMENT DATA BANKS, AN
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 258-59,266-67,271-76 (1979); GOVERNMENT INFOSTRUCTURES: A GUIDE TO THE NETWORKS OF INFORMATION RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGIES
AT THE FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL LEVELS 10-13 (Karen B. Levitan ed., 1987);
Robert Garcia, "GarbageIn, Gospel Out":" CriminalDiscovey, Computer Reliability, and
the Constitution, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1043, 1048, 1052-68 (1991) (describing federal
information resources, which include one billion reports per year of third party
payments filed with the IRS and seven million reports annually of cash transfers, as
well as proposals to integrate federal information systems and to develop data
matching programs). For example, NCIC records increased from 20,000 in 1967 to
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The expansion of government knowledge translates into an
increase in the effective power of government.5 At its most
mundane, an increase in government knowledge means an increase
in the ability to deploy existing government sanctions effectively.
At the time of Roe v. Wade, 6 for example, the ability to prosecute
abortions was limited by the capacity of the government to identify
abortions and abortion providers. Even in states that sought to
enforce prohibitions actively, the transaction costs of identifying
violations produced a friction that softened the prospect of legal
enforcement. Today, with the proliferation of health care records,
insurance records, medicare records, and tax records, all subject to
computerized retrieval and cross-reference, the zone of anonymity
that formerly protected reproductive autonomy has shrunk
considerably. A crusading prosecutor in a world without Roe stands
a greater chance of stamping out abortions than did her predecessor
17 million in 1986. See CriminalRecords: Open or Closed?, 13 PRIvACYJ., Oct. 1987,
at 1. Regarding the development of the NCIC criminal record system, see DONALD
A. MARCHAND, THE POLITICS OF PRIVACY, COMPUTERS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
RECORDS 66-71 (1980).
5 The concerns are not new. Leaving aside the dark projections of George Orwell,
apprehensions about increasing government access to personal information have
inspired a steady stream of commentary over the last three decades. See, e.g., DAVID
BURNHAM, THE RISE OF THE COMPUTER STATE 185-90 (1980) (expressing the concern
that the linkage of computers might lead to misuse of information); FRANK J.
DONNER, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 11-15 (Vintage Books 1981) (1980) (arguing that
surveillance of dissenters is a method of governance in our political system); MARX,
supra note 2, at 147-52 (analyzing the reasons for extensive use of police covert
operations and their effects on law enforcement); ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT
ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BASES, AND DOSSIERS 26-38 (1971) (considering the
"blessings and blasphemies" of computer technologyin light of the privacy dilemma);
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DATABANKS AND A FREE SOCIETY 251-56 (Alan F.
Westin & Michael A. Baker eds., 1972) (discussing the impact of data sharing and the
informal exchange of information in the absence of legal guidelines); PRIVACY
PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 346
(1977) (suggesting that government's expanded ability to collect personal information
has heightened "the dangers of official abuse"); FRANCIS E. ROURKE, SECRECY AND
PUBLICITY 209-16 (1961) (claiming that publicity and public opinion can and do
enable official power to expand beyond the limits of the legal system); JAMES RULE
ET AL., THE POLITICS OF PRIVACY 51-68 (1980) (providing a critique of the "privacy
issue" arising from documentary coverage of individuals); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY
AND FREEDOM 23-52 (1967) (postulating that the control of information allows
government to narrow the gap between totalitarianism and democracy); Symposium,
Privacy, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 251 (1966) (discussing the philosophical
development of a constitutionally based right of privacy); Symposium, Surveillance,
Dataveillance and Human Freedom, 4 COL. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 1 (1972) (essays
concerning surveillance, computers, and privacy).
6 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

6
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a generation before.
Information controlled by government provides a second, less
straightforward, means of exerting government power. Even if
formal prosecution of abortions remains beyond the constitutionally
permitted power of the state, a health department official who is
able to obtain and publish the names of women seeking abortions
can exercise a deterrent almost as effective as prosecution. From
Brandeis's advocacy of "sunlight as a disinfectant" 8 to the hearings
conducted by Senator Joseph McCarthy and his colleagues, the
spotlight of "pitiless publicity"9 has been valued, not only for its
light, but for its heat. The power of public opprobrium, once
evoked, is often more pervasive and more penetrating than criminal
punishment. As the volume of information controlled by the state
increases, so too does the government's ability to sanction dis10
favored activities by the simple act of public disclosure.
From the vantage point of constitutional law, this second aspect
of the information explosion is the more intriguing, for it brings the
ideal of rational and informed public decisions into conflict with the
mistrust of government power at the heart of American constitutionalism. In many aspects of constitutional law the dissemination
of information is applauded. Information is the currency of the
"marketplace of ideas," the prerequisite for political self-determination, and a security against usurpation by secret cabals. Secrecy
interferes with rational decision-making, accountability, and the
choice of national goals. In general, scholarly analysis of the First
Amendment disposes us toward the proposition that more informa7 When and if an effective abortifacient, such as RU-486, becomes available, the
balance may shift again. As we have learned in the most recent "war" on drugs, the
illicit transfers of medicine for cash is difficult, if not impossible, to trace and
eradicate. See, e.g., Leonard A. Cole, The End of the Abortion Debate, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
217, 223 (1989) (arguing that RU-486 will render moot the controversy over early
pregnancy abortions).
5
Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(1914).
9 See S. REP. No. 1783, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938); H.R. REP. No. 1381, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937).
10
This essay, directed toward issues of constitutional law, leaves largely unexamined the ability of private actors, who are accumulating information at an equivalent
rate, to disseminate that information. (An exception is my discussion of boycotts,
infra text accompanying notes 149-172). Although the impact of private dissemination is often comparable to that of government dissemination, the legal problems are
distinct enough to be left for a future essay. Not least among the differences is First
Amendment protection available for the dissemination of information by private
entities, but not by government.
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tion is better. 1 We esteem "sunlight" because it illuminates.
But constitutional law is also concerned with prot&cting
sanctuaries of private liberty from state intervention. In this
enterprise we acknowledge the necessity for shadows as well as
sunlight upon the landscape of our republic. The use of exposure
as a punishment and a deterrent is rooted in literature and political
folklore. No one doubts that Hester Prynne's scarlet letter provided
more than neutral information, 12 or that the effort of Senator
Joseph McCarthy to "expose" the background of his political
opponents was not simply public education.
This tension is not simply a matter of literary or historical
interest, for the contemporary scene teems with constitutional issues
linked to the government's dissemination of information. Although
the end of the Cold War has made efforts to suppress Communists
and fellow travellers in America seem quaint, hostility toward other
exercises of First Amendment liberties makes the threat of exposure
an effective contemporary sanction.
For this reason, political groups continue to seek exemptions
13
from obligations to disclose their membership and supporters,
11 For a partially dissentingvoice in the otherwise unanimous chorus, see Michael
A. Fitts, Can IgnoranceBe Bliss? Imperfect Informationas a PositiveInfluence in Political
Institutions, 88 MICH. L. REV. 917, 966-68 (1990); cf. Scott Altman, Beyond Candor,89
MICH. L. REV. 296, 299 (1990) (suggesting the benefits of inaccurate beliefs held by
thejudiciary); W. Robert Reed, Information in PoliticalMarkets:A Little Knowledge Can
Be a Dangerous Thing, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 355, 357 (1989) (providing a model of
electoral competition showing that more politician-specific information can make
voters worse off).
12 NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (Bantam Books 1986) (1850).
Hawthorne himselfwas acutely attuned to the interplay between the virtues and vices
of disclosure. At the outset of his fable, he tartly characterizes the pillory "as
effectual an agent, in the promotion of good citizenship, as ever was the guillotine
among the terrorists of France" and places in Dimmesdales' mouth approval of the
"[w]ondrous strength and generosity" of Hester Prynne's refusal to disclose her
partner in sin. Id. at 52, 64.
By the end of the novel, however, Hawthorne proclaims that: "No man, for any
considerable period, can wear one face to himself, and another to the multitude,
without finally getting bewildered as to which may be the true." Id. at 197. Hester
Prynne's scarlet letter has become in the minds of the populace a symbol to be
"looked upon with awe, yet with reverence too." Id. at 239.
13 See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 88
(1982) (Socialist Workers Party); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64-68 (1976) (political
parties); Pleasant v. Lovell, 876 F.2d 787, 795 (10th Cir. 1989) (identity of members
of National Commodity and Barter Association); Marshall v. Bramer, 828 F.2d 355,
359-60 (6th Cir. 1987) (Ku Klux Klan (KKK) membership lists); Adolph Coors Co. v.
Movement Against Racism, 777 F.2d 1538, 1540-42 (11th Cir. 1985) (anti-KKK
activists); Snedigar v. Hoddersen, 786 P.2d 781, 783 (Wash. 1990) (Freedom Socialist

8
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even as the FBI seeks to gather information about the identity of
patrons of public libraries and their reading habits. 1 4 A presidential commission has called on citizens' groups to boycott makers and
distributors of "pornography," 5 and has threatened to issue lists
identifying boycott targets. 16 Universities claim immunity from
17
disclosure of their tenure files on grounds of academic freedom,
while church hierarchies seek shelter from discovery requests on the
8
basis of free exercise of religion.'

Party); cf Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 472-77 (1987) (allowing description of film

as "political propaganda" despite damage to the disseminator's reputation); Citizens
Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 296-99 (1981) (implicitly
approving statutory disclosure requirements as applied to identity of campaign
organization in a local referendum); State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547,551-53 (Ga. 1990)
(rejecting a First Amendment challenge on behalf of KKK member to statute
prohibiting wearing of masks in public).
14 See e.g., Ulrika E. Ault, Note, The FBI's Libray Awareness Program: Is Big Brother
Reading Over Your Shoulder?, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1532, 1550-58 (1990) (arguing that FBI
library monitoring program infringes on First Amendment and privacy rights).
15 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 1317,
1339, 1346,

1348 (1986) [hereinafter COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY].

The

suggestion has been echoed in more measured form by Professors Hawkins and
Zimring. See GORDON HAWKINS & FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, PORNOGRAPHY IN A FREE
SOcIETY 200-05, 208-10 (1988).
16See Playboy Enter. Inc. v. Meese, 639 F. Supp. 581,587 (D.D.C. 1986); ef. United

States v. R. Enter., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 722, 727-29 (1991) (leaving for the lower court
question whether the First Amendment limited broad grandjury subpoena of records
of distributor of sexually oriented books, magazines, and video tapes); Fabulous
Assoc., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n., 896 F.2d 780, 785-88 (3d Cir. 1990)
(successful challenge to the loss of anonymity involved in requirements that sexually
oriented telephone services pre-approve callers); Acorn Inv. Inc. v. City of Seattle, 887
F.2d 219, 225-26 (9th Cir. 1989) (successful challenge to required disclosure of
identities of shareholders in "panorama" adult entertainment center); Carlin
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 837 F.2d 546,557 (2d Cir.) (unsuccessful challenge to
a similar policy), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988); Ellwest Stereo Theater, Inc. v.
Boner, 718 F. Supp. 1553, 1564-70 (M.D. Tenn. 1989) (successful challenge to
required disclosures regarding shareholders in "adult oriented establishments");
Techtow v. City Council, 775 P.2d 227, 230-31 (Nev. 1989) (striking down requirement that massage parlors keep records of lists of patrons available to police); Myrick
v. Board of Pierce County Comm'rs, 677 P.2d 140, 144-45 (Wash. 1984) (same).
17 See University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
18 See, e.g., United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization,
Inc., 487 U.S. 72 (1988) (challenge to discovery request for Catholic Conference's
records); St. German of Ala. E. Orthodox Catholic Church v. United States, 840 F.2d
1087, 1092-94 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that IRS subpoenas of real estate records did
not violate the free exercise clause); Smith v. District Court, 797 P.2d 1244, 1249-50
(Colo. 1990) (holding church not exempt from civil discovery of identity of
contributors under First Amendment); Michigan Dep't of Social Services v. Emmanuel
Baptist Preschool, 455 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Mich. 1990) (finding financial disclosure issue
"unripe for review"); cf. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 31-36 (1984)
(upholding protective order preventing a newspaper from publishing information

1991]

SUNLIGHT, SECRETS, AND SCARLET LETTERS

Reaction to the modem recognition of liberty interests in
reproductive autonomy has occasioned efforts to require disclosure
where criminal regulation is banned. Recent initiatives attempt to
require the disclosure to parents of minors' birth control prescriptions and abortions1 9 and notice to spouses of womens' efforts to
seek abortions. 20 Public identification of abortion providers
21
increasingly subjects them to the threat of organized harassment.
Disclosure is also problematic where informational privacy is
valued for its own sake. In recent Terms, the Court has grappled
with questions arising from dissemination of law enforcement
records, 22 official papers, 23 medical records, 24 and personnel
files. 25 Although not yet before the Court, treatment and testing
concerning religious group membership obtained via discovery); Church of
Scientology Flag Servs. Org., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 756 F. Supp. 1498, 1524-25
(M.D. Fla. 1991) (upholdinga municipal ordinance requiring registration of charitable
organizations against free exercise claims).
'9 See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v.
Heckler, 712 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1983); New York v. Schweiker, 557 F. Supp. 354
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
20 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 24,792 (3d Cir. Oct
21, 1991), petitionfor cert. filed, Nov. 7, 1991. In the interests of full disclosure, I
should note that I am a member of plaintiff's counsel team in this case and that I
advised plaintiff's counsel in earlier litigation, Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 765-68 (1986).
21 See, e.g., Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 765-68; Casey, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 24,792,
at *101.
22 See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 539-41 (1989) (disclosure of rape
victim's name by police); Department ofJustice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of
the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 769-71 (1989) (denying Freedom of Information Act request
for criminal records on the basis of a privacy exception); Boettger v. Loverro, 555
A.2d 1234, 1240 (Pa. 1989) (dissemination of the records of legal wiretaps), vacated
and remandedsub nom., Easton Publishing Co. v. Boettger, 110 S. Ct. 225 (1989), rev'd.
sub nom., Boettger v. Loverro, 587 A.2d 712 (Pa. 1991).
23 See, e.g., FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 631 (1982) (FBI "name check"
summaries of critics of Nixon Administration); United States Dep't of State v.
Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 602 (1982) (identity of U.S. passport holders);
Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 455-65 (1977) (Presidential
papers); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-13 (1976) (police list of shoplifters); cf. CBS,
Inc. v. Block, 725 P.2d 470, 474-76 (Cal. 1986) (applications for handgun permits);
Perkey v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 721 P.2d 50, 53-56 (Cal. 1986) (fingerprints
required for drivers licenses); In re Bagley, 513 A.2d 331, 338 (N.H. 1986) (reports
of child abuse).
24 See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-604 (1977) (records of medical
prescriptions); ef. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 626 n.7
(1989) (noting that drug testing makes data available to the government regarding
individual prescription drug use).
25 See, e.g., Siegert v. Gilley, 111 S. Ct. 1789, 1793-94 (1991) (personnel
recommendations). In a parallel context, the Court has regularly revisited the tension
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for HIV infection is embroiled in controversy over questions of
26
confidentiality and disclosure.

between First Amendment rights and privacy when private entities engage in
dissemination of information. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513,
2519 (1991) (enforcement of confidentiality agreement with news source); Florida
Star, 491 U.S. at 539 (tort action for publication of identity of rape victim); cf. Frisby
v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 479-88 (1988) (holding an ordinance proscribing picketing
outside of private residence not facially invalid).
26 Areas of conflict include:
1) the obligation or prohibition of doctors to report the positive HIV status of
their patients to those they may have infected, see, e.g., Joseph D. Piorkowski, Jr.,
Note, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: AIDS and the Conflicting Physician'sDuties of
PreventingDiseaseTransmissionand SafeguardingConfidentiality,76 GEO. L.J. 169, 17687 (1987); Jill S. Talbot, Note, The ConflictBetween A Doctor's Duty to Warn a Patient's
Sexual Partner that the Patient Has AIDS and a Doctor's Duty to Maintain Patient
Confidentiality, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 355, 357 (1988);
2) requirements to report HIV status to health authorities, see, e.g., New York
State Soc'y of Surgeons v. Axelrod, 555 N.Y.S.2d 911, 912 (App. Div. 1990) (rejecting
medical society's challenge to Health Department decision not to designate HIV
infection as a "communicable sexually transmitted disease," which would require
reporting and contact tracing), aff'd, 572 N.E.2d 605 (N.Y. 1991);Jeff Glenney, Note,
AIDS: A Crisis in Confidentiality,62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1701, 1729-31 (1989) (discussion
of disclosure by public health authorities to partners of HIV positive test results,
contact tracing, and statistical data);
3) the confidentiality obligation of public authorities regarding such information,
see, e.g., Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 382-85 (D.NJ. 1990)
(unjustified police disclosure of HIV positive status to neighbors states cause of action
for violation of constitutional rights of privacy); Rodriguez v. Coughlin, No. CIV-871577E, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15898 (W.D.N.Y.June 2, 1989) (requirement that HIV
positive inmate wear distinctive clothing may violate right to privacy); Doe v.
Coughlin, 697 F. Supp. 1234, 1240-41 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (segregation of inmates with
AIDS may violate right to privacy); Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874, 876-77 (W.D.
Wisc. 1988) (casual disclosure by prison medical service of prisoner's HIV positive
status violated constitutional right of privacy), affrd, 899 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1990); M.
Nicole van Dam, Note, The Scarlet Letter "A.": AIDS in a Computer Society, 10
COMpuTEI/L.J. 233, 241-62 (1990) (discussing problems associated with establishing
data bases regarding seropositive individuals);
4) government efforts to assure confidentiality in private HIV testing, see, e.g.,
Harold Edgar & Hazel Sandomire, Medical PrivacyIssues in the Age of AIDS: Legislative
Options, 16 AM.J.L. & MED. 155, 163-207 (1990); PeterJ. Nanula, Comment, Protecting
Confidentiality in the Effort to Control AIDS, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 315, 329-43 (1987)
(discussing confidentiality in AIDS testing); cf. St. Hilaire v. Arizona Dep't of
Corrections, No. 90-15344, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 11620, at *4-8 (9th Cir. filed May
30, 1991) (rejecting claim by inmate that prison officials were obligated to disclose to
the population the identity ofHIV positive inmates); Doe v. Hirsch, 731 F. Supp. 627,
632-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (constitutional challenge to confidentiality requirement by
policemen who feared infection by blood of dead suspect);
5) the obligation of health care professionals to disclose their own HIV status,
see, e.g., Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 909 F.2d 820, 832-33 (5th
Cir. 1990) (upholding discharge of nurse for failure to disclose the results of HIV test
to employer); Stephen Updegrove, EthicalIssues in the AIDS Crisis: The HIV-Positive
Practitioner,260JAMA 790 (1988);
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The tension between the attraction of sunlight and the fear of
the scarlet letter reflects deep-seated conflicts in our intuitions. We
know that the scarlet letter is a punishment not to be trifled with,
and like justice Brandeis, we consider "the right to be let alone" one
of the prizes of civilization. 27 Yet we also believe, as did Brandeis,
28
that "[s]unlight is ... the best of disinfectants."
The article that follows parses those intuitions. Believing that
constitutional argument is best conducted with an eye on concrete
historical paradigms, I begin by situating the problem of disclosure
in the McCarthy era, when governments at both state and federal
levels sought to use the "spotlight of public opinion" to discourage
activities apparently beyond the reach of direct criminal sanction.
I then map the contours of the scarlet letter by reviewing the
forces that made the McCarthyite efforts efficacious. Section IA is

6) the status of discovery regardingHIV status in litigation, see, e.g., Inmates with
HIV v. Cuomo, No. 90-CV-252, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1488, at "7-11 (N.D.N.Y. Feb.
7, 1991) (ordering discovery of identity of HIV positive inmates, but entering
protective order to prevent dissemination); Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs.,
125 F.R.D. 646, 650 (D.S.C. 1989) (denying both a motion to compel identification
of blood donor and a motion for a "veiled deposition"); Rasmussen v. South Fla.
Blood Serv. Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 534 (Fla. 1987) (denying discovery of identity of
blood donor); Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 554 A.2d 954, 960 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1989) (sealing deposition relating to HIV positive litigants); Peter B. Kunin, Note,
Transfusion-RelatedAIDS Litigation:PermittingLimited Discovey From Blood Donors in
Single Donor Cases, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 927, 942-60 (1991) (discovery of identity of
blood donor in transfusion related litigation); and
7) efforts by rape victims to compel accused rapists to submit to HIV testing, see,
e.g., 2Virgin
Islands v. Roberts, 756 F. Supp. 898 (D.V.I. 1991) (requiring test).
7
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 193 (1890).
28 BRANDEIS, supra note 8, at 92. Shortly after publication of The Right to Privacy,
Brandeis considered writing a "companion piece" on The Duty of Publicity, advancing
the thesis that: "If the broad light of day could be let in upon men's actions, it would
purify them as the sun disinfects." Letter from Louis Brandeis to Alice Goldmark
(Feb. 26, 1891), in 1 LETTERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 100 (Melvin I. Urofsky & David
W. Levy eds., 1971).
Professor Welsh argues that this tension has its roots in the structural
transformations of the Victorian era, which simultaneously made public opinion a
"social force that makes knowledge efficacious" as an engine of reform and made
individual vulnerability to public obloquy an obsession. ALEXANDER WELSH, GEORGE
ELIOT AND BLACKMAIL 66 (1985). Welsh continues:
The power of public opinion counts on literacy, education, and the rise of
information but also ... on shame. No wonder Mill was so concerned to
separate social from private spheres, if the very same forces counted on for
order and progress in society make almost anyone's business of interest to
third parties.
Id. at 208.
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a study of judicial treatment of constitutional challenges to efforts
by government to wield the sanction of exposure. Section IB
analyzes the mechanisms, both official and unofficial, by which
government disclosures affect their victims and evaluates the
objections to recognizing these effects in constitutional analysis. I
argue that courts should neither doubt the impact of informational
sanctions, nor the constitutional relevance of those impacts.
Although the precise effects of disclosure will vary with context, our
liberties are at risk when our constitutional law ignores the power
of information to punish.
The affirmative claims of sunlight, however, cannot be easily
dismissed. Disclosure may improve the choices of those who receive
information, and can be argued to purify the character and choices
of subjects whose actions and views become known. Section II
reviews the liberal and civic republican arguments for disclosure, as
exemplified by the claims advanced during the McCarthy era. Both
theoretical frameworks yield a common conclusion. The attraction
of sunlight is strongest within a relatively narrow set of boundaries:
where the activities disclosed are matters of public trust, where the
prospects of concrete retaliation are small, and where the freedom
of intimate self-definition is not implicated.
In Section III of the article, I close with an analysis of the
available methods of adjusting the tension between the costs and
virtues of disclosure. I argue for three conclusions. First, courts
cannot avoid the tension. Claims that citizens have waived constitutional protection are usually inappropriate. Questions of institutional competence can often be elided by relying on sub-constitutional doctrines and are irrelevant wherever the information at issue
is initially obtained by government coercion. Second, constitutional
rights that protect the formation of identity and private judgment
are entitled to protection against government disclosure regardless
of concrete consequence. Third, courts cannot escape a case by
case adjustment of the tension between the merits of sunlight and
the perils of the scarlet letter in cases involving either constitutionally protected but public activities or intimate facts not associated
with constitutional rights.
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B. The Memory of McCarthyism
Constitutional law is haunted by archetypes. Equal Protection
jurisprudence is shadowed by slavery and Jim Grow; Fourth
Amendment doctrine grapples with the ghosts ofJames Otis and the
writs of assistance; and free speech analysis rings with denunciations
of the Sedition Act. The inherent conservatism of the common law
method is partly responsible; advocates and jurists thirst for
precedent and authoritative "or enlightening analogies. But the
persistence of these images in constitutional law signifies their
deeper roots. We know that the Constitution should be read
through the lens of an evolving tradition, forged by confrontation
29
with specific challenges.
The landmarks by which we guide ourselves in constitutional law
are usually not positive ideals, but the dangers we have identified
and seek to avoid. We define the Constitution as a photographic
negative; its protections are thickest where evils have highlighted
our history.3 0 One element is a tendency to fight the last war, to
"return to controversies that are comfortably settled rather than
attempting to confront the disturbing ambiguities of the present.
But here again, there is a deeper truth to our practice: judges are
better at identifying concrete tyrannies than at elaborating affirmative theories of the good. This truth is attributable not only to the
fact-centered analysis inherent in the common law method, but also
to the reality that, as Edmond Cahn observed, an appeal to a sense
of injustice is more likely to be more broadly compelling than an
effort to complete a definition of the just.3 1 Although American
See; e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storm Lectures: Discoveringthe Constitution,93
YALE L.J. 1013, 1051-57, 1069-72 (1984) (arguing that constitutional argument and
29

interpretation should proceed in light of the lessons of prior "constitutional
moments" in our history that "control the meanings we give to our present
constitutional predicaments"); Vincent Blasi, The PathologicalPerspectiveand the First
Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 460 (1985) (value commitments that should

constitute the core of FirstAmendment doctrine "are those.., forged in the foundry
of political experience," which "tend to be simple, discrete, situation-oriented and
accessible").

SoJustice Scalia is, thus, misguided and misleading in his recent advocacy of a
principle by which traditions of tacit toleration for government practices constitutionally validate those practices. For examples of Scalia's views, see Rutan v. Republican
Party, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2748-49 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Burham v. Superior
Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2118-19 (1990) (plurality opinion); Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
491 U.S. 110, 122-23 (1989) (plurality opinion); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489
U.S. 1, 33 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). History functions best as a warning, rather
than a stamp of approval.
31 See EDMOND N. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE 13-14 (1949); cf. ROBERT C.
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constitutional jurisprudence finds no unanimity in an affirmative
definition of the good society, certain evils are highlighted in our
national experience and acknowledged by consensus. This consensus most legitimately claims the status of fundamental law.
Pursuing this approach, this article frames its analysis of the
scarlet letter problem in concrete terms, focusing on a core instance
of the problem in our history, and tracing the arguments that arise
from it. The activities of SenatorJoseph McCarthy during the 1950s
provide the historical focus.
Senator McCarthy has achieved the status of a negative archetype in contemporary political discourse. In the most recent
presidential campaign, partisans of Governor Dukakis saw the
shadow of McCarthyism in Vice President Bush's denunciation of
his opponent as a "card-carrying member of the ACLU." More
recently, during his confirmation hearing, Justice Clarence Thomas
accused his detractors of activities "far more dangerous than
McCarthyism," 32 while proponents of Professor Anita Hill criticized her attackers for "doing a pretty good imitation ofJoe McCarthy."3 3 McCarthyism has become a term of opprobrium, of classic
political impropriety.
In the judicial arena, Senator McCarthy's image is less clear.
Although the precise targets of his activities have achieved constitutional protection, 4 the judicial status of his methods remain a
matter of equivocation.

SOLOMON, A PASSION FORJusTIcE 299 (1990) (describing the passion forjustice as "a

sensibility that is more fundamental to morality and politics than the intellectual
prominence of the ideologue and the moral superiority of the uninvolved);JUDITH
N. SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICF 8-9 (1990) ("[M]odels ofjustice [do not] offer an
adequate account of injustice because they cling to the groundless belief that we can
know and draw a stable and rigid distinction between the unjust and the unfortunate.");Judith Shklar, Giving Injustice Its Due, 98 YALE L.J. 1135, 1151 (1989) ("No
theory of eitherjustice or injustice can be complete if it does not take account of the
sense of injustice.").
This approach to judicial review is rooted as well in a limited moral pluralism: if
there are many paths to the good, the role of the Constitution is to hold off conceded
evils sufficiently to allow citizens, singly or politically, to shape their own goods.
32 Hearing on Thomas, supra note 1.
33 Richard Cohen, Thomas s Missed Chance, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1991, at A23.
3' Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539, 557-58
(1963), was the first case to turn back an effort to publicly expose Communists.
Ironically, the legacy of McCarthyism in contemporary constitutional law is the
ostracized left's protection from disclosure, which is denied to mainstream political
enterprises. See Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 88
(1982) (striking down requirement that political parties publicly list contributors and
recipients of campaign disbursements, as applied to Socialist Workers Party).
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1. The Political Legacy
The "Red Scare" of whichJoseph McCarthy was emblematic did
not begin with Senator McCarthy's announcement of his antiCommunist crusade in 1950 nor did it end with his censure by the
Senate in 1954. Rooted in international frustrations and increasing
tensions with the Soviet Union following the end of World War
H,35 die-hard opposition to the socialist aspects of the New
Deal, 36 and evidence and charges of Communist espionage in the
past at the national level,37 the resolve to cleanse America of
Communist influence moved to the center of the national stage
when the Republicans took control of the House of Representatives
38
after the 1946 elections.
35 Examples of these frustrations and tensions include the refusal of the Soviet
Union to join the Marshall plan in 1947, the overthrow of the democratically elected
government of Czechoslovakia in 1948, the triumph of Mao in China despite massive
American aid to the Nationalists in 1949, the explosion of a Soviet nuclear device in
1949, and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.
36 See, e.g., RICHARD M. FRIED, NIGHTMARE IN RED: THE McCARTHY ERA IN
PERSPECTIVE 17 (1990) [hereinafter FRIED, NIGHTMARE] ("To critics on the Right, the
New Deal was Communist, Fascist, or both."); MICHAEL P. RoGIN, THE INTELLECTUALS
AND MCCARTHY: THE RADICAL SPECTER 250 (1967) ("Most of those who mobilized
behind McCarthy at the national level were conservative politicians and publicists,
businessmen, and retired military leaders discontented with the New Deal, with
bureaucracy, and with military policy."); see also RICHARD M. FRIED, MEN AGAINST

MCCARTHY 8 (1976) [hereinafter FRIED, MEN AGAINST MCCARTHY] (describingas one

example of this opposition the assertion by the 1944 Republican Vice-Presidential
nominee that Roosevelt and the New Deal were controlled by Communists); MARY S.
MCAULIFFE, CRISIS ON THE LEFT, COLD WAR POLrrMCS AND AMERICAN LIBERALS 19471954, at 28 (1978) (noting that one commentator felt that Truman's loyalty program
was a measure conceived by Republicans to attack the New Deal).
37 Top secret documents were found at Amerasia magazine offices in 1945. See
FRIED, MEN AGAINST MCCARTHY, supra note 36, at 6; ROBERT GRIFFITH, THE POLITICs
OF FEAR: JOSEPH MCCARTHY AND THE SENATE, 35-38 (2d ed. 1987). The next year,

a Canadian investigation revealed widespread Soviet spying in Canada, and by
implication, in the United States. See The Royal Comm'n Appointed Under Order in
Council P.C. 411 of February5, 1946 to Investigate the FactsRelatingto and Circumstances
Surroundingthe Communicationby Pub. Officials and OtherPersons in Positionsof Trust
of Secret and ConfidentialInformation to Agents of a ForeignPower,THE REPORT OF THE
ROYAL COMMISSION (1946). The reports were followed in 1948 by allegations of State
Department penetration by Communist agents, including Alger Hiss, and Hiss's
indictment for perjury. The year 1950 brought Hiss's conviction, revelations of
wartime spying on America's atomic weapons program by American agents of the
Soviet Union, and the prosecution of those agents. See GRIFFITH, supra, at 43-47.
38 Prior investigations of "loyalty" at the federal level and local level had set the
stage. See, e.g., GEORGE H. CALCOTT, MARYLAND AND AMERICA, 1940 TO 1980, at 109

(1985) (noting that Maryland passed the strongest loyalty oath in the country and
compiled lists of its potentially disloyal citizens well before McCarthyism became a
national phenomenon); VERN COUNTRYMAN, UN-AMERICAN ACTIvITIES IN THE STATE
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With many of their members newly elected on platforms of
anticommunism, the Republicans announced their intent to use the
investigations of the House Un-American Activities Committee
(HUAC) to drive Communist sympathizers from the (Democratcontrolled) federal executive branch. In March of 1947, President
Truman responded with a preemptive strike. Truman issued an
executive order setting up an administrative apparatus to examine
the "loyalty" of all government employees. The loyalty boards were
entitled to act upon anonymous accusations, to explore the political
beliefs of employees, and to proceed on evidence gathered by
investigating committees and the FBI. They were to determine
whether "reasonable grounds exist[ed] for belief that the person
involved [was] disloyal to the Government of the United States," a
finding of which would warrant dismissal.39 The Order authorized
the Attorney General to publish an expanded list of "subversive
organizations" connected with Communist activities, 40 with which
a previous "sympathetic affiliation" would constitute prima facie
proof of disloyalty. State governments followed suit with loyalty
investigations of their own. The Defense Department investigated

(1951) (detailing investigations of the Canwell Committee,
established by the state of Washington to monitor allegedly subversive activities);
OF WASHINGTON

FRIED, NIGHTMARE, supra note 36, at 104-08 (discussing anti-Communist activities in
New York, California, Washington, and Oklahoma prior to 1946);JAMES T. SELCRAIG,
THE RED SCARE IN THE MIDWEST 1945-55: A STATE AND LOCAL STUDY 1-86 (1982)
(analyzing the Red Scare in Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Michigan); THE
STATES AND SUBVERSION (Walter Gellhorn ed., 1952) (chronicling government
investigations designed to control disloyal or subversive conduct in California, Illinois,
Maryland, Michigan, New York, and Washington).
For recent discussions of state statutes adopted in the McCarthy era, see James
L. Gibson, Pluralism,Federalismand the Protectionof Civil Liberties, 43 W. POL. Q. 511,
518-20 (1990);James L. Gibson, PoliticalIntoleranceand PoliticalRepressionDuringthe
McCarthy Red Scare, 82 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 511,513-16 (1988). For a discussion of the
pre-1946 history of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, see WALTER
GOODMAN, THE COMMITTEE:
THE EXTRAORDINARY CAREER OF THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES 3-189 (1968).
39 See Exec. Order No. 9835, 3 C.F.R. 627, 630 (1948), reprinted as amended in 5
U.S.C. § 631 (1952). Topics explored by the loyalty boards included attitudes toward
race relations, domestic politics, premarital sex, social theory, and international
affairs. For examples of questions asked by the loyalty boards, see ELEANOR
BoNTECOU, THE FEDERAL LOYALTY-SECURITY PROGRAM 125-42 (1953); Thomas I.
Emerson & David M. Helfeld, Loyalty Among GovernmentEmployees, 58 YALE LJ. 1, 7375 (1948); see also RALPH S. BROWNJR., LOYALTY AND SECURITY: EMPLOYMENT TESTS
IN THE UNITED STATES 21-60 (1958) (discussing loyalty programs for federal civil
servants).
40
The organizations included the National Lawyers Guild and the Washington
Book Club.
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the loyalty of defense contractors, while private industry and some
unions adopted loyalty programs. During the next eight years,
approximately one American worker out of five was subjected to
41
loyalty review programs.
Truman's gambit proved unsuccessful in channeling the antiCommunist concern into administrative forums. In 1947, the
HUAC, under its new Republican chairman, Representative Parnell
Thomas, responded with the first set of a long series of hearings
which made famous the inquiry, "Are you now or have you ever
been a member of the Communist party?" HUAC publicized what
it regarded as "Communist influence" in education, media, industry,
and government by focusing on the past associations of protagonists
in each area. 42 Witnesses were placed under oath and questioned
about their political beliefs and associations, as well as those of their
friends and colleagues. Refusal to respond to such questions left
the witness vulnerable to prosecution for contempt of Congress or
dismissal from employment as an uncooperative witness, a "Fifth
43
Amendment Communist."
41 See FREDJ. COOK, THE NIGHTMARE DECADE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SENATOR
JOE McCARTHY 558 (1971) (noting that the Eisenhower loyalty program affected
approximately 2.5 million federal employees, 3.5 million in the armed forces, 3
million in private industry, and half a million merchant seamen and port workers);
FRIED, NIGHTMARE, supranote 36, at 70-72,92, 140, 173, 181-82 (estimating that 13.5
million employees came under these programs).
42 HUAC's counterpart in the Senate, the Senate Internal Subversion Subcommittee (SISS), established in 1951, pursued similar enterprises. See, e.g., DAVID CAUTE,
THE GREAT FEAR: THE ANTI-CoMMUNIST PURGE UNDER TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER
104-06 (1978) ("InJanuary 1951 the Senate ... established a subcommittee of the
Judiciary Committee ... [which] was the [SISS]," with the intention of rivaling the
HUAC.); M.J. HEALE, AMERICAN ANTICOMMUNISM, COMBATTING THE ENEMY WITHIN
1830-1970, at 158 (1990) ("HUAC remained the instrument of anticommunists in the
lower house, but was joined in 1951 by the [SISS], so that senators too could win
some Communist scalps.").
43 The chair of the HUAC, Parnell Thomas, characterized its activities in this way:
"The chief function of the committee has always been the exposure of unamerican
activities. This is based upon the conviction that the American public will not tolerate
efforts to subvert or destroy the American system of government once such efforts
have been pointed out." 80 CONG. REC. A4604 (1947). The Committee program
sought "to expose and ferret out ... Communist sympathizers in the Federal
Government... [and] to spotlight ... Communists controlling ... vital unions."
HOUSE COMM. ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, 80TH CONG., 2D SESS. INVESTIGATION OF
UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (Comm. Print 1948). See generally
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 133 n.33 (1959) ("The 1954 hearings were
set up by the committee in order to demonstrate to the people of Michigan the fields
of concentration of the Communist Party ... and the identity of the individuals
responsible for its success."); id. at 157-59, 163-68 (Black, J., dissenting) (detailing
Committee's efforts to use exposure as a sanction); CAUTE, supra note 42, at 102-03
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The Committee regularly issued indices of identified "communist sympathizers," which became the basis of formal and informal
blacklists in the public and private sectors. 44 Although Chairman
(detailing efforts to forward names to inquiring employers); HEALE, supranote 42, at
155-61 ("Use of the Fifth Amendment protected witnesses from prison but not from
their employers, and HUAC was soon smugly subpoenaing hostile witnesses, knowing
that their appearance would lose them their jobs.").
The approach was inherited from efforts adopted before World War II. See
SPECIAL COMM. TO INVESTIGATE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES AND PROPAGANDA IN THE
U.S., INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES AND PROPAGANDA, H.R. REP. No.

2, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (1939) ("While Congress does not have the power to deny
to citizens the-right to believe in, teach, or advocate, communism, fascism, and
nazism, it does have the right to focus the spotlight of publicity [on] their activities
44 In addition to providing evidence or proof of disloyalty to government loyalty
boards, defiance of or designation by HUAC meshed with sanctions administered by
the private sector. Between 1949 and 1959, HUAC directly furnished to employers
information on 60,000 persons. See CAUTE, supra note 42, at 102-03. In addition,
private networks disseminated the findings of the Committee. See HEALE, supranote
42, at 139, 156, 170, 173.
In the area of entertainment:
For blacklisting to work, HUAC's hammer needed an anvil. It was duly
provided by other groups who willingly punished hostile or reluctant
witnesses. American Legion publications spread the word about movies
whose credits were fouled by subversion.... [Employers] paid to have the
names of those they might hire for a show or series checked against "the
files." ...
It became habit for Hollywood, radio and TV networks,
advertisers, and stage producers ... not to employ entertainers whose
names cropped up in ... [those] files.
FRIED, NIGHTMARE, supra note 36, at 156-57; see also LARRY CEPLAIR & STEVEN
ENGLUND, THE INQUISITION IN HOLLYWOOD: POLITICS IN THE FILM COMMUNITY 193060, at 161-73, 210-20 (1983) (detailing blacklisting practices in the radio, television,
and motion picture industries); GOODMAN, supra note 38, at 218-25, 376-86
(describing interaction between HUAC procedures and entertainment blacklist,
noting that American Federation of Television and Radio Artists authorized sanctions
against members who failed to cooperate with HUAC); VICTOR S. NAVAsKY, NAMING
NAMES 84 (1980) (noting that after 1951, "the blacklist became institutionalized. No
Hollywood Communist or ex-[Communist] who had ever been accused, or called to
testify, or refused to sign a studio statement would get work in the business-at least
under his own name-unless he went through the ritual of naming names."); id. at 8596 (describing blacklist); id. at 321-22 (hearings and indices of HUAC "alerted the
free-lance blacklisters, who functioned as the enforcement arm"); RICHARD H. PELLS,
THE LIBERAL MIND IN A CONSERVATIVE AGE 302-09 (1985) (describing the process by
which HUAC provided a "forum in which an individual could choose either to absolve
himself of all radical heresies ... or suffer banishment to an indefinite blacklist");
Harold W. Horowitz, Legal Aspects of "PoliticalBlack Listing" in the Entertainment
Industy, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 263 (1956) (discussing the various legal positions of an
employee accused of having affiliations with the Communist Party, under employment
law, defamation law, and the law of unprivileged interference with business relations).
In the field of higher education, "almost 20 percent of the witnesses called before
congressional and state investigating committees were college teachers or graduate
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Thomas ultimately left Congress in 1948, six years before the fall of
Senator Joseph McCarthy, HUAC and its imitators continued their
efforts with substantial effect through the mid-1950s. They were
aided and applauded by large newspaper chains, the American
Legion, the Catholic Church, and large numbers of concerned
45
citizens for whom radical associations were a sign of disloyalty.
As one commentator observed,
it helps to view McCarthyism as a process ....
First the objectionable groups and individuals were identified [through] a
committee hearing, for example, or an FBI investigation....
Then, they were punished, usually by being fired.... In most

students. Most of those academic witnesses who did not clear themselves with the
committees lost theirjobs." ELLEN W. ScHREcKER, No IVORY TOWER: McCARTHYISM
AND THE UNIVERSITIES 10 (1986); see also id. at 126-307 (describing academic
imposition of sanctions and blacklist); LIONEL S. LEWIS, COLD WAR ON CAMPUS: A
STUDY OF THE POLITICS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL 49 (1988) ("Over 60 percent
of the [academic dismissal] cases were occasioned when individuals were called before
some governmental body to give testimony about their knowledge of or contributions
or connection to communist influence on education.").
45 See, e.g., Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702, 709-10 & n.7 (1966) (reversing
conviction for refusal to testify at 1955 HUAC hearings, described by chair as part of
a "plan for driving Reds out of important industries," because once exposed, "loyal
Americans who work with them will do the rest of the job"); Russell v. United States,
369 U.S. 749, 767 (1962) (detailing 1955 and 1956 investigations by SISS into alleged
Communist influence in the press); GOODMAN, supra note 38, at 367-98 (discussing
subpoenas of 1956, including that of folk singer Pete Seeger, who was a popular
figure in "popular front" activities and was subsequently blacldisted for a decade).
In some areas, the efforts at the state level to expose Communist sympathizers
lasted past the end of the decade. See, e.g., DeGregory v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S.
825, 828-30 (1966) (overturning conviction obtained in 1964 prosecution for failure
to respond to questions about Communist activities in early 1950s); Uphaus v.
Wyman, 364 U.S. 388, 389 (1960) (New Hampshire successfully continues confinement of director of World Fellowship Camp who refuses to disclose guest register
from early 1950s); cf Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 480-86 (1965) (striking down
statutory authorizations of general searches to discover "books, records, pamphlets,
cards, receipts, [and] lists" showing Communist affiliation).
The FBI participated in, and on some accounts instigated, these enterprises, both
executive and legislative. With the waning of the official activities of HUAC, the FBI
entered a phase of engaging in active dissemination of information regarding leftists
in its COINTELPRO program, which began in 1956. For a description of later FBI
activities under the COINTELPRO and COMINFIL programs, see FEANKJ. DONNER,
AGE OF SURVEILLANCE: THE AIMS AND METHODS OF AMERICA'S POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM 177-240 (1980) (discussing disclosures to news media and to
employers); see also KENNETH O'REILLY, HOOVER AND THE UN-AMERICANS: THE FBI,
HUAC AND THE RED MENACE 194-229 (1983) (discussing counterintelligence and
HUAC); RICHARD G. POWERS, SECRECY AND POWER: THE LIFE OFJ. EDGAR HOOVER

340, 341 (1987) (detailing anonymous telephone calls to prevent renting of halls and
the release of information about alleged Communist participants in marches and
rallies).
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cases it was a government agency which identified the culprits and
46
a private employer which fired them."
The McCarthy apparatus did not touch everyone, but for those
who ran afoul of it the impact was brutal. Even citizens who were
not called before loyalty boards or investigating committees felt
what would later be called a "chilling effect." In 1954, as Senator

McCarthy's power began to wane, a national opinion survey found
that 41% of a national sample felt that "some [or all] people do not

feel as free to say what they think as they used to," although only
13% said they personally were chilled. 47 In 1955, among a national sample of academic social scientists, 36% stated that their

colleagues were less willing to express unpopular views in the
community than they had been seven years earlier, while 22% said
that they themselves had refrained from expressing controversial

opinions. 48 When investigating committees explored the petitions
witnesses signed and the parties they attended 20 years earlier, a

46 SCHRECKER, supra note 44, at 9. Support for this analysis also comes from
Senator McCarthy and his admirei-s. See JOSEPH MCCARTHY, MCCARTHYISM: THE
FIGHT FOR AMERICA 2-100 (1952); William F. Buckley, Jr. & L. Brent Bozell, The
Question of Conformity, in THE MEANING OF MCCARTHYISM 41, 55 (Earl Latham ed:, 2d
ed. 1973) ("The McCarthyites are doing their resourceful best to make our society
inhospitable to Communists, fellow-travellers, and security risks in the government
... [by] conducting operations on two fronts: (1) they seek to vitalize existing legal
sanctions and (2) they seek to harden existing anti-Communist prejudices and channel
them into effective social sanctions.").
47 SAMUEL A. STOUFFER, COMMUNISM, CONFORMITY, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: A
CROSS-SECTION OF THE NATION SPEAKS ITS MIND 78-80 (1955). Among community
leaders, 48% felt that some or all of the country was chilled, and 13% felt chilled
themselves. See id. From 1948 to 1954, the proportion of Americans who felt that
'most people can be trusted" dropped from 66% to 62%, but among Jewish
respondents, the drop was from 71% to 57% and black trust went from 39% to 31%.
See id. at 86-87.
At the time of the Stouffer study, 34% of Americans in another national sample
expressed qualified or strong approval for Senator McCarthy. See id. at 231. Six
months earlier, approval for McCarthy was at the level of 60% among those
expressing an opinion in a Gallup survey. See FRED I. GREENSTEIN, THE HIDDEN
HAND PRESIDENCY: EISENHOWER As LEADER 201 (1982).
In 1950, the American Bar Association recommended that legislators be required
to take loyalty oaths, and in 1951 the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) adopted
an amendment to its constitution banning Communists from holding ACLU office.
See HEALE,
supra note 42, at 148-49.
48
See PAUL F. LAZARSFELD & WASNER THIELENS, JR., THE ACADEMIC MIND:
SOCIAL SCIENTISTS IN A TIME OF CRISIS 78, 195 (1958). In addition, the survey results
indicated that 27% worried that political opinions might affect job security, 9% had
toned down writing to avoid controversy, and 20% felt that their colleagues were less
willing to express unpopular political views in the classroom than seven years earlier.
See id. at 76, 78, 194.
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citizen avoided risks by keeping her head down.
For purposes of this article, the striking thing about the
enterprise which Senator McCarthy embodied was that it achieved,
strictly through the use of information, a substantial impact on
citizens' lives, the discourse of the republic, and the exercise of the
First Amendment rights of speech, belief, and association.
Conventional criminal sanctions ultimately were invoked against
active members of the Communist Party itself. Fellow travelers and
former members, however, were not prosecuted in their own right
unless they refused to reveal information. Official loyalty dismissals
were often predicated on previous disclosures, and were themselves
effective intimidation because of the stigma that would attach. The
sanctions at the command of Senator McCarthy, and his precursors
and imitators, were primarily the ability to obtain and publish
information.
The use of the "method of exposure" 49 as a sanction against
activities shielded from more direct intervention was neither
inadvertent nor unprecedented. A generation earlier, when Louis
Brandeis touted the virtues of sunlight as a disinfectant, 50 progressives pursued public disclosure as a mechanism to reach fields
barred from direct regulation by prevailing canons of dual federal51
ism or insufficient legislative support.
49 The phrase appears to have originated in efforts to suppress native fascist
movements before World War Il. See Institute of Living Law, CombattingTotalitarian
Propaganda,The Method of Exposure, 10 U. CH. L. REV. 107, 108-09 (1943).
50 See BRANDEIS, supra note 8, at 92.
5' See, e.g., SEYMOUR M. LIPSET & EARL RAAB, THE PoLITICs OF UNREASON:
RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN AMERICA, 1790-1977, at 214-15 (2d ed. 1978) (discussing
liberal use of congressional committees "to foster an antibusiness and anticonservative
climate of opinion"); Louis B. Boudin, Congressionaland Agency Investigations: Their
Uses and Abuses, 35 VA. L. REv. 143, 145-48 (1949) (detailing liberal defense of and
conservative attack on investigations during the 1920s and 1930s); Milton Handler,
The Constitutionalityof Investigationsby the FederalTrade Commission: I, 28 COLUM. L.
REV. 708,708 (1928) ("Control is exercised through the reflex effects of an informed
public opinion educated by the publications of the fact-gathering agency.").
Brandeis praised the Money Trust investigations as informing the public, but he
was not insensitive to the usefulness of hearings as a method of punishing
wrongdoers in the court of public opinion. See BRANDEIS, supra note 8, at 98, 104-05;
see also THOMAS K. McCRAw, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 90-91 (1984) (describing
Brandeis's use of press leaks, combined with public cross-examination, in the
Ballinger-Pinchot affair).
Senator Hugo Black was also an enthusiastic practitioner of the method of
exposure as a means "to restrain the activities of powerful groups who can defy every
other power." Hugo L. Black, Inside a Senate Investigation, 172 HARPER'S MAG. 275,
286 (1936); see also JAMES F. SIMON, THE ANTAGONISTS: HUGO BLACK, FELIx
FRANKFURTER AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN MODERN AMERICA 87-96 (1989) (detailing
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In the years before World War H, registration and disclosure of
the identity and activities of foreign agents were promoted as a
"democratic way ...
of destroying the poison of totalitarian
propaganda." 52 The "spotlight of pitiless publicity" 53 directed
through the lenses of the Voorhis Anti-Propaganda Act5 4 and the
Foreign Agents Registration Act5 5 was thought to provide a
mechanism for suppressing antidemocratic propaganda without
overstepping the bounds of the First Amendment.
When the principle was taken up and expanded upon by the
congressional -investigators of the post-war era the result was
McGarthyism. In its full flower, the evils of the "method of
exposure" were at least three-fold: the arbitrary and uncontrolled
imposition of disabilities on citizens subjected to compelled
disclosure, the substantive impact of exposure on individual exercise
of constitutionally protected rights of speech, thought, and
association, and the constraint on public thought and discourse
from the fear of public investigation of private or long-buried
beliefs and associations.
2. The Judicial Heritage
Despite these widely conceded evils, the courts never forthrightly repudiated Senator McCarthy's enterprise. During the early years
of the Red Scare that bears his name, judicial response to the loyalty
crusade began as sympathetic endorsement. 56
When judicial
Senator Black's uses of publicity as a sanction).
52 Institute of Living Law, supra note 49, at 107-08; see also Bruce L. Smith,
DemocraticControl of PropagandaThrough Registrationand DisclosureI, 6 PUB. OP. Q.
27,30 (1942) (explaining the importance to American democracy of allowing both a
balance of popular discussion and "[t]he development of administrative agencies for
disclosing to the average voters the real affiliations of influential propagandists").
53 S. REP. No. 1783, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938); H.R. REP. No. 1381, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937). The "pitiless publicity" language may have originated with
Senator Hugo Black. See Black, supranote 51, at 275,286 ("[Slpecial privilege thrives
in secrecy and darkness and is destroyed by the rays of pitiless publicity.").
5 Pub. L. No. 870, 54 Stat. 1201 (1940) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2836 (1988))
(requiring
registration of certain organizations subject to foreign control).
5
Pub. L. No. 319, 53 Stat. 1244 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 611 (1988)). See Viereck
v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1943) (construing Act); BONTECOU, supra note
39, at 164 & n.26 (noting that the Act required "the registration of groups engaged
in political propaganda on behalf of a foreign principal or acting under its order or
direction").
56 For one classic sample of this sympathy, see Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d
49 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 934 (1950), in which the court stated:
No one can doubt in these chaotic times that the destiny of all nations
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enthusiasm cooled, successful challenges to McCarthyite tactics were
couched in terms of opposition to their procedure, rather than their
substance. Statutes requiring disclosure of political activities were
construed narrowly in light of First Amendment values, 57 efforts
to brand "Communist front organizations" were held to be problematic because they lacked due process, 58 and legislative efforts at
59
regulation by disclosure, when they were subject to challenge,
were turned aside only because they lacked explicit congressional
authorization. 60 Even after the public tide had turned against
McCarthy, "abuses" were held legally improper because they had
been undertaken without adequate legislative mandate, or because
61
they-punished without adequate warning.
Such oblique approaches may well have reflected institutional
wisdom. They may have protected the Court from direct confrontation with Congress 62 by couching libertarian results in less controhangs in the balance in the current ideological struggle between communistic-thinking and democratic-thinking peoples of the world.... [I]t is absurd
to argue, as these appellants do, that questions asked men who, by their
authorship of scripts, vitally influence the ultimate production of motion
pictures seen by millions, which questions require disclosure of whether or
not they are or ever have been Communists, are not pertinent questions.
Id. at 53; see also Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 273 (D.C. Cir.) (Edgerton, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the majority's holding that Congress has the power to elicit
answers regarding whether a witnesses is "a believer in Communism or a member of
the Communist Party"), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948); United States v.Josephson,
165 F.2d 82, 92 (2d Cir.) (stating that "Congressional power to investigate [the
affiliations of individuals] is as flexible as its power to legislate"), cert. denied, 333 U.S.
838 (1948). But see In re United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, 111 F. Supp.
858, 869-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (upbraiding the government for using grand jury
presentment to smear union).
57 See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618 (1954).
58 SeeJoint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 142-43 (1951)
(Black, J., concurring); cf. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 214-15 (1957)
(holding a contempt conviction invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, but refusing to "prevent the Congress ... from obtaining any
information it needs for the proper fulfillment of its role").
59 See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-75 (1951) (finding absolute
immunity for legislative investigations against damage action for violation of
constitutional rights).
60 See United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 46-48 (1953).
61 See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 254 (1957); Watkins, 354 U.S. at
208-09.
62 That such a confrontation was in the air should not be doubted. In 1958
Congress came within a few votes of passing a statute limiting the power of the
Supreme Court to construe statutes as preempting state regulation, and removing
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in certain internal security cases. See DONALD
MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION:

A STUDY OF RESPONSIBILITY 269-91
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versial values that could mobilize broader support. It is far from
clear, however, that skeptical pupils in the national seminar fully
grasped their tutor's distinction between protecting Communists
and fellow travelers from unfair procedures and standing in the way
of the national crusade against Communism on the merits.
Whatever the popular reaction, the decisions were not a condemnation of McCarthyism that could be carried into other fields.
Judicial ambivalence, embodied in ad hoc balancing, characterized the response to the echoes of McCarthy-style inquiries after the

height of the McCarthy era passed. 63

The balancing approach

(1966); C. HERMAN PR1TCHETT, CoNGREss VERSUS THE SUPREME COURT: 1957-60, at

72-85, 96-106 (1961).

63 The balancing approach hardly charted a straight course. The Court
invalidated compulsory disclosure of NAACP membership lists because of the absence
of a "compelling and subordinating interest" in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449, 463-66 (1958), and Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524-28 (1960).
In the interim, disclosure of the list of guests at the World Fellowship Summer Camp
in New Hampshire was upheld because of the "compelling" interest of the state of
New Hampshire in "self-preservation." Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 81 (1959).
The Uphaus Court also distinguished Sweezy on the somewhat narrow ground that
"World Fellowship is neither a university nor a political party." Id. at 77. Inquiries
regarding membership which would have been dubious regarding the Progressive
Party were held appropriate in respect to membership in the Communist Party. See
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 129 (1959).
The inchoate prospect of private retaliation was enough to raise successful First
Amendment objections to requirements that teachers disclose membership in the
NAACP, see Sheton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-87 (1960), and that handbills in
support of equal employment opportunity carry the name of their author, see Talley
v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960). Yet the "public opprobrium and obloquy which
may attach to an individual listed with the Attorney General as a member of a
Communist-action organization" was outweighed by the "danger[s] inherent in
concealment" of American Communists, who probably numbered under 10,000 at the
time. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367
U.S. 1, 102-03 (1961); cf. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961)
(holding that State can deny bar admission to applicant refusing to answer relevant
questions). At the same time, the exigencies of the search for hidden Communists
were insufficient to justify public inquiry into the membership of the Miami branch
of the NAACP. See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539,
550-57 (1963).
These cases brought the first flowering of the extensive academic discussion of
balancing as ajudicial technique, reflecting the high-pitched dialogue between justice
Black and Justice Frankfurter on the issue. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A
GENERAL THEORY OFTHE FIRST AMENDMENT 53-56 (1966); Laurent B. Frantz, The First
Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); Laurent B. Frantz, Is the First
Amendment Law?-A Reply to ProfessorMendelson, 51 CAL. L. REV. 729 (1963); Charles
Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme Court'sBalancingTest,
76 HARV. L. REV. 755 (1963); Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First
Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CAL. L. REv. 821 (1962); Charles A. Reich, Mr.
Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARv. L. REV. 673, 737-44 (1963).
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continues to frame analysis of recent exposure problems. 64 Long
after any political necessity for delicacy has faded, the image of
Senator McCarthy's crusade remains out of focus. Judicial reticence
regarding McCarthy's legacy is not so much a matter of inherited
delicacy as it is a reflection of the deep-seated conflicts that form
the focus of the next sections.
I.

THE STING OF THE SCARLET LETTER:

DISCLOSURE AS

AN EFFECTIVE SANCTION

Any discussion of the use of information as a sanction runs
aground initially on the wisdom of childhood: "Sticks and stones
can break my bones but words can never hurt me." Whatever the
views of Shakespearian villains, 65 a strong undercurrent of modern
culture situates cognizable harm only in the physical realm. Thus,
reluctance to place McCarthyite exposure in the rogues gallery of
constitutional paradigms that call forth condemnation may reflect
an intuition that the sanction of disclosure is no sanction at all.
Professor Epstein observes in a related context: "False words are
the weak sidekick of force-presumptively bad in themselves, though
64 See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 91-98
(1982) (balancing the government's interest in disclosure of political party contributors against the individual's right to associate with a political organization in private);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 60-84 (1976) (same); cf Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465,
480-83 (1987) (balancing the state's interest in disclosing the identity of a person
engaged in political propaganda on behalf of foreign powers against an individual's
First Amendment rights); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 765-68 (1986) (balancing a woman's right to end her
pregnancy in private against the state's interest in gathering health-related
information).
65 In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990), Chief Justice
Rehnquist quoted eight lines from lago's speech regarding the observation that
"'good name ... [i]s the immediate jewel of [the) soul.'" Id. at 2702 (quoting
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act III, sc. 3, lines 155-56 (W.J. Craig ed. 1905)).
This seems to be a step forward both from ChiefJustice Rehnquist's casual attitude
toward reputation in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-10 (1976) (holding that
inclusion of plaintiff's name in list of "active shoplifters" disseminated by police
without notice or a hearing was not a violation of the Due Process Clause), and his
taste in literature in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 424 (1989) (Rehnquist, CJ.,
dissenting) (quoting at length from John Greenleaf Whittier's poem "Barbara
Frietchie").
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True words, one could claim, hold less

This skepticism, which underlay the early reluctance of federal
judges to intervene in McCarthyite investigations, recurs in modern
judicial approaches to constitutionally shadowed disclosure. Upon
close examination, however, initial doubts concerning disclosure's
impact, or the legitimacy of such impacts, do not militate against
judicial review of informational sanctions. Rather, careful exploration of the societal context of disclosure and the theoretical
structure of the rights endangered becomes a necessaryjudicial task.
A. DoctrinalDoubts
1. The McCarthy Era
The first major post-war challenges to HUAG foundered in part
on judicial skepticism regarding the theory "that the investigation
of Un-American or subversive propaganda impairs in some way not
entirely clear the freedom of expression guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights." 6 3 One panel regarded it as "doubtful" that the witness
had shown that "the free exercise of his rights has been impaired in
66

Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Property Rights, and Misrepresentations,12 GA. L.

REv. 455, 466 (1978); cf. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 159

(William Peden ed., Univ. of N.C. Press 1954) (1787) ("[I]t does me no injury for my
neighbor to say there are twenty gods, or no god. It neither picks my pocket nor
breaks my leg.").
67 Cf Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J.) (The line
of permissible First Amendment conduct falls "between the disparagement of ideas
... and the suppression of ideas through the exercise or threat of state power. If the
latter is rigorously proscribed, the former can hold no terror." (citation omitted)),
cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986).
A similar position has been unsuccessfully urged in cases involving the
Establishment Clause such as County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989):
Absent coercion, the risk of infringement of religious liberty by passive or
symbolic accommodation is minimal .... The creche and the menorah are
purely passive symbols of religious holidays. Passersby who disagree with
the message conveyed by these displays are free to ignore them, or even to
turn their backs, just as they are free to do when they disagree with any
other form of government speech.
Id. at 662-64 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also
American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 132 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Easterbrook,J., dissenting) ("Speech is not coercive; the listener may do as he likes.
We must distinguish threats from shadows.").
68 United States v.Josephson, 165 F.2d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S.
838 (1948).
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some way." 69 A second court noted an argument that "fear of, or
distaste for ... unpopularity" would inhibit "the most timid and
sensitive," and observed that public voting, before the introduction
of the secret ballot in the late nineteenth century, "subjected even
the most hardy to pressure and also to violence. But it was never
thought, or suggested, that public voting violated constitutional
rights." 70 Two Justices joined Justice Reed in maintaining that the
promulgation of a list of "Communist-action" organizations by the
Attorney General did not constitute an abridgement of the First
Amendment rights of organizations so listed: "They are in the
position of every proponent of unpopular views. Heresy induces
strong expressions of opposition. So long as petitioners are
permitted to voice their political ideas.., it is hard to understand
how any advocate of freedom of expression can assert that their
71
right has been unconstitutionally abridged."
These hesitations were understandable, for being pilloried in the
press as a "Communist dupe" is a far cry from being lined up
against the wall and shot as a traitor. Indeed, the wide reliance on
informational sanctions rather than criminal ones in the McCarthy
period was in part a testimony to the degree to which ideals of free
speech and belief retained a hold on the body politic as well as the
executive and judicial branches of government. Even at the height
of the McCarthy phenomenon, America remained a reasonably wellordered liberal society. It was in part because the executive was
reluctant to prosecute and courts were wary of punishing "UnAmerican" thoughts that congressional investigators turned to
publicity as a sanction. Still, to admit that the sanction was not
draconian should not suggest that it was ineffective.
During the McCarthy era, the argument that government
disclosures themselves caused no cognizable impact on First
Amendment freedoms quickly crumbled under the impact of the
political realities outside of the courtroom. 72 First, the Court
69 Id.
70 Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 249 & n.28 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334

U.S.71843 (1948).
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 200 (1951) (Reed,

J., dissenting); cf Buckley & Bozell, supranote 46, at 51 ("The traditional view among
libertarians has always been that freedom tends to be maximized for both majorities
and minorities, and thus for society in general, if social sanctions are preferred to
legal72 ones.").
justice Black's experiences with the power of "pitiless publidty" as an
investigating Senator, see SIMON, supra note 51, at 95; Black, supra note 51, at 286,
may well have been sharpened by the experiences of his sister, Virginia Foster Durr,
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acknowledged in dicta that "[u]nder some circumstances, indirect
'discouragements' undoubtedly have the same coercive effect upon
the exercise of First Amendment rights as imprisonment, fines,
injunctions, or taxes. A requirement that adherents of particular
...
political parties wear identifying arm-bands ... is obviously of
[that] nature." Ts The next year, the Court's majority joined in
Justice Frankfurter's conclusion that "[i]t would be blindness.., not
to recognize that in the conditions of our time . .. designation [as
a Communist-front organization] drastically restricts the organization[], if it does not proscribe [it]." 74
By 1957, as the shadow of Senator McCarthy began to fade, only
Justice Clark dissented from the proposition that
[t]he mere summoning of a witness and compelling him to testify
... about his beliefs, expressions or associations is a measure of
governmental interference. And when those forced revelations
concern matters that are unorthodox, unpopular, or even hateful
to the general public, the reaction in the life of the witness may be
disastrous .... Nor does the witness alone suffer the consequences. Those who are identified by witnesses and thereby placed in
the same glare of publicity are equally subject to public stigma,
75
scorn and obloquy.
Since then, Justices have remarked regularly upon the efficacy
of public hostility as a means of suppressing the exercise of
constitutional rights. 7 6 The legacy of the McCarthy era was

and his brother-in-law, Clifford Durr, as victims of McCarthyism. See VIRGINIA F.
DuRR, OUTSIDE THE MAGIC CIRCLE 254-73 (Hollinger F. Barnard ed., 1985)
(describing the social stigma resulting from a SISS investigation); FRIED, NIGHTMARE,
supra note 36, at 177-78 (describing investigation of the Durrs by SISS).
7s American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950).
74

joint Anti-FascistRefugee Comm., 341 U.S. at 161 (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
see also id. at 158 ("Publicity and meeting places have become difficult ... to
obtain....
denied ....

[T]ax exemptions ... have been revoked ... licenses ... have been
[T]he organizations assert [that they] lost supporters and members,

especially from present or prospective federal employees."); United States v. Rumely,
345 U.S. 41,44 (1953) ("[W]e would have to be that 'blind' Court, against which Mr.
Chief Justice Taft admonished ... that does not see what 'all others can see and
understand' not to know that there is wide concern ... over some aspects of the
exercise of the congressional power of investigation." (citation omitted)).
75 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197 (1957), see also Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 248 (1957) ("The sanction emanating from legislative
investigations is of a different kind than loss of employment. But the stain of the
stamp of disloyalty is just as deep. The inhibiting effect in the flow of democratic
expression... is equally grave.").
76

See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476

U.S. 747, 767 (1986) ("[R]eporting requirements raise the specter of public exposure
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illuminated by the potential for private suppression manifest in the
civil rights struggles of the 1950s and 1960s. The two combined to
fix in the judicial consciousness the destructive power of exposure
as a sanction. Courts have realized that words lead to sticks and
77
stones; both physical and social sanctions form legal reality.

and harassment of women who choose to exercise their ... right ... to end a

pregnancy."); Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 98
(1982) ("risk of harassment" of contributors to minority party); Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622, 645-47 (1979) (plurality opinion) (parental bypass procedure must be
completed with anonymity); id. at 655 (Stevens,J., concurring) (a right "to make the
abortion decision... maybe exercised without public scrutiny and in defiance of the
... opinion of ... third parties"); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 117 (1976)

(woman may be chilled from asserting her own rights in abortion suit "by a desire to
protect the very privacy of her decision from the publicity of a court suit");
Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S.
1, 143 & n.20 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (disclosure is "part of a pattern of
suppression" and makes it "almost impossible to get or retain employment"); Talley
v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) ("no doubt that such... requirement would tend
to restrict freedom to distribute information"); id. at 67 (Harlan, J., concurring)
(identification requirement is likely to have a "deterrent effect on free speech"); Bates
v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523-24 (1960) (compelled disclosure of NAACP
membership would work a significant interference with the freedom of association by
virtue of "fear of community hostility and economic reprisals"); Uphaus v. Wyman,
360 U.S. 72, 84 (1959) (Brennan,J., dissenting) ("[I]n an era of mass communications
...[and] international tensions.., exposure and group identification by the state of
those holding unpopular and dissident views are fraught with such serious
consequences for the individual as inevitably to inhibit seriously the expression of
views which the Constitution intended to make free."); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) ("[C]ompelled disclosure of affiliation with
groups engaged in advocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on freedom of
association as [taxes or punishments].").
77 This is not to say that the argument against recognizing the impact of exposure
is not still made, but simply that it is a loser. Cf.Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744
F. Supp. 1323, 1385 n.41 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that "any statute which requires a
physician to notify a third party of a woman's abortion decision is, as a matter of law,
a constitutionally significant burden on a woman's right to an abortion.... It would
be disingenuous for the Commonwealth to claim that any burden.. is not the result
of state action."), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 24,792 (3d Cir.
Oct 21, 1991), petitionfor cert. filed, Nov. 7, 1991; Planned Parenthood v. Board of
Medical Review, 598 F. Supp. 625, 636-37 (D.R.I. 1984) (rejecting the defendant's
contention "that even if forced notification [to] the husband of the wife's decision to
have an abortion] results in the husband taking action to delay or frustrate his wife's
decision to proceed with an abortion, that the burden is not imposed by the law
itself").
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2. The Modern Split: The Necessity of Concrete Impacts

Although judges have not returned to the skepticism of the early
McCarthy era, the degree to which adverse effects must be proved,
as the prerequisite to judicial scrutiny, has divided courts. One
group of cases simply assumes the deterrent effect of disclosure.
Analysis then proceeds strictly in terms of the persuasiveness of
78
governmental justifications. Thus, in Talley v. California, though
the dissenters observed that the record was "barren of any claim,
much less proof, that [the Plaintiff] will suffer any injury whatever
by identifying the handbill with his name," 79 Justice Black's
opinion for the Court proclaimed: "There can be no doubt that
such an identification requirement would tend to restrict freedom
to distribute information" by the National Consumer Mobilization.80 In another such case, Shelton v. Tucker,8 1 the dissenters
pointed out that the statute in question did not authorize the
publication of the associations to which Arkansas public school
teachers "belonged,8 2 while the majority found the fear of disclosure "neither theoretical nor groundless," and observed that even
in the absence of disclosure "pressure . . . to avoid any ties which
might displease those who control his professional destiny would be
constant and heavy."8 3 Most recently, in Thornburgh v. American

78 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
79 Id. at 69 (Clarke, J., dissenting).
80 Id. at 64; see also Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301,307 (1965) (striking
down a requirement that addressees of "communist political propaganda" affirmatively request delivery, and holding that "this requirement is almost certain to have a
deterrent effect," because "any addressee is likely to feel some inhibition in sending
for literature which federal officials have condemned as 'communist political
propaganda'").
81364 U.S. 479 (1960).
82 See id. at 491 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 499 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) ("[I]f it turns out that this statute is abused . . . by an unwarranted
publicizing of the required associational disclosures.., we would have a different
kind of case .... ").
83 Id. at 486; see also DeGregory v. Attorney Gen. of N.H., 383 U.S. 825, 828-29
(1966) (striking down conviction for failure to reveal "political associations of an
earlier day" and stating that "exposure ... is objectionable and damaging in the
extreme to one whose associations and political views do not command majority
approval"); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539,544,55556 (1963) (holding that the First Amendment "encompasses protection of privacy of
association in organizations such as [the NAACP]").
A three-judge court protected the financial records of the Arkansas Republican
Party in 1968, despite the absence of record evidence of deterrent effect, on the
ground that disclosure of the identities of contributors would "subject at least some
of them to potential economic or political reprisals of greater or lesser severity" and
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College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,84 the Court, relying on

Talley, struck down a statute requiring the public reporting of the
age, race, marital status, and political subdivision of residence,
though not the name, of women who obtained abortions in
Pennsylvania. Despite a contrary district court finding, the Supreme
Court held that the requirements "raise the specter of public
exposure and harassment of women who choose to exercise their
personal, intensely private, right.., to end a pregnancy," and hence
pose "an unacceptable danger of deterring the exercise of that
85
right."
On the other side of the fence, recent applications of the
disclosure doctrine in the realm of free speech manifest skepticism
"well may tend to discourage both membership and contributions." Pollard v.
Roberts, 283 F. Supp. 248,258 (E.D. Ark. 1967) (panel included Blackmun, J.), aff'd
per curiam, 393 U.S. 14 (1968); cf. United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion
Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 75 (1988) (noting that Catholic Conference
resisted discovery into its political activities, which were alleged to have violated tax
exemption limitations, on grounds that it could not "in conscience, comply with the
subpoenas in question"); Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20,38 (1984) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (Aquarian Foundation is entitled, despite protections of free speech,
to prohibition of private disclosure of information obtained in discovery on basis of
"interests in privacy and religious freedom," withouta discussion of the substance for
claims of oppression).
84 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
85 Id.
at 767-68. Indeed, it was precisely the conclusion that the "specter" of
disclosure was sufficient to strike down the statute that provoked the dissenters:
I can accept the proposition that a statute whose purpose and effect are
to allow harassment and intimidation of citizens for their constitutionally
protected conduct is unconstitutional, but... striking down the ... statute
on this basis is...
indefensible.
[The majority did not have a sufficient basis] for a conclusive
finding on the complex question of the motive and effect of the reporting
requirements and the adequacy of the statute's protection of the anonymity
of doctors and patients.
Id. at 805 (White, J., dissenting).
In the cognate area of parental consent and notification regarding abortions for
pregnant minors, a plurality of the Court held in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622
(1979), that exemptions from such requirements must be provided by judicial
procedures that"assure... anonymity" without any concrete showing that disclosure
would tangibly harm the minors in question. Id. at 644. Most recently, in Ohio v.
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990), a majority of the Court held
that anonymity was not required where the identity of the minor requesting an
abortion was to be "kept confidential," and disclosure was criminally punishable. See
id. at 2979. The dissent by Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall took the
position that the possibility of unauthorized disclosure of the required statements of
identity was enough to render the statute unconstitutional. See id at 2991 (Blackmun,
J. dissenting).

32

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 140: 1

regarding the reality of disclosure-based deterrence. These cases
demand affirmative and concrete showings of adverse impact. In
Buckley v. Valeo, 86 the Court required "reasonable probability that
the compelled disclosure of ... contributors names will subject
them to threats, harassment or reprisals from either [g]overnment
officials or private parties." 87 The Court held that the standard
was not met, although granting that it was "undoubtedly true that
public disclosure of contributions to candidates and political parties
88
will deter some individuals who otherwise might contribute."
86 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
87 id. at 74.
8 Id. at 68; see also Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S.
290, 299-300 (1982) ("The integrity of the political system will be adequately
protected if contributors [to ballot-initiative campaigns] are identified in a public
filing[;]... if it is thought wise, legislation can outlaw anonymous contributions.");
cf. Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 799 n.11, 800 (1988) (holding
that state could require fundraisers for constitutionally protected causes to "disclose
unambiguously his or her professional status," or may "publish the detailed financial
disclosure forms it requires professional fundraisers to file").
Justice Burger, in his dissent in Buckley, suggested some "facts of political life"
that support this conclusion:
Rank-and-file union members or rising junior executives may now think
twice before making even modest contributions to a candidate who is
disfavored by the union or management hierarchy. Similarly, potential
contributors may well decline to take the obvious risks entailed in making
a reportable contribution to the opponent of a well-entrenched incumbent.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 237.
The failure of proof in Buckley might be interpreted in two ways. First, it may
be that "reprisals and harassment" are cognizable only when they reach, or threaten
to reach, a level where they "deter contributions to the point where the movement
cannot survive." Id. at 71. The Court might be arguing that the value of contributions is primarily their addition to the political marketplace of ideas. Although one
can predict that some contributions will be deterred, the viewpoints represented by
the unpopular parties are not driven from the political stage. See Geoffrey R. Stone
and William P. Marshall, Brown v. Socialist Workers: Inequality as a Command of the
First Amendment, 1983 SUP. CT. REv. 583, 610 (interpreting Brown and Buckley as
protecting against content-neutral disclosure scheme only where "there is a risk that
particular ideas or viewpoints may be driven completely from the marketplace of
ideas").
This, however, seems implausible, both because the Court has elsewhere shown
itself to be sensitive to the effect of government regulation that mutes but does not
eliminate particular voices, (even NAACP cases had no showing that participation
would be entirely eliminated), and because the rest of the Buckley opinion seems to
value political contributions as a form of political expression in themselves.
It seems more reasonable to conclude that the Buckley Court reacted to an effort
to invalidate legislation on its face, and was simply unwilling to paint with a broad
brush, either because of skepticism as to the magnitude of the effect, or because of
reluctance to allow a narrow class of plaintiffs to raise arguments based on effects on
the rights of others.
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Following Buckley, the Court in Brown v. Socialist Workers '74

Campaign Committee,89 found that the record of harassment and
unpopularity of the Socialist Workers Party supported a showing of
"reasonable probability of threats, harassment, or reprisals"9 0 of
contributors and recipients of campaign funds. Justices O'Connor,
Rehnquist, and Stevens, however, took the position in dissent that
"persons providing business services to a minor party are not
generally perceived by the public as supporting the party's ideology,
and thus are unlikely to be harassed if their names are disclosed."9 1 They further maintained that disclosure of the identity of
campaign workers "is unlikely to increase the degree of harassment
so significantly as to deter the individual from campaigning for the
92
party."
This skepticism regarding the adverse effects of disclosure
attracted a majority of the Court in Meese v. Keene,93 a challenge to
the Attorney General's designation of a film of the Canadian Film
Board as "foreign propaganda" under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. Justice Stevens's majority opinion did confer standing,
since evidence introduced by the Plaintiff established potential harm
to the political candidate who wished to show these films. 9 4 But,
on his reading, the Act "does not pose any obstacle to appellee's
access to the materials he wishes to exhibit ....

Congress simply

required the disseminators of such material to make additional
disclosures" and "allows appellee to combat any such bias simply by
95
explaining [his side of the story]."

459 U.S. 87 (1982).
Id. at 100-01.
91 Id. at 111 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
89

90

A recollection of the use of boycott

threats to eliminate employment opportunities and other facilities for blacklisted
performers during the McCarthy era, see supra note 43 and accompanying text, might
have suggested another conclusion.
92 Id. at 111-12; see also Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 580-81 (1981)
(distinguishing the argument in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 565 (1965), that the
broadcast of trials is "potentially a form of punishment in itself" on the ground that
the question of public humiliation is an empirical issue that "must also await the
continuing experimentation").
93 481 U.S. 465 (1987).
94 See id. at 473-74 n.7 (finding that 49% of the public would be less likely to vote

for a candidate who showed foreign films that the Justice Department had classified
as "political propaganda"); ef. Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(evidence introduced to show that potential customers declined to take the films
labeled as political propaganda).
9s Keene, 481 U.S. at 480-81. One defect of this argument is thatjust as with the
McCarthy disclosure mechanism, the plaintiffs' explanations have neither the same
authority nor the same scope of dissemination as the government's labels. Another
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The modern version of the "sticks and stones" objection,
therefore, does not absolutely exclude protection. Courts recognize
that disclosures by the government can interfere cognizably with
constitutional rights. The open question is what showing plaintiffs
must make to evoke this recognition. The issues here are both
positive and normative.
Under what circumstances should we
expect disclosure to have substantial effects on constitutionally
protected behaviors, and under what circumstances should courts
give weight to those effects?
B.

The Doubts Clarified and Allayed

To take a sensible position on what types of disclosures should
be cognizable as unconstitutional burdens, we must first examine in
some detail the mechanisms by which exposure can achieve a
deterrent effect and the situations in which the effect is most likely.
Three discrete types of effects can be identified.
First, publicity by one agency can form the basis for actions by
other government entities.
This is the most easily analyzed
situation. Official retaliation against constitutionally protected
activities is impermissible, but the costs of claiming judicial
protection on a case by case basis may well be prohibitive.
Protection against initial disclosure is an effective prophylactic
measure against dispersed contemporary threats, as well as a means
of embodying current constitutional limitations in a form that has
some binding effect on the future. Where there is a history of
governmental hostility or a plausible threat of future official
retaliation, the memories of the McCarthy era suggest protection
against involuntary disclosure of protected activities.
Second, government disclosure can trigger concrete private
actions against the object of publicity. Despite the early doubts of

difficulty is the dubious status of the claim that the government may legitimately
burden the exercise of constitutional rights with the requirement of "explaining" their
exercise to the public.
Judicial skepticism was also evident in the decision to allow grand jury subpoenas
regarding newspaper sources. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693-94 (1972)
("Estimates of the inhibiting effect of such subpoenas [to newspaper reporters] on the
willingness of informants to make disclosures to newsmen are widely divergent and
to a great extent speculative.").
The Court has similarly expressed an unwillingness to review Army domestic
intelligence operations directed against political dissenters. See Laird v. Tatum, 408
U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972) ("Allegations of a subjective 'chill' are not an adequate substitute
for a claim of specific present objective harm . . ").
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courts during the McCarthy period, and the claims of some
contemporary commentators, the prospect of private violence or
economic coercion triggered by government disclosures is a danger
against which citizens exercising their constitutional rights are
entitled to constitutional safeguards. In evaluating these threats, the
vulnerability of particular plaintiffs to coercion is central to the
analysis. Incidence of physical violence should trigger full protection, and in evaluating economic threats, judges must be wary of
excessive reliance on countervailing forces and of excessive faith in
the perfection of the market.
Finally, disclosure can lay the basis for social stigma and expose
to public view information the victim wishes to remain private.
These effects suggest two normative issues. First, stigma, like
private economic pressure and violence, is the result of actions by
private individuals. To suggest, as some commentators do, that
pressures resulting from private decisions should not be the basis
for constitutional concern is unpersuasive. That argument gains
strength, however, from a second point: efforts to invoke public
opinion are often entitled to constitutional protection. In approaching the prospect of stigma, therefore, courts must establish
the degree to which particular constitutional rights carry an
immunity from public scrutiny.
1. The Impact of Disclosures
a. Disclosure as the Basisfor Other Public Sanctions
During the McCarthy years, a good deal of the sting associated
with public accusations of Communist affiliation by the investigating
committees or the Attorney General lay in the collateral consequences attached to the disclosure by other agencies of federal,
state, and local government. Sometimes those consequences flowed
explicitly, as in the case of New York's Feinberg Law,9 6 which
made membership in an organization listed by the Attorney General
a prima facie basis for disqualification from employment in the
public schools, or Maryland's Ober Law, 97 which contemplated use
of the Attorney General's list as a basis for disqualification from
public office. 98 More often, public accusations and disclosure of
N.Y. EDUCATION LAW § 3022 (McKinney 1949) (repealed 1958).
97 MD. ANN. CODE OF 1957 Art. 85A (1949) (repealed 1978).
98 See, e.g., CAtJTE, supra note 42, at 404, 413 (detailing state requirements that
teachers execute oaths disclaiming membership in organizations listed by the Attorney
96
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affiliation rendered citizens subject to the adverse exercise of
administrative discretion. 99 Whether the sanction was explicit,
implicit, or covert, at a time when government employment and
benefits were regarded as gratuities that could be withdrawn at
will, 10 0 disclosure of unpopular but constitutionally protected
activities invited public retaliation.
In Shelton v. Tucker,101 the Court wrote in the shadow of its
experience with McGarthyism:
To compel a teacher to disclose his every associational tie is to
impair that teacher's right of free association.... Such interference... is conspicuously accented when the teacher serves at the
absolute will of those to whom the disclosure must be made-those

General); FRIED, NIGHTMARE, supra note 36, at 109 (detailing states which copied the
Ober Law: Mississippi (1950), New Hampshire (1951), and Washington (1951)); cf.
CAUTE, supra note 42, at 103 (discussing a Florida town that passed an ordinance
revoking a license of an unfriendly witness); id. at 181-82 (discussing Gwinn
Amendment, which prohibited occupancy of federally assisted housing by members
of Attorney General-listed organizations, which was struck down); id. at 182
(discussing attempt to cut off old age benefits to Communist Party members); id. at
183 (discussing efforts to exclude "Fifth Amendment communists" from unemployment benefits).
99 See, e.g., CAUTE, supra note 42, at 224-44 (deportation); id. at 403-30 (efforts by
committees at state level to generate firings at universities); id. at 403-45 (detailing
efforts by the FBI to force the dismissal of teachers); SCHRECKER, supra note 44, at 9
(explaining how government agencies identified allegedly disloyal employees and
universities fired them); SELCRAIG, supra note 38, at 54-57 (describing the Detroit
experience, including a ban on newsstands selling subversive newspapers and
magazines and the eviction of leftists from public housing); id. at 73-75 (discussing
HUAC attacks on public school teachers and student allegations of teacher disloyalty).
For a more recent example, see GOODMAN, supra note 38, at 425-27 (describing how
HUAC sent names of California teachers suspected of being Communists to local
school boards.).
Informal disclosures as well as public denunciations were used. Thus, the FBI
often fed information on alleged Communist affiliations to other government
agencies. See e.g., KENNETH O'REILLY, HOOVER AND THE UNAMERICANS 6-12 (1983)

(discussing the role of FBI informants during the HUAC investigations); DAVID M.
OSHINsKY, A CONSPIRACY SO IMMENSE, THE WORLD OFJOSEPH MCCARTHY 117, 257,

321 (1982) (reporting that "[m]uch of what [McCarthy] got came directly from the
FBI" and that many of McCarthy's informants were former FBI agents). One study
suggests, however, that at least in the area of higher education, it was primarily the
formal activities of investigative committees that triggered other sanctions. See
LIONEL S. LEWIS, COLD WAR ON CAMPUs 49 (1988).

For later uses of the technique, see for example DONNER, supra note 5, at 198200 (describing FBI efforts to provoke local governmental action against Socialist
Workers Party); id. at 209 (same tactics against Klan).
1oo See, e.g., Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46,58 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ("In the absence
of statute or ancient custom to the contrary, executive offices are held at the will of
the appointing authority. . . ."), aff'd, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
101 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
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who any year can terminate the teacher's employment without...
notice ... hearing ... or opportunity to explain....
Even if there were no disclosure to the general public, the
pressure upon a teacher to avoid any ties which might displease
those who control his professional destiny would be constant and
heavy. Public exposure, bringing with it the possibility of public
pressures upon school boards to discharge teachers who belong to
unpopular or minority organizations, would simply operate to
02
widen and aggravate the impairment of constitutional liberty.
The modern threat of adverse governmental action associated
with disclosure of unpopular exercises of constitutional rights
remains a matter for concern.
Contemporary constitutional
doctrine frowns upon retaliation for the exercise of constitutional
rights, and legal protections against illegitimate use of government
discretion have multiplied since the McCarthy years in many
areas.1 03 Explicit statutes mandating such retaliation, like the
Ober Law, would be constitutionally vulnerable on their face. Even
10 4
so, successful judicial challenges cost time, tears, and money.
Where official retaliation is imminent, it will often be more
appealing to abandon the exercise of the constitutional right when
exposure is threatened.
102 Id. at 485-87 (citations omitted). The Court expressed similar concerns in
Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965), striking down a requirement that
citizens request in writing delivery of "Communist propaganda." The Court
commented:
This requirement is almost certain to have a deterrent effect, especially as
respects those who have sensitive positions. Their livelihood may be
dependent on a security clearance. Public officials, like school teachers who
have no tenure, might think they would invite disaster if they read what the
Federal Government says contains the seeds of treason.
Id. at 307.
103 See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (summarizing
prohibitions on government retaliation for the exercise of constitutional rights); see
also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542-45 (1985) (procedural
protections required before deprivation of property interest); Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (same).
The proposition that "even though a person has no 'right' to a valuable
governmental benefit... [the government] may not deny a benefit to a person on a
basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests" has in the last thirty years
attained the status of a new orthodoxy. Rutan v. Republican Party, 110 S. Ct. 2729,
2736 (1990) (citation omitted). This orthodoxy is now, however, subject to the attacks
of new iconoclasts. See id. at 2749-52 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
104 For representative studies, see for example KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL
RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMs 25-32 (1988); GEORGE R.
LANOUE & BARBARA A. LEE, ACADEMICS IN COURT: THE CONSEQUENCES OF FACULTY
DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 34-40 (1987).
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Covert retaliation is even more difficult to protect against. A
prudent citizen must consider the costs of vindicating her rights as
well as the possibility that retaliation will go undetected by the
courts. Unlike the prospect of retaliation triggered in the private
economy, there is limited hope that a competitive market will
operate to limit or circumvent retaliation by public officials. Nor
can one take comfort in a belief that official retaliation occurs only
in times of broad political pathology. Individual public decisionmakers may exact retribution from groups that they regard as
unsavory. Moreover, when responding to public opinion, politicians, like decision-makers in the private economy, are likely to
respond to the desires of the volatile fraction of the population they
must attract to be elected. If 10% of voters desire a government
purged of ACLU members, for example, and the remainder are
neutral on the subject, a promised purge may provide the margin of
10 5
victory at the polls.
Much turns, therefore, on the appropriate evaluation of the
propensity of other public entities to retaliate against those who
exercise constitutional rights, whether such retaliation is constitutionally legitimate, and the ability of post-hoc legal remedies to
constrain such retaliation. Acknowledging a right of anonymity
elides the difficulties of obtaining effective relief; it prevents
unconstitutional administrative actions without requiring case by
case judicial intervention. 10 6 It is also a means of binding the
future to current constitutional norms. The probability of administrative harassment of a dissident group may be small today, but
administrators ten years hence may not be so self-restrained. If we
105 This example assumes that there is no equally powerful and volatile group of
marginal voters who support the ACLU. It is here that the legal protections
developed since the McCarthy years may come into play. To the extent that
politicians announce an intention to retaliate against the exercise of constitutional
rights in order to reap electoral benefits, they are more vulnerable tojudicial control.
An election-year promise to purge the public payroll of members of the ACLU (or
the KKK) casts significant light on the "intent" behind a subsequent discharge of such
employees.
This protection should not be exaggerated, however. Coded announcements
may be sufficient to garner political support without providingjudicially cognizable
proof, and decisions to avoid public controversy by declining to hire or provide
benefits to a controversial figure, or by deleting her name from the payroll need not
be carried out with the clarity necessary to make out a constitutional claim.
106 Anonymity will certainly be more effective in preventing abuses than would
post-hoc damage relief. It often will be more effective than an injunction. An
injunction can be disobeyed or evaded, but an administrator cannot harass those
whom she cannot identify.
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are skeptical of the measure of protection available from future
courts, preventing today's administrators from obtaining information that could be 7used to harass imposes a measure of restraint on
their successors.

10

b. The Varieties of PrivateReactions
i. Material Sanctions
The reactions to government disclosure easiest to identify as
constitutionally problematic are those that threaten the physical or
economic interests of the victim. The law traditionally provides a
remedy for violence or economic loss, and it is reasonably straightforward to account for these threats in a constitutional analysis.
a. Violence
Disclosure of the exercise of unpopular constitutional rights, at
its most devastating, leads to physical violence. Such private
violence is generally conceded to be illegitimate, but it is a regular
10 8
outgrowth of public hostility in the United States.
The problem of the future takes on particular poignancy when recalling the
experience of the McCarthy era, in which the answer to the crucial "have you ever
been" question often turned on events fifteen or twenty years earlier. Cf. DeGregory
v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 825, 828 (1966) (overturning appellant's conviction for
contempt based on his refusal to answer questions based on events over ten years
old).
This same experience, however, should suggest that the confidentiality of files
is no substitute for their destruction, and imbue a certain skepticism that any
information-limiting strategy will impose substantial restraints on a government
committed to repression. In good times, most groups will be unwilling to sacrifice
the benefits of publicity in order to avail themselves of the cloakof anonymity, while
in bad times an information-processing capacity far in excess of that available to the
McCarthy investigators will render anonymity almost unattainable.
This analysis leads again to the conclusion that the limitation of information is
a strategy that is fitted to a reasonably well-ordered society, as a tax on repression,
not an impenetrable bulwark.
108 During the McCarthy era, reported violence against left wing activities appears
to have been predominantly linked to public confrontations at voluntarily publicized
rallies. See, e.g., CAUTE, supra note 42, at 164-65 (documenting a stone-throwing
confrontation immediately following an open concert raising money for the Harlem
Chapter of the Civil Rights Congress); FRIED, NIGHTMARE, supra note 36, at 96
(discussing a savage beating of a farm worker attempting to circulate a petition at a
union rally); SELCRAIG, supra note 38, at 89-90 (describing the forceful ejection from
a plant of a union worker who circulated a copy of the Stockholm' peace petition
before the Korean War).
During the civil rights struggles of the 1950s and 1960s in the South, it was
107
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Hostility toward a given exercise of constitutional rights need
not be widespread for the threat of physical retaliation to be an
effective deterrent; a single pair of hands can wield a match, an axe,
or an explosive device, while threatening letters or telephone calls
are virtually impossible to prevent. Although prosecution or
protection may deter attacks, prosecutidn may be welcomed by
would-be martyrs and the cost of protection may make continued
exercise of constitutional rights prohibitive.
Anonymity is the only sure defense.
To the extent that
government penetrates the screen of anonymity in situations where
violence is threatened, it imposes vulnerability to violent private
sanctions. 10 9 Where the relations between the subject of disclo-

generally accepted that public affiliation with civil rights organizations or public
avowal of constitutional rights carried with it the risk of private violence. See, e.g.,
Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) ("harassment and threats of
bodily harm.., community hostility and economic reprisals"); NAACP v. Alabama
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) ("economic reprisal, loss of employment
[and] threat of physical coercion" accompanied the exercise of ivil rights); NUMAN
V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH
DURING THE 1950s 215-20 (1969) (detailing the reactions of the Florida, Georgia,
Texas, and South Carolina legislatures to the NAACP, including enjoining planned
activities, demanding membership lists, discontinuing public facilities, and calling out
state militias); TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA INTHE KING YEARS
1954-63, at 197-203, 503-04,508-11,528-29,633-39,690-91,715,717-20,759-62,78182, 793-94, 866 (1988) (describing tactics of harassment and resistance to derail
King's civil rights movement in the South).
Such reactions were in tune with traditions of private enforcement of social order
in the South. See, e.g., EDWARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN THE 19TH CENTURY SOUTH 9-33 (1984) (examining the history of
violence in the South); ROBERT P. INGALLS, URBAN VIGILANTES IN THE NEW SOUTH:

TAMPA, 1882-1936, at 1-30 (1988) (discussing the roots and development of traditional
Southern lynch law).
In recent years, courts have been cognizant of the potential for violence directed
against abortion clinics. See, e.g., American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists
v. Thornburgh, 613 F. Supp. 656, 660-65 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Anthony Paonita, Embattled
Judge at Center of Abortion ClinicBattle, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 19, 1991, at 6 (reporting that
U.S. districtjudge received death threats for issuing an injunction against Operation
Rescue and had been placed under protection of U.S. marshals). See generally Abortion
Clinic Violence: Oversight HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights
of the House Comm. on the Judiciaqy, 99th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1985-86).
As international travel increases, the United States may suffer from the export
of other traditions of violent direct action. See, e.g., DANIEL PIPES, THE RUSHDIE
AFFAIR: THE NOVEL, THE AYATOLLAH, AND THE WEST 27-29 (1990) (discussing the

death sentence proclaimed and the million dollar reward offered by Ayatollah
Khoumeini for the execution of author Salman Rushdie); id. at 167-71, 204-05
(describing how bombings and harassment require security precautions by authors,
publishers, and bookstores); They Also Serve, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1989, § 4, at 9
(discussing terrorist bombing attack in California against wife of captain of USS
Vincennes, which had previously shot down an Iranian airliner).
109 These forms of harassment are not limited to physical violence. In addition

1991]

SUNLIGHT, SECRETS, AND SCARLET LETTERS

sure and the recipient of the disclosed information are already
charged with violent potential, disclosure is a virtual invitation.
Abortion, for example, is today an issue laden with threats of
physical confrontation. Efforts to expose to parents and husbands
the identity of women who seek abortions, like attempts to publicize
the identity of professionals who provide abortions, threaten to
110
precipitate violent retaliation.
Required disclosure mechanisms in a violent atmosphere are
threats even in situations where their subject has not chosen total
anonymity. A campaign worker for a fringe political party may
willingly expose herself to physical harassment while distributing
leaflets in the business district of a city if she can retire to substantial anonymity at home. When her name and address are publicized
by the government, she is exposed to both the retaliation of
neighbors and to hooligans drawn from elsewhere. Furthermore,
the threat of violence entailed by publication may itself cause
customers, suppliers, neighbors, and co-workers to shun the
victim.11 1 Where the exercise of constitutional rights requires the
to the possibility of disruptive midnight telephone calls and malicious accusations to
law enforcement authorities or news media, modern reliance on computers makes
Americans vulnerable to more exotic electronic harassment. See, e.g.,John Markoff,
Cyberpunks Seek Thrills In Computerized Mischief, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 26, 1988, § 1, at 1
(expressing fears that computer hackers are so skilled at tampering with computers
that they might be able to alter credit ratings or have electricity turned off).
110 See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2938-39, 2945 n.36 (1990)
(noting that required parental notification can result in violence and harassment and
that the "most common reason for not notifying the second parent was that that
parent was a child or spouse-batterer and notification would have provoked further
abuse"); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 24,792, at *76-93 (3d
Cir. Oct. 21, 1991) ("real world consequences" of husband notification are likely to
include violence, economic and psychological coercion), petitionfor cert.filed, Nov. 7,
1991; American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 613 F.
Supp. 656, 660-65 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (discussing and listing"unwanted and unwarranted
acts of violence, threats, intimidation, and harassment" caused by state disclosure
requirements). But see PlannedParenthood,1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 24,792, at *97-101
(while acknowledging threats of "substantial public protest," holding that disclosure
of information regarding abortion clinics had not been shown to "so enlarge the
number or escalate the severity of protests that they will become an absolute
obstacle"). In this last holding the PlannedParenthoodcourt seems to have forgotten
its own observation that "the principal power of Damocles' sword is in its hanging
rather than its fall." Id. at *83.
11 See, e.g., Barry Dyller, Not in his Good Books, NEWSDAY, Feb. 23, 1989, at 78
(reporting bookstores refusing to sell Rushdie's SatanicVerses due to terrorist threats);
They Also Serve, supra note 108 (describing how wife of captain of U.S.S. Vincennes
was dismissed from position teaching at private school after she had been the target
of an apparent terrorist attack).
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cooperation of third parties, as in the cases of publishing and
reproductive autonomy, the effect of disclosure in a violent
atmosphere turns also on the willingness of others to risk a
112
dangerous association.
Government disclosure may increase the level of harassment by
decreasing the costs of engaging in effective intimidation. For acts
of spontaneous vandalism, the availability of obvious targets
highlighted by the government may serve as lightning rods for
impulses that would otherwise dissipate relatively harmlessly. For
more organized efforts of repression, government disclosure frees
resources otherwise spent searching out targets for harassment.
Where the disclosure carries a taint of disapproval, government
disclosure may also serve to legitimize the impulse to harass.
b. Economic Sanctions
In a market economy every participant is hostage to the
willingness of others to trade with her. Robert Nozick praises this
situation as one which enforces the principle of "to each as they are
chosen."11 3 John Stuart Mill put it another way: "In respect to
all persons but those whose pecuniary circumstances make them
independent of the good will of other people, [public] opinion on
this subject is as efficacious as law; men might as well be impris114
oned, as excluded from the means of earning their bread."
This economic threat was a substantial weapon of the red-baiters
of the 1950s. In an era when 68% of the populace believed that
Communists should be fired from jobs as sales clerks, and 91%
believed that Communist teachers should be discharged, 115 public
registration as a member of the Communist party was economic
suicide, and being named as an "uncooperative" witness was a
pathway to ruin.1 16 The prospect of economic retaliation likewise
112 See, e.g., Lisa Belkin, Women in Rural AreasFaceMany Barriersto Abortions, N.Y.

TIMES,July 11, 1989, at Al (discussing the unwillingness of small town hospitals and
doctors to risk harassment and violence by providing abortions or associating with
abortion clinics).
113 ROBERT NOZIcK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 160 (1974).
114 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1849) [hereinafter Mill, On Liberty], reprinted in
THE UTILITARIANS 506 (1961).
115 See STOUFFER, supra note 47, at 40-43.

116 See, e.g., CAUTE, supra note 42, at 103 (describing how Rose Edelmann
Anderson was driven from the drug store she had owned for 22 years upon taking the
Fifth Amendment before HUAC); DURR, supra note 72, at 269 (discussing how legal
practice of C. Durr "dropped away" after V. Durr was an uncooperative witness
before SISS and how independent newspaper publisher Aubrey Williams was driven
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shaped the perceptions of courts called upon to adjudicate the issue
of required publication of the membership lists of civil rights
organizations.117
Unlike the effect of threatened violence, the economic threat
implicit in public disclosure must exceed the dislike of a few angry
bigots in order to be an effective deterrent. If the vast bulk of
Americans today bear no animus toward Masons, the disclosure of
not likely to be a
the membership list of a Masonic lodge is
118
substantial economic disincentive to joining.
It will not do, however, to exaggerate the security to be sought
in countervailing forces. The times need not sanction pogroms to
generate repression. Indeed, employers need not even harbor
hostility toward a pariah group for employment opportunities to dry
up, as long as a sufficient proportion of customers are unwilling to
do business with those who hire pariahs. In an industry with low
profit margins, great competition, or high fixed costs, the level of
public hostility need not be overwhelming to block employment
opportunities, since management's attention is riveted upon the
19
marginal consumer.
out of business by the American Legion after being called before SISS); supra note
44 and accompanying text (discussing Hollywood and academic blacklists).
117 See, e.g., Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (holding that NAACP's
refusal to disclose membership lists in an effort to protect members freedom of
association was protected by the Due Process Clause); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding that Alabama's efforts to force the NAACP
to release membership lists interfered with members' freedom of association); cf.
ACLU v. Mabus, 719 F. Supp. 1345, 1348-50 (S.D. Miss. 1989) (relating the activities
of Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission, which "harassed individuals who assisted
organizations promoting desegregation or voter registration" by disseminating lists
of activists and urging job actions by employers), vacated on other grounds, 911 F.2d
1066 (5th Cir. 1990).
118 A prospective Mason must take into account, however, the possibility of an
emergence of anti-Masonic sentiment in the future.
11 See, e.g., ERIK BARNOUW, THE SPONSOR: NOTES ON A MODERN POTENTATE 4849 (1978) (describing the effect of the threat of "listing" by anti-Communists on Block
Drug Company, whose toothpaste success was based on heavy advertising expenditures). Compare the unyielding response ofAlcoa, in a relatively noncompetitive and
differentiated market, to hostility generated by Edward R. Murrow's attack on
McCarthy. See id. at 51-52; HUGH C. DONAHUE, THE BATTLE TO CONTROL
BROADCAST NEWS: WHO OWNS THE FIRST AMENDMENT? 114-15 (1989); A. M.
SPERBER, MuRRow, His LIFE AND TIMES 357, 420, 453-54, 482-83 (1986).

In the case of modern conglomerates, as long as one of the affiliated entities
participates in a vulnerable market, the entire group is vulnerable. For example,
Roussel Uclaf, a French company, has declined to license the abortion pill RU-486 out
of fear of a boycott directed at its majority shareholder, the German pharmaceutical
company Hoechst. See Alan Riding, Abortion Politics are Said to Hinder Use ofFrench
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At the height of the McCarthy era, slightly more than one third
of the population was willing to boycott sponsors of radio programs
on which "Communists" appeared, and only one tenth were willing
to boycott sponsors of programs involving alleged Communists who
denied such involvement under oath. 120 Nonetheless, an allegation of "controversial" involvement was generally enough to make
a performer unacceptable. 121 As one official of the movie industry observed in 1946: "20,000,000 people have to see every picture
Universal makes before you get five cents of your salary. We can't
122
afford to offend anybody."
Although a majority of Americans today favor access to
abortions, 123 the threat of consumer boycotts has, at least temporarily, dissuaded all major drug manufacturers from pursuing
development of the abortifacient RU-486.124 Current efforts to
generate consumer pressure to control broadcast programming,
whether from the right or left, seem to have a substantial im-

Pill,N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1990, at Al.

120 See STOUFFER, supra note 47, at 39, 43.
121 See BARNOUW, supra note 119, at 44-45, 49 (describing the television "terror

of controversial people" and the blacklists which conquered television and radio);
CAUTE, supra note 42, at 500 (quoting a studio production head who explained that
"the freedom of the industry" required the rejection of "anyone thought to be a
Communist"); NAVASKY, supra note 44, at 78-85 (discussing the HUAC hearings
concerning the "unfriendlies"). The McCarthy blacklisting techniques also tapped
into the market power of intermediaries. See BARNOUW, supra note 119, at 49
(describing the tactics of the president of the National Association of Supermarkets
in exerting
pressure on programmers).
122 EDWARD DE GRAZIA & ROGER K. NEWMAN, BANNED FILMS 71 (1982); cf. id. at
42-46 (describing the efforts of the ten million members of the Catholic Legion of
Decency to affect the quality and morality of films in 1934); RICHARD S. RANDALL,
CENSORSHIP OF THE MOVIES: THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONTROL OF A MASS
MEDIUM 160-68 (1968) (The Catholic church "probably ranks as the most important
single group in the control of movies ... at any level.").
123 See, e.g., George Gallup,Jr. & Frank Newport, Americans Shift Toward Pro-choice
Position, 295 GALLUP POLL MONTHLY 2, 3 (1990) (53% of Americans favor law
allowing abortion until viability, while 36% oppose; 52% oppose law prohibiting
abortion with exceptions for rape, incest, deformed fetus, and health of the mother,
42% favor); Larry Hugick, Abortion: Majority Critical of Abortion Decision, But Most
Americans Favor Some New Restrictions, 286 GALLUP REP. 5, 8 (1989) (58% oppose
overturning Roe v. Wade, while 34% favor).
124 See, e.g., Mindy J. Lees, Note, I Want a New Drug: RU-486 and the Right to
Choose, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1113, 1126-28 (1990) (discussing how the protests of
American anti-abortion groups have hindered distribution of RU-486 in other
countries); Riding, supra note 119, at A15 ("Although some small American
pharmaceutical companies have offered to market RU-486 in the United States,
Roussel Uclaf has turned down their proposals, apparently out of fear that antiabortion groups might organize a boycott of Hoechst in the United States.").
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pact. 125 Hostility toward a number of constitutionally protected
groups and activities stands at national levels that could generate
substantial pressure on suppliers or employers implicated in such
activities.1 26 Local pockets of intolerance may be much deeper,
putting rights at risk locally which receive broad support nationwide. 127
Further, local repression may spread as routinized
12 5

See BARNOUw, supra note 119, at 33 (noting that the CIO boycott of Philco in
1938 forced Philco to drop sponsorship of news commentator Boake Carter);
KATHRYN C. MONTGOMERY, TARGET:

PRIME TIME

155-65 (1989) (describing the

history of a recent effort to use commercial threats to alter media practices); Roger
Cohen, With Boycott and Ads, a Battle Over Selling, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1990, at C18
(detailing efforts to generate boycotts of national bookstore chains by Rev. Donald
Wildmon's American Family Association to force them to stop carrying Playboy and
Penthouse); Walter Goodman, Commercial TV Gets Commercial Threats, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 24, 1989, at C13 (citing effort by Terry Rakolta of Michigan to persuade
sponsors to abandon television show Married With Children, efforts to exclude
elements offensive to minority groups, and efforts by nurses to boycott sponsors of
an allegedly sexist program about nurses); TVBoycott Is Criticized,N.Y. TIMES,July 19,
1989, at D23 (reporting boycott of Clorox and Mennen by Christian Leaders for
Responsible Television because of sponsorship of "offensive" programs).
12' Roughly one third of the American public is opposed to legal abortions. See
supra note 123. Hostility toward HIV positive individuals, gays, and lesbians is at
similar levels. See Attitudes on AIDS Shffting Toward Acceptance of Victims' Rights, 268
GALLUP REP. 30, 38 (1988) (25% would refuse to work alongside person with AIDS);
Diane Colasanto, Tolerance ofHomosexuality Is on theRiseAmongthePublic,289 GALLUP
REP. 11, 14-15 (1989) (13% think a "homosexual" should not be hired as salesperson;
32% as doctor; 43% as high school teacher); George Gallup Jr. & Alec M. Gallup,
AIDS: 35 Nation Survey, 273 GALLUP REP. 2, 27 (1988) (32% avoid or seek to avoid
homosexuals); PublicExpresses Compassionfor AIDS Victims, But Holds Them Responsible
for Contractingthe Disease,263 GALLUP REP. 12, 13 (1987) (33% of Americans believe
employers should have the right to fire employees with AIDS).
Hostility toward the availability of sexually explicit materials is more pervasive.
See HERBERT McCLosKY & ALIDA BRILL, DIMENSIONS OF TOLERANCE 208 (1983) (44%
of the public believes that selling pornographic books should be forbidden by law);
Tom W. Smith, The Polls-A Report: The Sexual Revolution?, 54 PUB. OPINION Q. 415,
426-27 (noting that in 1989, 40.3% of respondents believed there should be laws
against distribution of pornography to purchasers of all ages, while in 1986, 45%
strongly agreed that the government should crack down more on pornography in
books, movies and nightclubs, and believed that standards regarding the sale of
sexually explicit material should be stricter).
Stouffer found that 89% of respondents would have fired a Communist teaching
in college during the McCarthy era. See STOUFFER, supra note 47, at 43. Subsequent
replications between 1972 and 1985 found that at least 50% of respondents believed
that college teachers who are Communists should be fired. See MCCLOSKY & BRILL,
supra, at 54-55 (66% of public would refuse to hire professor because of "extreme"
and unusual political beliefs); John Mueller, Trends in Political Tolerance, 52 PUB.
OPINION Q. 1, 6 (1988) (only 20% would allow least favorite groups to teach in public
school).
127 Cf. STOUFFER, supra note 47, at 109-31 (finding that levels of tolerance and
nonconformity vary according to region and type of community); Mark Abrahamson
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national businesses adopt standard operating procedures forced on
them by local boycotts. 28
Economic threats arising from disclosure ultimately may prove
unstable. Even in the worst of times, market forces may tend to
undercut efforts to use disclosure to impose economic sanctions.
If hostility toward the target group is not rooted in economic

& ValerieJ. Carter, Tolerance, Urbanism and Region, 51 AM. Soc. REV. 287, 290 (1986)
(discussing difference in intolerance between large and small cities); George E.
Marcus et al., Rural-UrbanDifferences in Tolerance: Confoundingproblemsof Conceptualization andMeasurement, 45 RURAL Soc. 731, 732-34 (1980) (comparing tolerance in
urban and rural areas). Thus, in 1989, while only 8% of respondents in the East took
the position that homosexuals should not be hired as salespersons, 18% of Southern
respondents would have barred such hiring. See Colasanto, supra note 126, at 14.
A recent study has found that the number of doctors and facilities providing
abortions in rural areas has declined, while the availability in cities has remained
constant. See Tamar Lewin, Abortions Harder to Get in Rural Areas of Nation, N.Y.
TIMES, July 28, 1990, at A18; see also Belkin, supra note 112, at Al (attributing the
decline of availability of abortions in rural areas to boycotts of doctors and hospitals
providing abortions).
128 In 1986, more than 8,000 chain store outlets discontinued sales of adult
magazines in response to a letter from the Attorney General's Commission on
Pornography threatening to identify them as distributors of "pornography." The
threat was enjoined, but the magazines did not return to the stores, which
represented about 5% of the retail outlets selling magazines in the United States. See
RICHARD S. RANDALL, FREEDOM AND TABOO: PORNOG.PHY AND THE POLITICS OF A
SELF DIDED 292 n.58, 293 n.63 (1989).
The economic effects of disclo;ure of controversial involvements need not always
be adverse. The same disclosure that generates pressure against a particular
enterprise can also open up marketing opportunities among more sympathetic
elements of the population. If there are enough consumers who are supportive of
the publicized activity, or even curious about it, the disclosure may be a net
advantage. The fact that a book had been "banned in Boston" by means of informal
censorship served as a marketing tool in more free-wheelingjurisdictions. See PAUL
S. BOYER, PURITY IN PRINT: THE VICE-SOCIETY MOVEMENT AND BOOK CENSORSHIP IN

AMERICA 171-90 (1968) (describing the activities of Boston's Watch and Ward Society,
which was formed to prevent the sale of "unacceptable books"). On a more
contemporary note, the efforts to organize a boycott of The Last Temptation of Christ
have probably generated as much revenue from free advertising as has been lost in
boycott-reduced attendance. See Russel Chandler, Protests Aided 'Temptation,' Foes
Concede, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1988, § 2, at 1. The Ayatollah's attempt to ban The
Satanic Verses was an effective ticket to the best seller list. See PIPES, supra note 108,
at 200-01. Robert Mapplethorpe and 2 Live Crew are two other unintended
beneficiaries of efforts at suppression.
The positive effect of an attempted boycott, however, is limited to exercises of
constitutional rights that tap a sympathetic commercial market. Although the
controversial artist or writer may be glad to receive publicity in 1990, the research
scientist portrayed as a fellow traveller was not a more attractive employee in the
1950s, and the doctor whose abortion is publicized againsther will cannot be sure she
will gain patients. In most situations where the subject seeks anonymity, disclosure
is unlikely to bring economic benefit.
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reality, some firms will discover that there are profits to be made by
hiring pariahs at lower wages. 129 In the long run, one may hope
that firms that refuse to bow to economically "irrational" public
demands would win back market share by exploiting technical
advantages to attract marginal consumers on grounds of price and
quality, or that employees excluded from one industry as a
consequence of public hostility would find employment in some less
vulnerable industry, thereby reducing the impact of the economic
sanction.1 30 In a market with easy entrance, firms structured to
reach supporters without relying on sales to opponents may
13 1
evolve.
One of the bases for the effectiveness of the McCarthy blacklists
in the entertainment industry may have been the absence of
competitive pressures and the existence of industry-wide cartels that
previously enforced other limitations. 132 With the decline of the
129 Thus, toward the end of the McCarthy era, the black market ate away at the
Hollywood blacklist. See NAVASKY, supra note 44, at 326-29 (describing successful
efforts by blacklisted Hollywood writers and directors to avoid the effects of
blacklisting through the use of pseudonyms); see also CAUTE, supra note 42, at 519-20
(discussing black market scripts); id. at 535 (explaining that Broadway was less
affected because of a more liberal market); cf BARNOUW, supra note 119, at 33
(detailing the 1938 CIO boycott of Philco, which forced Philco to drop sponsorship
of news commentator Boake Carter, who was subsequently picked up by General
Foods and others). Less talented or fortunate directors and writers, however, were
effectively shut out of their careers by the blacklist for a decade, and actors were
unable to pursue their careers under pseudonyms. See CAUTE, supranote 42, at 51520 (noting that about 250 Hollywood personalities were blacklisted); id. at 557-60
(listing 69 film personalities without credits for the decade after blacklisting).
13' In the frictionless and perfectly informed world of economic theory,
noncontroversial workers and controversial workers might exchange places with only
marginal changes in wages. In the world as we know it, controversial workers are
likely to suffer substantial wage penalties.
151 Thus, pornographers usually do not rely on sales to mainstream audiences.
The difficulty is that firms that narrow their market narrow their economic base.
152 In 1934, the Motion Picture Producers and Distributers Association (MPPDA)
reacted to the boycott threats of the ten million member Catholic Legion of Decency
by establishing the Production Code Administration, which undertook more rigorous
enforcement of a moral code promulgated four years earlier. All member studios
were required to obtain clearance from the Administration before releasing their
motion pictures. See DE GRAZIA & NEWMAN, supra note 122, at 42-46; LEONARD J.
LEFF &JEROLD L. SIMMONS, THE DAME IN THE KIMONO: HOLLYWOOD, CENSORSHIP
AND THE PRODUCTION CODE FROM THE 1920S TO THE 1960S, 47-54 (1990). A good
deal of the power of the Production Code Administration came from the fact that
most first-run theaters were part of vertically integrated studio conglomerates that
subscribed to the Production Code; the theater circuits, whether implicitly or
explicitly, agreed not to run noncomplying films. See id. at 187.
The activities of the MPPDA were not limited to script and film review. During
the early 1920s, in response to popular objection to his involvement in the death of
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entertainment cartels13 3 and the rise of rival media and international competition, a contemporary effort to establish controls by
13 4
threat of boycott might not be as effective in motion pictures.
13 5
Increasing concentration could revive the threat in the media,

an actress, the MPPDA effectively banned from Hollywood a comedian named Fatty
Arbuckle, by "advis[ing] the industry to 'refrain from showing pictures in which Mr.
Arbuckle appears.'" DE GRAZIA Se NEWMAN, supra note 122, at 27.
Thus, it was no novelty when, in 1947, fifty Hollywood executives agreed to ban
from employment any "Communists or other subversives." NAVASKY, supra note 44,
at 83. Shortly thereafter, the Motion Picture Association of America, (the former
MPPDA), announced that no uncooperative witnesses would be employed by its
members. See id. at 86-87.
In television and radio, the limited number of networks served the same
coordinating function; by contrast, the relatively unconcentrated media of publishing
and legitimate theater were "largely immune to the intimidations of the Red Scare."
STEPHEN J. WHITFIELD, THE CULTURE OF THE COLD WAR 180-81 (1991).
Similarly, the efficacy of white economic pressure directed against black voting
registrants in the South during the 1950s and 60s reflected in part the market defects
associated with geographical immobility and racial exclusion from economic
opportunity. See, e.g., BRANCH, supranote 108, at 330, 332-34 (describing blacklists,
evictions, and credit squeezes directed against blacks who attempted to register);
DAVIDJ. GARROw, PROTEST AT SELMA 9 (1978) (detailing the introduction of literacy
tests and "persuasion" to discourage black voters); NEIL R. MCMILLEN, THE CITIZENS'
COUNCIL 216 (1971) (describing economic coercion designed to inhibit black
registration); MARGARET PRICE, THE NEGRO AND THE BALLOT IN THE SOUTH 20-21
(1959) (discussing obstacles to black voting rights).
133 United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948), which required
divesture of theater chains by production studios, marked the beginning of the
decline of the ability of the MPPDA to enforce its Production Code. See LEFF &
SIMMONS, supra note 132, at 187.
134 Efforts to generate in-house censorship in video markets have in part focused
on lifting antitrust constraints on agreements to exclude programming and on the
creation of agreed-upon standards among television networks, video producers,
independent stations, and cable networks. See Michael Oreskes, Voluntaiy Curb on TV
Violence Urged by House, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1989, at Al. There seems to be
substantial doubt that such efforts will succeed, given the economic incentives to
"undercut" standards, and the divergence in economic incentives that face the
participants. Cable companies, for example, since they do not depend on advertisers,
may be less vulnerable to boycott threats than broadcast networks, and better able to
capitalize on narrow demands for otherwise offensive programming.
135 The current trend toward concentration in the communications industry may
well make free expression more vulnerable to boycotts, in several dimensions. See
BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY 18-26 (1990). First, the larger the
conglomerate, the more points of attack are open to groups which seek to exert
pressure. NBC, for example, as a subsidiary of General Electric (GE) is vulnerable
to threats against GE even if GE is not an advertiser. A large conglomerate with an
ideological interest in resisting a boycott may have more resources with which to do
so, but the less personalized the communications business becomes, the more likely
it is to focus on financial rather than ideologically principled considerations. Second,
the more concentrated the industry, the less opportunities there are for employees
to flee to a safer sector.
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however, while other industries have structures that make them
vulnerable.
Scenarios predicting the instability of economic sanctions are
empirically conditioned, and take time to develop. 1 36 Entities
which themselves have no stake in the exercise of the constitutional
right at issue may or may not be willing to take the economic
gamble that the market will work quickly enough. Publishers may
discontinue controversial publications, universities may decline to
hire named "Communists," doctors may decline to associate with
birth control clinics when their association becomes public, and
convenience stores may pull magazines from their shelves rather
than be named as pornographers, even though there is a chance
that contrary actions would accumulate profits in the long run.
While the market is working its magic, those who seek to exercise
the unpopular constitutional right will suffer or drift away.
To the extent that the right in question is a First Amendment
freedom valued for its role in maintaining a political, system, this
may be of less moment. Under some versions of the "marketplace
of ideas" approach, the important issue regarding a limitation on
speech is not whether any particular citizen can express an idea, but
whether the idea is expressed at all. If one can be sure that some
stubborn Socialists will continue to defy public opinion until
alternative employment becomes available, there is some reassurance that the message of Socialism will not be lost to the marketplace of ideas.
But even under marketplace theories, the loss of speakers is not
without significance. An idea confined to the margins of public
discourse is not likely to have as powerful an impact. Speech,
moreover, is valued not only for its capacity to inform the search for
truth, but for its ability to check government abuses. The availability of the Daily Worker, or the possibility of Ramparts being available
ten years hence does little to constrain the government if the Times,
Post, and Tribune are deterred from criticism today.
More importantly, the exercise of constitutional prerogatives is
valuable for its own sake. The market may provide assurances that
someone else, at some future time, will exercise those rights
punished by economic sanctions today. But this is no consolation
136 Actors, for example, because their identity was more obvious to the public,
found it more difficult to break the McCarthy era blacklist than did writers. With
contemporary information processing technology, a writer's identity may be harder

to hide.
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to those who cannot freely exercise rights themselves. Prospective
NAACP members in Little Rock cannot commute to Boston daily
for their meetings. The fact that gynecologists who perform
abortions can move to New York and continue to perform them
there does little to calm the fears of residents of Allentown or
Wichita who are left without the opportunity to obtain an abortion
short of disruptive travel. Actors who could not work during the
1950s because of their politics might have been punished more
severely had the blacklists been fully effective. Punished, however,
they were.
Like physical sanctions, economic sanctions may be warded off
by legal protection. Efforts to organize boycotts of book chains
on
have evoked RICO suits, while attempts to exert pressure 13
7
abortion providers have been countered by antitrust actions.
Such responses, however, suffer from both legal and practical
defects. As a legal matter, some ideologically motivated boycotts
can claim First Amendment protection themselves. Thus, the scope
of legal relief available is constrained. As a practical matter, legal
action against economic harassment requires the expenditure of
time and effort, while ultimate vindication may be long delayed and
bring little relief.'3 8
Real protection requires the prevention of economic sanctions
in the first place. Government disclosures often facilitate or
precipitate effective economic sanctions against constitutionally
protected activities. Disclosures undercut two of the most important forces militating against effective economic sanctions: the
difficulty of coordinating sanctions and the difficulty of policing
their effectiveness. Government identification of pariahs may both
legitimate a prospective boycott and provide a signpost to coordinate its efforts. Where government disclosures perform such a role,
effective protection of constitutional rights requires that disclosure
be barred.

137 See Adam D. Gale, Note, The Use of Civil RICO Against Antiabortion Protesters
and the Economic Motive Requirement, 90 CoLUM. L. REV. 1341, 1345-49 (1990); Dinah
R. PoKempner, Note, The Scope ofNoerrlmmunityfor DirectAction Protestors: Antitrust
Meets
the Anti-Abortionists, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 662, 665-68 (1989).
1
38 SeeJOHN H. FAULK, FEAR ON TRIAL (1963) (detailing a successful case, tried in
1962 against McCarthy-era red-hunters who blacklisted the plaintiff-author in 1956,
which found the defendants dead or bankrupt by the end of the appeal).
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ii. Social Sanctions
During the 1950s, the impact of red hunting was felt by society
as well as the economy, as McCarthyism mobilized public opinion
against disfavored targets. Judicial responses to the McCarthy era
"1 9
considered the effects of "exposure, obloquy, public scorn, 3
"public opprobrium," 140 and "public stigma" 141 as seriously as
142
they considered diminished economic prospects.
A century earlier, John Stuart Mill suggested that public
opinion's power to alter behavior, without the aid of material
sanctions, was a threat to liberty as effective as criminal laws. He
observed:
Reflecting persons perceived that when society is itself the tyrant
... its means of tyrannizing are not restricted to the acts which it
may do by the hands of its political functionaries. Society can and
does execute its own mandates ... it practices a social tyranny
more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since,
though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves
fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the
details of life, and enslaving the soul itself. 4 3

139 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 141 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
140 Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 102-03
(1961).
141 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197 (1957). A lineal descendant of this
idea is Justice O'Connor's concern for the "offensive and disturbing nature" of
picketing outside of personal residences. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487
(1988); see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 478-79 (1980) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting)
("'To those inside.., the home becomes something less than a home.... [T]ensions
and pressures may be psychological, not physical, but they are not, for that reason,
less inimical to family privacy and truly domestic tranquility.'... [T]here are few of
us that would feel comfortable knowing that a stranger lurks outside our home."
(quoting Wauwatosa v. King, 182 N.W.2d 530, 537 (Wis. 1971))).
142 One reason for this concern might have been the difficulty of proving concrete
economic impact, since many blacklisting organizations denied blacklisting. Cf.
FAULK, supra note 138, at 240-43, 261-62 (detailing an attempt to prove economic
damages from blacklisting).
143 Mill, On Liberty, supra note 114, at 478-79. Mill further observed:
For a long time past, the chief mischief of the legal penalties is that
they strengthen the social stigma. It is that stigma which is really effective,
and so effective is it, that the profession of opinions which are under the
ban of society is much less common in England than is, in many other
countries, the avowal of those which incur risk ofjudicial punishment....
Our merely social intolerance kills no one, roots out no opinions, but
induces men to disguise them, or to abstain from any active effort for their
diffusion.
Id. at 505-06.
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In this perception, Mill stands in a long line of political thinkers
and social theorists. 144 Contemporary social psychologists find
that the prospect of continued exposure to adverse public opinion
reduces not only a subject's willingness to advocate nonconformist
positions, but also the willingness to entertain such positions

privately. 145
144

Consider the words ofJohn Locke:

And as to the punishments due from the laws of the commonwealth,
they frequently flatter themselves with the hopes of impunity. But no man
escapes the punishment of their censure and dislike, who offends against
the.., opinion of the company he keeps, and would recommend himself
to. Nor is there one of ten thousand, who is stiff and insensible enough, to
bear up under the constant dislike and condemnation of his own club.
1 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 479 (Alexander C.
Fraser ed., Dover Publications, Inc. 1959) (1690); see also 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 261 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1945) (1840) ("[I]n a democratic
country ... public favor seems as necessary as the air we breathe, and to live at
variance with the multitude is, as it were, not to live. The multitude require no laws
to coerce those who do not think like themselves: public disapprobation is enough
....
'). Another theorist writes:
The opinion an individual has of himself and his doings, like all judgments
not, grounded on the perceptions of the senses, is greatly affected by
suggestion.... Rarely can one regard his deed as fair when others find it
foul, or count himselfa hero when the world deems him a wretch. The first
hold of a man's fellows is, therefore, their power to set him against himself,
and to stretch him on the rack of whatever ideas of excellence he may
possess.
EDWARD A. Ross, SOCIAL CONTROL: A SURVEY OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF ORDER 90
(1901).
John Braithwaite has recently reviewed the literature suggesting that the prospect
of public shaming before relevant reference groups exerts a far greater deterrent
impact on illegal behavior than does the prospect of legal punishment. See JOHN
BRAITHWArTE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 69-74 (1989); see also id. at 124-27
(examining the impact of shaming on white collar criminals); BRENT FISSE & JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON CORPORATE OFFENDERS 229, 233-36
(1983) (same).
145 In a classic experiment, Asch found that 35% of subjects could be induced
regularly to voice a clearly incorrect opinion when confronted with a group that
unanimously voiced that erroneous opinion. See S.E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure
Upon the Modification and Distortion ofJudgments, in GROUPS, LEADERSHIP AND MEN
177, 181 (Harold Guetzkow ed., 1951); see also Knud S. Larsen, The Asch Conformity
Experiment: Replication and Transhistorical Comparisons, 5 J. SOC. BEHAV. &
PERSONALITY 163, 166-67 (1990) (finding that conformity rates correspond to
prevailing political and social values); Serge Moscovici, SocialInfluenceand Conformity,
in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 347,377 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson
eds., 3d ed. 1985) (explaining that the coercive power of the majority operates "not
by virtue of its numerical strength but by virtue of the unanimity of consensus");
Nigel Nicholson et al., Conformity in the Asch Situation: - A Comparison Between
ContemporaryBritish and U.S. University Students, 24 BRITISHJ. SOC. PSYCH. 59 (1985)
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The impact of stigma depends upon the strength and pervasiveness of the mobilized hostility. To be branded a Socialist in
1954 is quite different than being branded a Socialist in 1990.146
The effectiveness of social pressure is also dependent on its
uniformity; tolerance and pluralism both vitiate the threat of social
sanctions.

147

The opportunity to cluster with like-minded members of a
political minority makes the threat of majority disapprobation less
fearsome, and the knowledge of the existence of other dissenters
may be sufficient to resist the tyranny of the majority. 148 In
evaluating the climate of public opinion, it is not sufficient to
determine national averages. Social sanctions against nonconformi(finding that a minority yield to pressure of uniformity).

When subjects in such experiments were allowed to voice their opinions in
private, away from exposure to the group, conformity plummeted. See Morton
Deutsch & Harold B. Gerard, A Study of Normative and InformationalSocialInfluences
upon IndividualJudgment 51 J. ABNORMAL AND SOC. PSYCH. 629, 633 (1955);Jane S.
Moulton et al., The Relationship Between Frequency of Yielding and the Disclosure of
PersonalIdentity, 24J. PERSONALITY 339, 342-43 (1956). The prospect of continued
exposure to groups seems to induce a change of private as well as public beliefs. See
Charles A. Kiesler et al., Deviation and Conformity: Opinion Change as a Function of
Commitmen Attraction and Presence of a Deviate, 3 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCH.
458, 463-66 (1966); see also SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, IN THE AGE OF THE SMART MACHINE:
THE FUTURE OF WORK AND POWER 344-51 (1988) (observing "powerful conformityinducing effects of shared information" in computerized workplace, and explaining
the tactic of internalizing "the normative standard of the observer" as a method of
avoiding the threat of shame); cf. Alice H. Eagly et al., Sex Differences in Conformity:
Surveillance by the Group as a Determinantof Male NonConformity, 40J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCH. 384, 389-90 (1981) (finding surveillance decreased male but not female
conformity).
Note, however, that subjects predict the effect on others to be stronger than it
is. See Robert J. Woloson et al., Predictions of Own and Other's Conformity, 43 J.
PERSONALITY 357, 358 (1985).
146 Being branded a "liberal" has its own political consequences, however, and
being labelled a Communist in Russia may be more hazardous today than it ever was
in the U.S.
147 Thus, whether the decrease in hostility today towards particular dissenting
views is a function of greater tolerance or simply a splintering of the locus of hostility,
the result is less constraining social pressure. Compare Mueller, supra note 126, at 3

(arguing that there is increased tolerance of leftists with no redirection towards other

groups) with JOHN L. SULLIVAN ET AL., POLITICAL TOLERANCE AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 77, 250-52 (1982) (concluding that "pluralistic intolerance" has replaced
the focused intolerance of the 1950s).
148 Existence of either allies or nonconforming opponents substantially reduces
the above described Asch effect. See Ehor 0. Boyanowsky et al., Generalizationof
Independence Created by Social Support, 31 PSYCHOL. REC. 475, 481 (1981); William N.
Morris & Robert S. Miller, The Effects of Consensus-Breakingand Consensus-Preempting
Partnerson Reduction of Conformity, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 215, 221-22
(1975).
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ty achieve their impact on a retail not wholesale level. Just as the
availability of a sheltering community of dissenters can blunt a
social threat, the inhabitant of an island of narrow-mindedness may
find social pressure exposure unendurable.
These considerations suggest that if we are troubled by the
impact of social pressure on the exercise of individual autonomy, we
should be particularly alert to protect the formation of small
communities of dissenters. Protection of these communities from
social sanctions, in addition to the protection of individual anonymity, provides shelter for the exercise of other individual liberties.
2. The Significance of the Impacts
However real the effects of disclosure may be, many of them do
not derive from regulatory or criminal measures that invoke state
coercion. They depend on intermediary private parties. Whether
this factjustifies lenient treatment of such effects is not immediately
obvious. In a constitutional regime whose focus is the control of
governmental authority, and which values citizens' association for
collective action, one might argue that sanctions resulting from
private obloquy or economic pressure fall outside of the scope of
constitutional concern. Ultimately, this objection is unpersuasive;
courts must take account of social pressure in constitutional
analysis.
a. The Import of Private Actions
Few doubt that the administration of public affairs by the
government is subject to constitutional constraint. Whether private
reactions to public disclosures are a legitimate element of constitutional analysis, however, has been a subject of disagreement. The
question was raised in early judicial encounters with the Red Scare
of the 1950s. In Barsky v. United States,1 49 in the course of upholding a contempt citation against an unfriendly witness before
HUAG, the majority observed:
It is no doubt true that public revelation at the present time of
Communist belief and activity on the part of an individual would
result in embarrassment and damage. This result would not occur
because of the Congressional act itself; that is, the Congress is not
imposing a liability, or attaching by direct enactment a stigma.

149

167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
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The result would flow from0 the current unpopularity of the
15
revealed belief and activity.
Justice Jackson picked up the theme in his concurrence in JointAntiFascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,151 arguing that "mere designation as subversive deprives the organizations themselves of no
legal right or immunity.... Their claim of injury is that they cannot
attract audiences, enlist members, or obtain contributions as readily
as before.
These, however, are sanctions applied by public
disapproval ....
The Court ultimately repudiated the claim that the mediation of
private sanctions removed constitutional concerns. 153 In NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,154 Justice Harlan wrote for a unanimous court:
It is not sufficient to answer, as the State does here, that whatever
repressive effect compulsory disclosure of names of petitioner's
members may have upon participation by Alabama citizens in
petitioner's activities follows not from state action but from private
[action]. The crucial factor is the interplay of governmental and
private action, for it is only after the initial exertion of state power
represented by the production order that private action takes
hold.'

55

Since NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, attempts by states to
disavow responsibility for public reaction have been consistently
rebuffed. 15 6 The Court will probably have the opportunity to

110 Id. at 249.
151 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
15 2 Id. at 183-84 (Jackson,J, concurring).

153 The first clear announcement came in Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178
(1957). Speaking for all butJustice Clark, ChiefJustice Warren described the impact
of HUAC investigations on freedom of speech and association and rejected the claim
that the government was not responsible: "That this impact is partly the result of
non-governmental activity by private persons cannot relieve the investigators of their
responsibility for initiating the reaction." Id. at 198. Justice Clark maintained that
"remote and indirect disadvantages such as 'public stigma, scorn and obloquy' may
be related to the First Amendment, but they are not enough to block investigation."
Id. at 232 (Clark, J., dissenting).
15 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
155 Id. at 463.
156 See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747, 767-68 (1986) ("Pennsylvania's ... harassment of women who choose
to exercise their personal, intensely private, right ... to end a pregnancy [by
requiring disclosure of their identities poses] an unacceptable danger of deterring the
exercise of that right.. . ."); Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459
U.S. 87, 93 (1982) ("'[E]vidence offered need show only a reasonable probability that
the compelled disclosure of a party's contributors' names will subject them to threats,
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1 57
address the argument again in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey.
Under a conventional "state action" analysis, disclosures by
government officials are bound by constitutional constraints. Some
recent commentary, however, suggests that governmental efforts to
generate private retaliation, at least in the area of the First Amend-

ment, should be viewed with a tolerant eye. Professor Schauer, for
example, takes the position that the "fact that there is an absence of
governmental force behind private intolerance is a difference in
kind and not a difference in degree.... If social intolerance has a
practical effect similar to that caused by governmental coercion, it
is because people choose to respect the views of the majority
"158

In his initial scholarly statement of his views, Professor Schauer
characterized his argument as "tentative."1 59
With somewhat
larger stakes on the table, however, he joined without reservation in

harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties.'"
(emphasis added) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976))); Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 65 (exacting scrutiny is "necessary even if any deterrent effect on the exercise of
First Amendment Rights arises, not through direct government action, but indirectly
as an unintended but inevitable result of the government's conduct in requiring
disclosure"); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) ("This repressive
effect, while in part the result of private attitudes and pressures, was brought to bear
only after the exercise of governmental power had threatened to force disclosure of
the ... names."); cf Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 52-53 (1961) ("There is
here no likelihood that deterrence of association may result from foreseeable private
action, for bar committee interrogations such as this are conducted in private."
(citation omitted)).
157 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 24,792, at *76-85 (3d Cir. Oct. 21, 1991) (invalidating
a statutory requirement that married women in Pennsylvania inform their husbands
before obtaining an abortion as an "undue burden," where such notice predictably
results in the exercise of physical, psychological, and economic coercion to prevent
abortions),petitionforcert.filed,
Nov. 7, 1991; cf id. at *97-99 (upholding requirement
of confidential reports to state of identity of referring physician); id. at *99-105
(upholding requirement of public disclosure of identity of abortion providers
receiving government funds).
158 FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPICAL ENQUIRY 121 (1982); cf.
Buckley & Bozell, supra note 46, at 51-52 (social sanctions are preferred to legal
sanctions because they "more accurately reflect the real 'lay' of community
sentiment.... A legal sanction is, in theory 100 percent effective: all.., are made
to conform, even if only 51 percent ... entertain the views that prompted the
legislation.... Social sanctions, by contrast, are effective roughly in proportion to the
number of persons who wish to exercise them.... ."); William Glaberson, Trapped in
the Terror of New York's HoldingPens, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1990, at Al, B4 ("[P]olice
officers put a sign on the back of [a suspect] saying the man was accused of raping
his own daughter. Then ... the officers sent him into the [holding] pens in a
Brooklyn courthouse.").
159 SCHAUER, supra note 158, at 125.
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160
the Report of the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography,

which sought to encourage "[c]itizen action in the area of lawful
economic boycotts and picketing of establishments which produce,
161
distribute or sell sexually explicit materials in the community."
The Commission suggested that "citizen groups may wish to focus
on materials which are not legally obscene and which are constitutionally protected from government regulation." 162 Professor
Schauer's position on the Commission staff's abortive efforts to
facilitate "citizen action" by drafting a final section on "identif[ied]
... distributors of... pornographic material" 163 is unclear, as is
his stance on earlier Commission efforts to induce distributors not
to sell certain publications by threatening to include that final
section.164

In an argument similar to Professor Schauer's, Professor Sherry
sees in the work of Dean Bollinger the seeds of approbation for
government efforts to deter or educate through nongovernmental
160 COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 15. At least two reports credit
Professor Schauer with being the author of both the draft that formed the basis of
the ultimate report, and the reporter who assimilated the views of the Commission
into a final draft. See Hendrik Hertzberg, Big Boobs: Ed Meese and His Pornography
Commission, NEW REPUBLIC, July 14, 1986, at 21; Robert Scheer, Inside the Meese
Commission, PLAYBOY, Aug. 1986, at 154, 164-66.
161 COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 15, at 1317.
162 Id. at 1318. The Report continues:
Some types of pornographic materials may be harmful, offensive and
incompatible with certain community values, but nonetheless fall short of
the legal standard for prosecution ....
In these instances grassroots efforts
may be an effective countermeasure .... Grassroots measures may include
picketing and store boycotts.., contacting sponsors of television and radio
programs... and the use of the media.... Pickets and boycotts... [may]
be an effective means of... alerting retailers that every option available will
be exercised to discourage ... circulation.
Id. at 1339-40. For more advice on grassroots organization, read further:
Businesses can be encouraged to insure that they are not being unknowingly
used as an instrument for the spread of obscene or pornographic material
which the community has requested not be produced or sold on moral,
social or other legitimate grounds ....
In the case of credit card companies,
a review of the types of businesses that their "merchant" members are
conducting might be useful.
Id. at 1348.
163 Playboy Enters. v. Meese, 639 F. Supp. 581, 588 (D.D.C. 1986) (enjoining
publication of a list of identified distributors of pornography). Although the
executive director of the Commission issued a letter referring to the "drafting" of
such a "final section," the Commission advised the court they would not publish such
a section. See id.
164 See id. (requiring retraction of a letter threatening inclusion in the blacklist).
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intolerance. "Under this version of Bollinger's tolerance theory,
however, there is no reason for the government to remain neutral;
1 65
it need only permit the speech, not condone it."
These arguments seem to view constitutional protection of
speech as a by-product of the pursuit of more important values. If
the effort to provoke suppression by private action avoids danger to
those values, there is no constitutional bar. If, for Professor
Schauer, or the contemporary Court, the speech of pornographers
and Nazis is protected only because such protection is necessary to
disable the government from suppressing truly valuable forms of
speech,166 facilitating private suppression of pornographers and
Nazis is permissible because the Constitution still protects gay-rights
activists and controversial artists. If, under Dean Bollinger's theory,
legal protection for obnoxious speech is a mere training ground in
165 Suzanna Sherry, An Essay ConcerningToleration, 71 MINN. L. REV. 963, 988-89
(1987).

Bollinger's own stand on the issue is less clear. In his view, there is a clear
distinction between government intolerance, which is improper, and private
intolerance, which is constitutionally tolerated and often appropriate. See LEE C.
BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN
AMERICA 12-13 (1986) ("When we compare our reluctance to impose legal restraints

against speech with our readiness to employ a host of informal, or nonlegal,forms of
coercion... the paradox is striking.... We may respond [to deeply offensive speech]
with ridicule or humiliation ... social shunning, ...

[or the withholding of]

employment opportunities."); see also id. at 71 ("A subtle, but nonetheless extensive
process of dissolution can [occur] by denying the ...group the means of responding
to the behavior they find troublesome.").
The relations between the two are muddy, however. On one hand, the burden
of much of Bollinger's argument is that government must provide a model of
toleration, which will serve to control overreactions in the social sphere. See id. at
109-10. On the other hand, he suggests that we "use natural curbs whenever we can,"
and that anonymous speech is unprotected because "the anonymity of the act makes
the vast web of social, unofficial constraints and penalties ineffective." Id. at 212.
166 The Supreme Court in recent years has evinced a repeated tendency to
distinguish between high value speech, which is regarded as truly protected, and low
value speech, which is protected only as a hedge against erroneous suppression of
high value speech. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 2456, 2460 (1991)
(holding that nude dancing was only "[marginally] within the outer perimeters of the
First Amendment"); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988)
(concluding that false statements about public figures have "little value" but must be
tolerated in order to protect speech with "constitutional value"); City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 49 n.2 (1986) ("'[I]t is manifest that society's
interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser,
magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate... .'(quoting Young
v. American Mini Theatre, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976))); Young, 427 U.S. at 61
("[T]here is ...a less vital interest in the uninhibited exhibition of material that is on
the borderline between pornography and artistic expression than in the free
dissemination of ideas of social and political significance ....
").
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tolerance, encouragement of private suppression of intolerant
speech might lead to a net increase in the tolerance which is to be
fostered by First Amendment protections.
By the nature of its premises, the Schauer/Bollinger/Sherry
argument is limited in its applicability. When it is legitimately
applicable, its predictions of probable outcomes are dubious.
On a theoretical level, the arguments are rooted in a particular
conception of freedom of speech. They assume that freedom of
speech is valued instrumentally, as a means of encouraging
tolerance, or preserving political discourse, rather than as an
intrinsic human good. This is not an uncontroversial assumption,167 and if free speech is intrinsically valuable, the radical
distinction between private and public censorship dissolves. If free
expression is a virtue, its suppression is a vice, regardless of the
source of the suppression.
More importantly, whatever the proper conception of freedom
of speech, a variety of constitutional rights vulnerable to governmentally triggered private suppression are generally conceded to be
of intrinsic, not instrumental, value. We value reproductive
freedom, family autonomy, and freedom of religion as liberties in
their own right, not as means to other political goals. When
disclosures adversely affect these rights, the Schauer/Sherry/
Bollinger argument is simply irrelevant.
Leaving aside such theoretical objections, analyses that exonerate private intolerance incorporate the dubious empirical judgment
that the encouragement of private suppression is consistent with the
social goals of the First Amendment. The McCarthy years attest to
the dangerousness of the suggestion that the government may
encourage private actors to achieve what it is prohibited from doing.
An aura of neat hypocrisy surrounds HUAC's assertion that "while
Congress does not have the power to deny citizens the right to
believe in, teach, or advocate communism.., it does have the right
to focus the spotlight of publicity upon their activities." 168 Vice
167

Many commentators regard free speech rights as intrinsically valuable. See, e.g.,

C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47 (1989); THOMAS I.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION 6-7 (1971); STEVEN SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST

AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 113-20 (1990); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory
of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 215-22 (1972).
168 HOUSE COMM. ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN

ACTIVITIES AND PROPAGANDA, H.R. REP. No. 2, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1939); see
also Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 256 (D.C. Cir.) (Edgerton,J., dissenting)

("The Committee and its members have repeatedly said in terms or in effect that its
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pays homage to virtue. Public sanctions are confessed to be
improper, and constitutional values are affirmed, back-handedly.
The piquancy of the contrast between private sanctions and
government's sense of its constitutional duty might strengthen
support for the virtues of tolerance.
Social evolution is more likely to follow a different course,
however. The moral drawn from official attempts to evade a norm
will probably be that the norm is not worthy of respect. The
evolution from the assumption that Congress "has no right to deny
citizens the right to advocate Communism" to the outlawing of the
Communist Party was not unrelated to the efforts to "focus the
spotlight of publicity." One of the lessons of "massive resistance"
to desegregation orders is that local government efforts to evade
constitutional commands reduced the likelihood of their peaceful
69
implementation. 1
Similarly, one can speculate that recurrent efforts to deter
abortions by the back door of burdensome regulations have
contributed to the credibility of private anti-abortion activities, both
inside and outside the law. The message that "we can't get them,
but you can" seems less likely to evoke measured reflection than to
provoke witch hunts, vigilantes, and fervent calls for more active
government participation.
Once loosed against the soft-core pornographer, the genie of
social pressure is not likely to spare gay-rights activists or provocative artists. Fine discriminations between valuable and valueless
speech, barely plausible in the imposition of legal sanctions, are still
less likely in private conduct. Court hearings prior to incarceration
provide an opportunity to demonstrate "redeeming social value" or
the "political" nature of speech. Private sanctions, by contrast, are
unburdened by the formal constraints of notice and hearing. The

main purpose is to do by exposure and publicity what it believes may not validly be
done16 9by legislation."), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948).

See, e.g., HARRELL R. RODGERS, JR. & CHARLES S. BULLOCK, III, COERCION TO

COMPLIANCE 65-67 (1976) (concluding that resistance by school officials had a high
negative correlation with acceptance of the legitimacy of the desegregation decisions);
FRANCIS M. WILHOIT, THE POLITICs OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE 41-48 (1973) (discussing
local government resistance to school desegregation); cf. DAVID J. KIRBY ET AL.,
POLITICAL STRATEGIES IN NORTHERN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 136-37 (1973) (finding
decentralized opposition to desegregation in the North, which readily capitulated to
court order requiring desegregation); D. GARTH TAYLOR, PUBLIC OPINION AND
COLLECTIVE ACTION, THE BOSTON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CONFLICT 81-95 (1986)
(concluding that opposition by community leaders in Boston to bussing led
neighborhood residents to oppose the bussing remedy).
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probability that consumers will distinguish the varying literary merit
of articles in offensive magazines before boycotting convenience
stores is infinitesimally small.
Nonviolent social sanctions, unlike legal sanctions, intrinsically
require a substantial public following. If constitutional protections
are designed primarily to prevent a minority of governors from
suppressing a majority of the governed, one could claim that social
sanctions are less inimical than official prosecution to constitutional
principles. 170 In. the short run, the government can shut down
opposition newspapers by brute force in the face of an apathetic, or
even hostile, populace. A boycott declared against newspapers read
by, or even tolerated by, the great bulk of the -populace, however,
is unlikely to have either immediate or long-term effects on the
1
target.

17

But constitutional protections are counter-majoritarian. Rights
are protected against the sincerely expressed will of the people in
the fields of religion, association, reproductive autonomy, expression, and criminal procedure. Although disclosure likely will be
ineffective against targets who do not violate broadly held social
norms, adherence to broadly held norms is not the litmus test of
1 72
constitutional protection.
The groups most likely to benefit from limitations on government exposure are those who generate the most public antagonism.
In contemporary America, this means both Nazis and gays, not to
mention those who incinerate the American flag. The fact that most
of us are usually safe from the effects of exposure does not suggest
that constitutional values are equally secure.
170

See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Role of the People in FirstAmendment Theory, 74

CAL. L. REV. 761, 779-85 (1986) ("[W]e might wish to be especially sensitive to
restrictions on political speech by unaccountable public officials. But whether we

should be equally concerned with restrictions inspired, supported and implemented
by the people is far more problematic.").

171 Note, however, as observed supranotes 114-38 and accompanying text, that a

boycott need not have a majority following to be effective; public hostility allowing

for violent harassment can be effective if even a small minority engages in it.
172 One might also argue that social sanctions are brought to bear even without
government involvement, and that sponsors clearly shape modern communications
media. See BARNOTW, supra note 119, at 149-51. Intense and cohesively organized
groups will obtain information on how to exert leverage over sponsors, and hence
over the media, without any government involvement. See MONTGOMERY, supra note
125, at 48-55, 112. In this view, all government exposure does is correct for collective
action problems by placing less organized groups on a similar plane. But whatever
the empirical merits of the argument, the "efficient" result here is less freedom of
speech.
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b. The Constitutionally Protected Status of Social Pressure and the
ConstitutionalValues of Privacy
However real the impact of social pressure may be, raising it to
the level of a constitutional impairment may conflict with other
parts of the constitutional scheme. On the surface, a tension exists
between the proposition that public opinion's effects raise constitutional concerns and the recently reaffirmed First Amendment
doctrine that unwilling recipients of public offensive messages may
"effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply
by averting their eyes." 173 In general, contemporary constitutional doctrine recognizes that public life in a democratic society
requires a reasonably thick skin. If the state is legally disabled from
shielding its citizens from verbal offenses to their dignity, why, one
may ask, should it be precluded from enlisting attacks on dignity in
socially constructive causes? Periodically, the Court reiterates that
boycotts and "threats of [vilification or] social ostracism" are
1 74
constitutionally protected.
On one level, the tension is easily resolved. First Amendment
protection for words evoking social opprobrium does not presuppose a belief that the targets of social pressure experience no harm.
Protection need only rest on the claim that such harm does not
overcome the general principle prohibiting government punishment
of speech. The possibility of "public obloquy" cannot be eliminated;
it is a cost of freedom that must be borne. The government's

173 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). The Court has unanimously
reiterated its "longstanding refusal to [punish speech] because the speech in question
may have an adverse impact on the audience." Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 55 (1988); see also United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2410 (1990) ("'If
there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the
Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds
the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.'" (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
414 (1989))); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) ("As a general matter, we have
indicated that in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even
outrageous, speech in order to provide 'adequate "breathing space" [for] the First
Amendment.'" (quoting HustlerMagazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 56)).
174 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 921 (1982). The Court has
noted that "[s]peech does not lose its protected character ... because it may
embarrass others or coerce them into action." Id. at 910; cf. EdwardJ. DeBartolo
Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568,578 (1988)
(holding that the peaceful distribution of leaflets by a union did not "threaten, coerce,
or restrain any person"). But ef. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S.
411,425-28 (1990) (holding a politically motivated, but self-interested, boycott illegal
despite lack of showing of market power); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-85
(1988) (upholding a prohibition on picketing targeted at a residence).
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contribution to ostracism, on the other hand, raises constitutional
objections, for the government can be bound in ways that private
175
parties are not.
This explanation adequately accounts for those cases that
condemn the imposition of psychic injury, while protecting the
offending speech from punishment. The First Amendment imposes
a need for "breathing space," 176 and it is difficult to draw bright
lines distinguishing "outrageousness" from politics, 177 or lyrics
178
from vulgarity.
The explanation is less successful in reconciling those cases that
contemplate social pressures directed against private parties as a
legitimate, and perhaps essential, element of free expression
protected by the First Amendment. 17 9 As Tocqueville recognized,
America is a nation of joiners. From colonial nonimportation
associations, to temperance rallies, to open-housing marches, the
collective voice of the "public out of doors" is traditionally thought
175 Thus, although interference with private erection of a creche would be a
violation of First Amendment protections of free expression and free speech, a
religious nativity scene at a courthouse violates the Establishment Clause. See County
of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 598-602 (1989). Although private racist speech
may be protected by the First Amendment, see Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1
(1949), government speech that encourages racist activity may violate the equal
protection clause, see Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1964). Similarly, the
Court has made clear that disclosures of private information that could not
constitutionally be punished if made by private parties, are subject to sanction if
disclosed by public officials. See Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524, 538-41 (1989).
176 Boos, 485 U.S. at 322.
177 Sep HustlerMagazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 55.
178 S6 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
179 See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 580 (1988) ("The loss of customers because they read
a handbill urging them not to patronize a business ... is the result of mere
persuasion, and the neutral who reacts is doing no more than what its customers
honestly want it to do."); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886,911-12 (1982)
("Through exercise of [their] First Amendment rights, petitioners sought to bring
about political, social and economic change. Through speech, assembly and petition
... [the boycott] sought to change a social order that had consistently treated them
as second-class citizens."); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415,
419 (1971) ("Petitioners [residential picketing] plainly intended to influence
respondent's conduct by their activities; this is not fundamentally different from the
function of a newspaper."); cf. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S.
411,447 (1990) (Brennan,J., dissenting) ("Expressive boycotts have been a principal
means of political communication since the birth of the Republic.... From the
colonists' protest of the Stamp and Townsend Acts to the Montgomery bus boycott,
... boycotts have played a central role in our Nation's political discourse."); BAKER,
supranote 167, at 189-90 (concluding that assemblies and boycotts are constitutionally
as important as each individual's exercise of free speech).
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to be appropriately directed to a variety of social problems. 8 0 If
the interplay of social pressure is a crucial element of the formation
of public opinion, itself protected and fostered by the First
Amendment, disclosures that facilitate the deployment of such
social pressures should be, if not required, at least constitutionally
favored.
Perhaps, therefore, the grounding for the distinction between
direct and privately mediated sanctions raised by Bollinger, Sherry,
and Schauer is quite different than what they claim. The case for
private social sanctions can rest on the argument that they are
constitutionally protected, not constitutionally irrelevant.
Memories of the McCarthy era, like those of the civil rights
struggles in the South, recall the danger of exempting government
precipitation of private sanctions from constitutional scrutiny. Two
lines of argument, both rooted in recent Supreme Court cases,
8
suggest that such an exemption is also legally inappropriate.'1
The first approach proposes that the constitutional value of
18 2
social pressure depends on the goal for which it is exercised.
For an excellent survey of the history of popular pressure, arguing that its
protection should be embodied in the constitutional right to assembly, seeJames Gray
180

Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct PopularPower in the American Constitu
tional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 287 (1990).
181 A third response should also be considered, but ultimately rejected: that any
protection of social pressure is wrong and lacks intrinsic constitutional merit. Cf
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,487 (1988) (denying protection to targeted residential
picketing efforts); id. at 498 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that "picketing
for the sole purpose of imposing psychological harm on a family in the shelter of
their home" is not constitutionally protected). In the labor law there was an early
history of hostility toward joint actions designed for this effect. See, e.g., Giboney v.
Empire Storage and Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) (holding that a peaceful
secondary boycott could constitutionally be enjoined); Gompers v. Bucks Stove &
Range, 221 U.S. 418, 437 (1911) (holding that listing in union publication of
employers as "unfair" was an unprotected "verbal act"); see also International
Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 226 (1982) (holding that
petitioner's political boycott of Soviet goods after invasion of Afghanistan was an
unprotected secondary boycott). Later cases seem to rely on claims that boycotts call
for "coercion," as distinguished from social pressure. See InternationalLongshoremen's
Ass'n, 456 U.S. at 226; NLRB v. Retail Stores Employees Union, 447 U.S. 607, 619
(1980) (enjoining picketing calculated to coerce a neutral party in a labor dispute).
The protection for social pressure is too deeply woven into our constitutional law
and political practice to be uprooted. See, e.g., Pope, supra note 180, at 324-44, 34956 (finding constitutional and historical support for the exercise of vast social
pressure for societal change).
182 See Randall Kennedy, MartinLuther King's Constitution,98 YALE LJ. 999, 1039
(1989) ("[Nit ahistorical, noncontextual, normative judgment can properly be made
about a political boycott per se; its legitimacy depends upon the circumstances in
which it occurs."). Professor Pope flirts with a reading of recent cases that would
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Efforts to further constitutional ideals would not be regarded as
illegitimate coercion. Thus, the Court in NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware,8 upheld the constitutionally protected status of a civil
rights boycott in Port Gibson, Mississippi, emphasizing that "the
purpose of petitioners campaign was to ... vindicate rights of
equality and of freedom that lie at the heart of the Fourteenth
184
Amendment itself... to force governmental and economic change."

hold that "popular republican tactics are constitutionally protected, but only if they
exhibit the virtues of popular republicanism." Pope, supra note 180, at 351. He
ultimately suggests that such protection would be inadequate, although he fails to
directly delineate the dimensions of an adequate approach. See id. at 354.
183 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
184 Id. at 914. Petitioners' purpose was "to challenge a political and economic
system that had denied them the basic rights of dignity and equality that this country
bad fought a Civil War to secure." Id. at 918; cf. Organization for a Better Austin v.
Keefe, 402 U.S. 415,419-20 (1971) (allowing distribution of leaflets to prevent"blockbusting" and to further racial integration); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 63-64
(1960) (protecting boycott in support of equal employment opportunity).
More recent discussion in FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n., 493 U.S.
411 (1990), lends support to this argument. Writing for a six-member majority,
Justice Stevens, who also authored ClaiborneHardware,distinguished an unprotected
boycott by appointed counsel for criminal defendants in the District of Columbia,
who sought increased remuneration, from the protected boycott by the black citizens
in Port Gibson, Mississippi, who sought equal political and economic opportunities:
"Those who joined the ClaiborneHardwareboycott sought no special advantage for
themselves .... They sought only the equal respect and equal treatment to which they
were constitutionally entitled." Id. at 426; see also id. at 428 (power to regulate
economic activity "applies with special force when a clear objective of the boycott is
to economically advantage the participants").
This cannot mean that the Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n boycott was
unprotected because it was merely self-interested; the ClaiborneHardwareboycotters
also stood to benefit personally from increased black political and economic
opportunities. The claim must rather be that efforts to obtain "special" advantages
are unprotected, while efforts to obtain constitutional entitlements are constitutionally privileged. SuperiorCourt TrialLawyers Ass'n also suggests that the test is not the
purity of the motives of the participants, but the substantive constitutional value of
their goals. See id. at 427 n.1 1 (finding the claim that the boycott sought to vindicate
the constitutional rights of indigent defendants to be insufficient: "Claiborne
Hardwaredoes not, and could not, establish a rule immunizing from prosecution any
boycott based upon sincere constitutional concerns."). The distinction suggested by
Claiborne Hardware is more than simply the distinction between "political" and
Unonpolitical" speech, for the goals of the ClaiborneHardwareboycott included the
demand that "[a]ll stores must employ Negro clerks and cashiers." Claiborne
Hardware,458 U.S. at 900.
It is possible that the economic demands in Claiborne Hardware were so
intertwined with the political that the whole was rendered "political." This is not
compatible with the tone of the opinion, however. Moreover, the Court has since
taken the position that the right to petition the government for redress of grievances
provides no protection beyond the general guarantees of the First Amendment. See
McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985). Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assn
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Under this interpretation, private exertion of social pressure to
induce actions that accord with constitutional values is intrinsically
protected, while social pressure to suppress constitutionally valued
activities is protected only insofar as "breathing space" is necessary
to protect "core" First Amendment activities. Government actions
facilitating the first form of pressure would be more defensible than
those which expedite the latter. Thus, governmental denunciations
of named members of discriminatory private clubs would stand on
a different footing than the publication of the names of members
185

of the NAACP.
This approach presses too hard on the notion of "constitutional

values." It presumes that certain private actions are constitutionally
favored, and not simply protected from governmental sanction.
This, alone, is a matter of some controversy for those who envision
the Constitution as a charter of limits upon government. More
problematic is the hierarchy among constitutional provisions that
courts would be required to establish. The attempts to obtain
employment opportunities for blacks or racially integrated neighborhoods reflect the "values" of the Civil War amendments. These
efforts are, if current law is any indication, accorded greater weight
than the rights of property and contract reflected in the Contracts
Clause, the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, or the
freedom of association read into the interstices of due process and
free speech.' 86 Absent a strong theory of constitutional hierar-

demonstrates that political motivation or subject matter does not remove a boycott
from legal regulation. See also InternationalLongshoremen's Ass'n, 456 U.S. at 224-26
("We would create a large and undefinable exception to the statute if we accepted the
argument that 'political' boycotts are exempt from the secondary boycott provision.").
One doubts that a similar status would be accorded to a boycott designed to
induce the discharge of black employees, or a boycott designed to induce local
authorities to eliminate antidiscrimination laws. Cf. Roberts v. United StatesJaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 625-29 (1984) (finding a compelling state interest in eliminating sexual
discrimination-discrimination "entitled to no constitutional protection").
185 ComparePacific-Union Club v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 287,294-97 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1991) (striking subpoena for membership list of club that engages in
discriminatory admissions practices) with Salvation Army v. Department of
Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 185-86 (3d Cir. 1990) (remanding challenge to
regulations requiring disclosure of identification of residents of a homeless shelter).
If one took this approach seriously, the question of intermediate cases would
become troublesome, such as the publication of a list of the ten worst polluters in a
city, or the violators of wage-price guidelines. Disruption of price stability and
pollution are not constitutional rights, but neither is their elimination a constitutional
imperative.
186 On the other hand, the most recent case raising the issue sensibly suggests that
private attempts at social pressure in service of a goal constitutionally prohibited to
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chy, the approach dissolves.
A second approach is better grounded. We may grant the
general propriety of social pressure, as part of a free social system,
while shielding certain constitutionally privileged areas from
exposure to such pressure. A presupposition of the political system
embodied in the Constitution is the autonomy of citizens in the
formation of their personality and opinions. Constitutional analysis
should thus draw a line between actions and activities that are in the
public domain, and others that require the incubation of privacy to
maintain autonomy. 8 7 Only the former class of activities is a
legitimate object of social pressure. The latter is presumptively
1 88
shielded from government disclosures.
the government is constitutionally protected. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 47991 (1988) (according constitutional protection to anti-abortion demonstrators
picketing the home of a doctor who performed abortions).
Frisby could be reconciled with a "constitutionally protected purpose" approach
if abortion were not constitutionally protected. Note, however, that thejustices most
sympathetic to protection of the speech in Frisby were also those who are least
inclined to overrule Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). CompareFrisby, 487 U.S. at
491 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.); Frisby, 487 U.S. at 496 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) with Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2951 (1990) (Marshall,J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part,joined by Brennan & Blackmun,JJ.); Ohio
v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972, 2984 (1990) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting,joined by Brennan & Marshall,JJ.); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492
U.S. 490, 537 (1989) (Blackmun,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part,joined
by Brennan & Marshall, J1.).
17 Cf. Louis Michael Seidman, PublicPrincipleandPrivate Choice: The Uneasy Case
for a Bounday Maintenance Theory of ConstitutionalLaw, 96 YALE LJ. 1006, 1026-27
(1987) (arguing for distinctions between actions attributable to the government and
inactions leaving private decisions untouched); SilasJ. Wasserstromm &Louis Michael
Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 108-10
(1988) [hereinafter, Seidman, FourthAmendment] (arguing that similar protections are
required by civic republicanism).
Private refuges are part of what has saved America from the tyranny of the
majority, perceived by Tocqueville as a likely consequence of social equality. See DE
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 144, at 9-10, 261-63; cf. S. N. EISENSTADT & L. RONIGER,
PATRONS, CLIENTS AND FRIENDS, INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS AND THE STRUCTURE OF

TRUST IN SOCIETY 282-84 (1984) (arguing that shelter from the "glare of public life"
is a prerequisite to the development of intimate dyadic relations characteristic of an
open society).
188 Although the Court has never fully resolved when the state may prohibit media
communication in the interest of "privacy," it has suggested that some occasions may
warrant limits. Although the Court has struck down restrictions on free speech in
every encounter with the interest of personal privacy, it has invariably crafted its
holdings to leave open the door for more narrowly tailored protections of the privacy
interests. See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102-04 (1979)
(protecting the publication of the identity of a juvenile court defendant); Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-94 (1975) (protecting the broadcast
of rape victim's name contained in public records); Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,
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The importance of a line between presumptively public and
presumptively private varieties of information is obvious in the case
of dissenting political views. The "spotlight of pitiless publicity" in
the McCarthy era radically constricted contemporaneous political
discourse, and narrowed the public resources available for a
generation. The Court has regularly recognized that shelter from
public exposure is often a prerequisite to the contribution of
unorthodox views to the marketplace of ideas.
The principle, moreover, is not limited to activities of direct
political relevance. The offensiveness of the inquiries by HUAC and
the loyalty boards lay not only in their potential impact on the
future political activities of the witnesses. The inquiries were
experienced, and intended, as violations of witnesses' personal
autonomy.
So, too, the ritualistic requirement that former

389-91 (1967) ("false light" privacy action).
In its most recent venture into the area, the Court struck down a damage award
to a rape victim whose name, in violation of a Florida statute, had been published in
a local newspaper while her assailant was still at large; the victim suffered harassment,
telephoned threats and mental breakdown. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524,52829 (1989). The Court's majority pointedly emphasized the "limited" nature of the
holdingRespecting the fact that press freedom and privacy rights are both "plainly
rooted in the traditions and significant concerns of our society," ... [w]e
continue to believe that the sensitivity and significance of the interests
presented in clashes between First Amendment and privacy rights counsel
relying on limited principles that sweep no more broadly than the
appropriate context of the instant case.
Id. at 533. In particular, the majority relied on the fact that the newspaper initially
"lawfully obtained" the victim's name from an inadvertent and unauthorized
disclosure by the local police department in the absence of "individualized
adjudication" regarding the impropriety and harmful nature of the publication. See
id. at 538-40.
The facts of the Florida Star case might evoke some skepticism regarding the
narrowness of the holding. The initial release took place in violation of department
policy, and in a room where the applicable Florida statute was clearly displayed. The
publication took place in violation of the newspaper's own internal policy, and the
harm to the victim was palpable.
In contrast to its protection of intrusive private speech, the Court has regularly
suggested that the clash between values of privacy and hostility to government
regulation of communication appropriately can be avoided by official policies
requiring the retention of confidential information unduly impinging on private
realms. See, e.g., id. at 534 (noting that government may classify certain sensitive
information to protect private interests); Landmark Communications Inc. v. Virginia,
435 U.S. 829, 845 (1978) (stating that risk of premature disclosure can be eliminated
"through careful internal procedures to protect... confidentiality"); CoxBroadcasting,
420 U.S. at 496 (noting that, if there are privacy rights to be protected, the states
must respond by means which avoid any disclosure).
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Communists "name the names" of their leftist friends and colleagues as a condition of avoiding blacklists was objectionable even
when the names had been published previously. The public betrayal
of intimate relations assaulted both the witnesses and those they
identified by denying their autonomy as citizens.
The citizen who is truly free in forming her identity should have
the opportunity to experiment with roles she does not wish to adopt
in public.18 9 Women have a constitutional right to exercise their
reproductive autonomy and then distance themselves from that
exercise, even in their own minds. 190 Similarly, the First Amendment interest in "freedom of thought and expression" provides
authors a constitutionally protected right to tear up their manu19 1
scripts without disclosing them to the public.
These rights gain import from two phenomena. First, the sense
of exposure to public view encourages individuals to engage in
actions that society desires. Unorthodox but protected activities are
less likely to be undertaken when subject to public examination. 192 The author who must expose every draft to the public is
likely to turn out a more timid product than the one who can
experiment in private.
Second, exposure as the author of an action or statement links
that action to our identity; the broader the exposure, the more
indissoluble the link and the harder it is to disavow it. Forcing
citizens to publicly link themselves to identities they are constitu189 See, e.g.,JOHN A. HALL, LIBERALIsM: PoLmTCs, IDEOLOGY AND THE MARKET 8687 (1987) ("[T]wo facts ... give the individual a meaningful sense of freedom: his

ability to control information about himself and his right to choose to separate the
audiences before whom he can play separate roles."); cf. MICHEL FOUCAULT,
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 187 (1977) ("It is the fact of being constantly seen, of being
able always to be seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in his subjection.");
ERvING GOFFMAN, On the Characteristicsof Total Institutions, in ERvING GOFFMAN,
ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS AND OTHER
INMATES 23-24, 28, 33 (1961) (describing debilitating effect of forced disclosure,

which violates "informational preserve regarding the self" of inmates in total
institutions).
190

See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476

U.S. 747, 766-67 (1986).

191 See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985).
192 See, e.g., ARNOLD H. BUSS, SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND SOCIAL ANXIETY 67-68,

93 (1980) (describing public self-awareness when a person focuses his attention on
how others see him); ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE
336, 374-77 (arguing that individuals adopt social norms through observation of
members of the social group); Hans L. Zetterberg, Compliant Actions, 2 ACTA
SOCIOLOGICA 179, 183-88 (1957) (concluding that visibility leads to convergence
toward norm).

70

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 140: 1

tionally entitled to eschew is a violation of their constitutionally

193
protected autonomy-their right to define themselves.
The ability to experiment in the realm of the intimate is valuable
not only for the society it builds, but for our own sense of freedom
and character. The prospect of promiscuous disclosure is likely to
stunt the development of our character. As Professor Zuboff
observes: "To be visible in this way evokes a sense of vulnerability
and powerlessness. The person observed begins to wonder, 'Am I
exposed in some way I would not choose to be? How can I be
certain about precisely what I have exposed? What is it that they
194
might see?'"'

1

Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities

Commission, 475 U.S. 1, (1986), linked the right to decline to salute the flag, the
right to decline to place state-required slogans on one's license plate, an author's
right to block publication of her own manuscript, and the right to prevent use of
union dues for objectionable ideological purposes as manifestations of "negative free
speech rights" which "natural persons enjoy... because of their interest in selfexpression; an individual's right not to speak or to associate with the speech of others
is a component of the broader constitutional interest of natural persons in freedom
of conscience." Id. at 32-33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also id. at 18 (plurality
recognizing right of corporation to avoid "forced association with potentially hostile
views"); Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986) (finding a right of
non-union employees not to contribute to objectionable political expenditures); Keller
v. State Bar, 110 S. Ct. 2228, 2235-37 (1990) (finding a similar right for state bar
association members).
This interest is not only the right to avoid being forced to misrepresent one's
conscience to the public-it is a right of a citizen to choose her identity in certain
areas. The core objection is the government's forcing a citizen to take on an identity
that the citizen would prefer to avoid, whether by associating her involuntarily with
certain views, or having thoughts published against her will. "[A]t the heart of the
First Amendment is the notion that.., in a free society one's beliefs should be
shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State." Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977). Forcing publication of those
beliefs is a mode of coercion.
194 ZUBOFF, supra note 145, at 344. On the basis of her observations of
workplaces in which visibility has been enhanced by increased information-processing
capacity, Professor Zuboff notes a phenomenon which she calls "anticipatory
conformity":
The behavioral expectations of the observer can be so keenly anticipated by
the observed that the foreknowledge of visibility is enough to induce
conformity to those normative standards. Anticipatory conformity is a tactic
for avoiding the dread associated with the possibility of shame.... As the
immediate environment is saturated with measurement, the pressure of
visibility begins to reorganize behavior at its source, shaping it in conformity
with the normative standards of the observer.
Id. at 345. Compare the observations of the German Constitutional Court, as it
struck down parts of the German Census Law as intrusions on privacy:
If someone cannot predict with sufficient certainty which information about
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The phenomena extend beyond actions to conditions of mind
and body. Unwanted observation by others is itself a limitation of
autonomy, and the more intimate the observation, the greater the
sense of violation. To retain a sense of control over who can
observe us nurtures our sense of independence; to retain such
control over disclosure of intimate matters may be essential to our
sense of identity. Conversely, the power of the state to inflict the
sense of vulnerability is itself a sanction.
Under this analysis, public disclosures by government should be
evaluated according to what is being disclosed, not merely the
purpose of the disclosure. The subject of disclosure is relevant in
two dimensions. First, the freedom to form unorthodox political
commitments undergirds self-government. Nondisclosure benefits
our commitment to political openness. Second, the importance of
individual autonomy weighs heavily against government disclosures
in areas of life that shape intimate identity and provide autonomy
of character. The citizens needed to maintain a free society gain
independence from the capacity to make initial intimate commitments in private and from the retirement to a sanctuary free of
public scrutiny. The phrase, "it's none of your business," is no less
crucial to the vocabulary of a free citizen than the phrase, "it's a
195
free country."
This second approach also may appear to place undue weight on
a particular political conception, in this case, an individualistic
liberalism no less controversial than a hierarchy of constitutional
values. A view that public dialogue defines, refines, and purifies the
tastes of the citizenry may suggest that shielding information about
"private" activities from public debate truncates judgment and
pollutes decisions with private domination. As we will observe in
section III, however, both liberal individualism and its communal
competitors find virtues in disclosure, and retain substantial
himself in certain areas is known to his social milieu ...he is crucially
inhibited in his freedom to plan or to decide freely.... The right to selfdetermination ...precludes a social order and a legal order enabling it, in
which the citizens no longer can know who knows what, when and on what
occasion about them.
Judgment of Dec. 15, 1983, BVerfG, 65 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsderichts [BVerfGE] 1, translatedin 5 HuM. RTs. LJ. 94, 100 (1984) [hereinafter German
Census Judgment].
195 See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) (noting that the importance of
"'preserving the sanctity of the home, the one retreat to which men and women can
repair to escape from the tribulations of their daily pursuits"justifies prohibition of
residential picketing (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980))).
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sanctuaries from public observation.
II. IN PRAISE OF SUNLIGHT: THE ARGUMENTS FOR OPENNESS
Having established the cognizable impact of government
exposures, how can we account for the reluctance of courts to
condemn disclosures unequivocally? The answer returns us to Louis
Brandeis's claim that "sunlight is the best of disinfectants" and faith
in the forum of public opinion. Judicial reluctance is rooted in the
virtues of disclosure.
In one aspect, information is a prerequisite to the effective
exercise of choice. As knowledge increases so does societal and
individual freedom. Full and accurate data is required for appropriate government policy-making and informed private decisionmaking. 196 Those who suppress information may be seeking to
manipulate an audience's choices.
Dissemination of information also may improve the actions of
those who are the subject of disclosure. Mutual disclosure and
confrontation by citizens is on some views a prerequisite to
appropriate participation in public discourse. Exposure to the
public is thought to improve the character of the participants in
public deliberations, and the quality of their decisions. 197 Even
personal decisions, when shielded from public view, it is claimed,
are less likely to be defensible with reasoned and responsible argument.

196 In the market, informed private decision-makingis also usually a prerequisite
for efficient outcomes. For possible exceptions, see, for example, Jack Hirshleifer,
The Private and Social Value of Informationand the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM.
EcON. REV. 561, 568 (1971) (arguing that in certain market models, it is more
efficient to prevent disclosure of market information prior to trading); J. Gregory
Sidak & Susan E. Woodward, CorporateTakeovers, The Commerce Clauseand the Efficient
Anonymity of Shareholders, 84 NW. U. L. REv. 1092, 1098-1100 (1990) (arguing that
participation of shareholders in decisions regarding takeovers would result in lower
profits).
197 As Professor Post observed, dissemination of information can also form a
common core of public identity that holds a society together. See Robert C. Post, The
ConstitutionalConcept of PublicDiscourse: Outrageous Opinion, DemocraticDeliberation
andHustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 603, 633-37 (1990). With regard
to this function no particular information is necessary. As long as some information
is held in common, public identity will be constituted. Nondisclosure of particular
types of information will result in different types of public identities, but it cannot be
said that any particular level of disclosure is necessarily superior to nondisclosure.
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A. The Virtues of Knowing
1. Accurate Decision-Making on Public Issues
Good social policy requires accurate information. Whether
resources should be devoted to homelessness or hunger depends,
in part, on the number of homeless and hungry; whether heroin
should be legalized depends, in part, on the number of likely heroin
addicts; whether free syringes and needles should be disseminated
depends, in part, on the rate of HIV infection in the drug-using
population. An increasingly activist state demands increasingly high
198
levels of information.
During the McCarthy era, defenders of the investigations
maintained that the enactment of proper regulations regarding the
Communist party and associated dissidents required public
disclosure of dissident activities, even if constitutionally protected
activities were adversely affected. 19 9 The argument was neither
new nor without successors; similar claims have been made
200
regarding disclosure of membership in the Ku Klux Klan,
membership in the civil rights and antiwar movements, 20 1 campaign contributions, 20 2 and abortions. 20 3 If we grant that these
activities are subject to some regulation, further disclosures appear
appropriate to ensure that such regulation is both effective and
20 4
efficient.
198 Cf. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 452 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)

("Technological progress creates an ever-expanding need for governmental
information .... .").
199 See Konigsbergv. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36,52 (1961); Barenblattv. United States,
360 U.S. 109, 112, 127-28 (1959); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 195-98
(1957); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 409 (1950) ("If it
is admitted that beliefs are springs to action, it becomes highly relevant whether the
person who is asked whether he believes in overthrow of the Government by force
is a general... or a village constable."); Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d 49, 53-54
(D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 934 (1950); United States v. Josephson, 165
F.2d 82, 88-91 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 838 (1948).
200 See New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 73-75 (1928).
201 See Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504-05 (1975);
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 547-49 (1963).
202 See Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 92-95
(1982); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-29 (1976).
20s See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 804-05 (1986) (WhiteJ., dissenting); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 79-81 (1976).
204 See University of Pa. v. EEOC, 110S. Ct. 577, 583, 587-88 (1990); Thornburgh,
476 U.S. at 804 (White, J., dissenting); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 65; Communist Party of
United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 101-02 (1961) (noting
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On one level, the claims for disclosure are one side of the
familiar conflict between the competing demands of government
efficiency and of constitutional rights. Whatever mechanisms adjust
the conflict generally might settle this issue as well. The problem
is a more poignant one, however. Adjustment of the tension
between rights and interests requires at least that they be compared.
Acquisition of contested information is thus needed to establish the
magnitude of considerations on either side of the conflict. When
the government does not know how many Communists are in the
United States, how can it determine what the costs of not knowing
are?
Moreover, even if one denies that the rights in question are
subject to defeasance by the mine run of governmental interests, the
tension raised by problems of disclosure may be more than a
conflict between "rights" and efficiency. In some areas, it is a
decision between "rights" and the system of self-governance that
justifies those rights. To the extent First Amendment rights are
rooted in the "marketplace of ideas," disclosure of information
cannot but contribute to the functioning of that marketplace. In a
well-functioning market, more information moves the market closer
to truth.2 °5 Hence, the argument that a constitutional doctrine
that inhibits disclosure "[by withholding] information from the
public" out of a "zeal to protect the public from 'too much
information' could itself not withstand First Amendment scruti206

ny."

that "secrecy itself [can be] made an active instrument of public harm").
205 See; e.g., LouIs PHLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION 12 (1988);
Joe A. Oppenheimer, Public Choice and Three Ethical Properties of Politics, 45 PUB.
CHOICE 241, 242-43 (1985). But see Michael A. Fitts, CanIgnoranceBe Bliss? Imperfect
Informationas a Positive Influence in PoliticalInstitutions,88 MICH. L. REV. 917, 939-82
(1990) (analyzing situations under which limited information may lead to better
political decisions).
206 Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1987); cf Viereck v. United States, 318
U.S. 236, 251 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that disclosure legislation
implements rather than detracts from freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment).
The paradox has not gone unnoticed in the commentary. See, e.g., FRANKLYN S.
HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 360 (1981) (arguing that the "First

Amendment claim of a right to silence is opposed by another First Amendment
value-the public's right to know"); Robert F. Nagel, How Useful isJudicialReview in
Free Speech Cases?, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 302, 322 (1984) (protection of NAACP
membership lists "protected free speech by denying the public access to important
information ... [for reasons that] conflicted with traditional first amendment
theory"). Another commentator put it this way:
If truth can be discovered only by the free trade of ideas ... any provision
which has the effect of excluding an idea.., should ... be abolished....
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Insofar as freedom of speech and political association are
grounded on ideals of democratic self-rule, suppression of information relevant to public decisions carries costs of a constitutional
magnitude. An uninformed citizenry cannot meaningfully address
itself to the substance of public affairs. Public decisions taken
without public information risk not only inaccuracy, but illegitima20 7
cy
The somewhat distinct vision of the First Amendment that
contemplates the use of public information to hold government in
check through public accountability 20 8 points initially toward a
preference for disclosure of information regarding government
But if disclosure-which promotes full information-does have the effect of
deterring and thereby excluding ideas, it is obvious that free trade of ideas
and full information are conflicting values which cannot be achieved
simultaneously.
Note, The ConstitutionalRight to Anonymity: Free Speech, Disclosureand the Devil, 70
YALE
LJ. 1084, 1112 (1961).
207
See e.g., 9 WRINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) ("A
popular government without popular information, or the means of acquiringit is but
a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern
ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves
with the power that knowledge gives."); EDWARD A. SHILS, THE TORMENT OF SECRECY
23 (1956) ("The struggle for c~nstitutional government ... was directed against
privacy in government. Almost as much as the extension of the franchise and
constitutional restraint on monarchical absolutism, publicity regarding political and
administrative affairs was a fundamental aim of the modern liberal democratic
movement."); GEORG SIMMEL, SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 337 (Kurt H. Wolff
trans. & ed., 1950) ("Every democracy holds publicity to be an intrinsically desirable
situation, on the fundamental premise that everybody should know the events and
circumstances that concern him... [to] contribute to decisions about them."); Spiros
Simitis, ReviewingPrivacy in an InformationSociety, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 707, 731 (1987)
("The more ... that privacy is equated with a deliberate and legally protected
seclusion of the individual, the more the right to be let alone develops into an
impediment to the transparency -necessary for a democratic decisionmaking

process.").
The claim goes beyond the objection to judicial review most recently articulated
by ChiefJustice Rehnquist in his dissent in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989):
"Surely one of the high purposes of a democratic society is to legislate against
conduct that is regarded as evil and profoundly offensive to the majority of people
....

Uncritical extension of constitutional protection ...

risks the frustration of the

very purpose for which organized governments are instituted." Id. at 435 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting). A lack of information interferes not only with the achievement of
public purposes, but with the very ability to form those purposes.
208 See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in FirstAmendment Theoy, 1977 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 631-49 (arguing that the checking power of free expression
should be more openly considered in First Amendment adjudication). This "checking
function" does not presume that the citizenry is actively engaged in defining public
policy on a regular basis, but rather that it can be roused to "check" particular
government tyrannies.
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operations. 20 9 But such a vision suggests the necessity for public
dissemination of information bearing on the legitimacy of government decisions, as well as the decisions themselves. Whether a
particular act of government is an unjustified usurpation or an
appropriate effort to further the public interest depends, not only
on the nature of the official act taken, but on the situation to which
it responds. 2 10 A public that is informed about the state, but not
about society, therefore, will flail blindly in wielding its "checks"
against its rulers. Indeed, one ofJoseph McCarthy's claims was that
public ignorance of the extent of Communist infiltration prevented
the public from adequately guarding against betrayal by its government.
Only First Amendment theories grounded exclusively on claims
of individual liberty2 11 do not permit the potential benefits of
government disclosure to attain countervailing constitutional
status. 2 12 But even in these systems, individual freedom may
require information as a precondition for its exercise. Whenever
individual choice is contingent upon a state of the world, information about that state is needed to exercise that freedom legitimately.2 13

209 See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 29, at 491-95 (arguing that abuse of governmental

power "can be warded off by a strict insistence, as a matter of constitutional doctrine,
that traditional standards of openness in government be maintained"); Anton M.
Revedin, InformationActivities ofParliamentsand PoliticalParties,9 HUM. RTs. L.J. 456,
467 (1988) ("[I]nformation constitutes a guarantee[to] the citizen .... it becomes part
of [a] series of guarantees which control individual freedom.... [I]information as
an instrument ... could be used by the electorate to supervise their elected
representatives.").
210 In this regard, the majority in United States Department ofJustice v. Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989), made the issue too easy
for itself. Reporters Committeefor Freedom of the Press construed an exemption from
disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, which protects against "unwarranted" infringements on privacy. In holding that the infringement resulting from
disclosure of "rap sheets" of government contractors was unwarranted, the Court
avoided comparing interests in privacy and disclosure by limiting considerations
favoring disclosure to the interest in finding out "what the government was up to,"
rather than the private context in which the government's actions took place. See id.
at 771-75, 780.
211 See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 167, at 47-51.
212 The author of The ConstitutionalRight to Anonymity attempts to escape the
tension between self-rule and the costs of disclosure by rooting First Amendment
protections in a Millian skepticism of settled orthodoxies. For him, the need to allow
articulation of unorthodox opinions stands on a different footing than the need to
inform orthodoxies. See Note, supra note 206, at 1116-24. In the McCarthy era, this
effort runs aground, since McCarthy was, in his own view, attempting to uproot a
liberal orthodoxy.
213 See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1783 (1991) (Blackmun, J.,
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The prevalence of the conflict between the constitutional costs
and benefits of disclosure illuminates the continuing tendency of
courts to adopt ad hoc accommodations in this area. Constitutional
values can be threatened by both disclosure and secrecy. Either
choice may be a sacrifice of constitutional magnitude, and that
decision cannot be made in the abstract. The crucial question is the
degree of sacrifice in the particular context.
Still, not all claims from self-governance are equally compelling.
In many instances extensive disclosures are unnecessary. McCarthyite tales of subversion, if plausible at all, are difficult to evaluate
sensibly without knowing the identity of the alleged protagonists.
A foreign agent in the motor pool creates a very different threat
than one in the code room. The identity of the unreliable employee
may be crucial to making sensible policy regarding classification
procedures.
On the other hand, public policy tends to deal in aggregates
rather than specifics. The names of particular patients who test
positive for AIDS, or of specific women who obtain abortions, are
of only tangential relevance to informed public opinion. For this
reason, the claim that disclosure of the identity of individuals is
crucial to public decision-making should be greeted with some
skepticism.

2 14

dissenting) (arguing that the reproductive interests of family planning clients demand
comprehensive information); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 760-63 (1986) (striking down Pennsylvania "informed
consent" disclosures required in abortion situations as "state medicine imposed upon
the woman, not the professional medical guidance she seeks"); Bigelow v. Virginia,
421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975) (protecting advertisements containing "information of
potential interest and value" regarding abortion).
214 See, e.g., ACLU v. Mississippi, 911 F.2d 1066, 1071 (5th Cir. 1990) (concluding
that disclosure of the names of individuals targeted by the state's former secret
intelligence commission "would rarely, if ever, be necessary to enumerate and
demonstrate the Commission's divers [sic] dealings"); Seymour v. Barabba, 559 F.2d
806, 807-08 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (emphasizing that census data containing names and
addresses is not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act);
German CensusJudgment, supranote 194, at 104, 106, 110-11 (statistics for planning
must be aggregated in a fashion that eliminates individually identifiable data as a way
of accommodating the right of informational privacy and the legitimate needs of
government).
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2. You Can't Tell the Players Without a Scorecard: Consumer
Protection in the Marketplace of Ideas
A second argument for disclosure puts individual identity not at
the periphery, but at the core of information that deserves public
disclosure. During the McCarthy era, when fears of covert Communist subversion of public opinion were rampant, identification of
potential sources of subversion was thought to be a remedy.
Identifying the background of groups and individuals who participated in public debate, it was argued, would provide the facts for
accurate decision-making, and also avoid covert manipulation.
To produce consent' legitimately, public debate must be
informed.
According to one school of thought, part of the
necessary information is the identity and background of the bidders
in the marketplace of ideas. Just as government and citizens must
obtain information about regulated activities to choose among
proposals for further regulation, citizens are entitled to information
about the source of the proposals that come before them. Thus, at
the outset of the McCarthy era, the President's Committee on Civil
Rights maintained that "the principle of disclosure is ...
the
appropriate way to deal with those who would subvert our democracy, " 2 15 and recommended "[t]he enactment by Congress and the
state legislatures of legislation requiring all groups, which attempt
to influence public opinion, to disclose the pertinent facts about
themselves." 216 The proposal stood in a long line of arguments
that anonymous speech is to be distrusted.
The recurring concern in this line of argument is deception.
Anonymity allows a speaker to pretend to be something that she is
not, and to convince her interlocutor under false pretenses.
Disclosure safeguards the freedom of choice of the listener who
seeks to further her own goals. Identifying speakers allows the
recipients of communication to guard themselves against manipulation.
As early as the First World War, the Court upheld a requirement
that ownership of publications receiving second class postage be
publicly disclosed, because "'[i]t is a common belief that many
periodicals are secretly owned or controlled, and that in reading
such papers the public is deceived through ignorance of the interest

215 THE PRESIDENT'S COMMrITEE ON CIVIL RIGHTs, To SEcURE THESE RIGHTS

(1947).

216 Id. at 164.
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the publication represents.'"
The prelude to World War II, and the accession to power of
fascist governments in Europe, was accompanied by uneasiness
concerning the vulnerability of the American polity to the dark arts
of propaganda.

Congress "had discovered ...

that business

enterprises had been utilized as a means for propagandizing, and
that many [foreign agents]... had published articles... concealing
their identity behind pseudonyms .... 'They were employing the
same method they had employed in Germany for the purpose of
obtaining control of the government over there.'" 218 But naming
the devils was thought to deprive them of their power. Disclosure
legislation, according to Justice Black, rested on
the fundamental constitutional principle that our people, ade217 Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288,312 (1913) (quoting S. REP. No.
955, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1912)); see also id. at 316 (approving requirement that
paid advertisements be identified on the ground that such identification "enable[s]
the public to know whether matter which was published was what it purported to be
or was in substance a paid advertisement"); cf. 47 U.S.C. § 317 (1988) (requiring
identification of paid political announcements on federally licensed broadcasting
stations).
218 Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 250 n.2 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting)
(quoting manuscript of House Committee hearings on Nazi propaganda); see also
Institute of Living Law, supra note 49, at 141 (calling for stronger disclosure
requirements in order to stem propaganda's "poisonous growth on American soil");
Smith, supra note 52, at 40 (arguing that registration and disclosure are the only
"non-dictatorial" methods of limiting subversive propaganda).
Disclosure was not universally thought to be a sufficient response to the threat
of foreign infiltration:
With respect to the propaganda studies, there was a period between World
War I and the early 1950s in which the so-called "bullet theory" of mass
communications ... held sway.... Propaganda was an "insidious force"
wielded by the mass media.... The critical assumptions were that people
were defenseless and passive ... and that "communication could shoot
something into them, just as an electric circuit could deliver electrons to a
lightbulb.". . .Many of these notions surely flowed from the fear generated
by World War I and, later, Communist and Nazi propaganda.
MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 74 (1983) (quoting Wilbur Schramm,
Nature of Communication Between Humans, in THE PROCESS AND EFFECTS OF MASS

COMMUNICATIONS 9 (Wilbur Schramm & Donald Roberts eds., 1971)).
Many of the theorists supporting the "method of exposure" as a weapon against
totalitarian propaganda were dubious as well about the propriety of granting free
speech rights to totalitarian movements at all, and doubtful of the conception of the
state as neutral regulator in the marketplace of ideas. See, e.g., Norman L. Rosenberg,
Another History of Free Speech, 7 LAW & INEQ. J. 333, 352 (1989) (outlining David
Reisman's arguments that "free speech policy 'must be selective and discriminating
...on the basis of an overall judgment of the social forces which favor democracy'"
(quoting David Riesman, Civil Liberties in a Period of Transition,3 PUB. POL'Y 33, 83
(1942))).
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quately informed, may be trusted to distinguish between the true
and the false[;] the bill is intended to label information of foreign
origin so that hearers and readers may not be deceived by the
belief that the information comes from a disinterested source.
Such legislation implements rather than detracts from the prized
219
freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment.
In the postwar period, labor unions were viewed as vulnerable
to the covert tactics of Communist infiltrators, and in need of
government aid to reveal the hidden infestation.
Here again,
sunlight was thought to disinfect, and an adequately informed
populace could be trusted:
[The Communist Party's] labor leverage, however, usually can be
obtained only by concealing the Communist tie from the union
membership. Whatever grievances American workman may have
with American employers, they are too intelligent and informed to
seek a remedy through a Communist Party which defends Soviet
conscription of labor, forced labor camps and the police state.
Hence the resort to concealment, and hence the resentment of
220
laws to compel disclosure of Communist Party ties.

219 Viereck, 318 U.S. at 251 (Black,J., dissenting); see also Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S.
465, 480 (1987) (disclosure "enable[s] the public to evaluate" political propaganda
coming from foreign sources). Some light is cast on justice Black's initial hospitable
attitude toward "the method of exposure" by his own successful efforts as a senator
to expose manipulative lobbying efforts by public utility holding companies. See
SIMON, supra note 51, at 90-96; Black, supra note 51, at 286 ("special privilege thrives
in secrecy and darkness and is destroyed by the rays of pitiless publicity").
220 American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,431 (1950) (Jackson,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice White expressed similar
sentiments: "Although one of the classic and recurring activities of the Communist
Party is the infiltration of other organizations,"
[t]he freedom of association which is and should be entitled to constitutional protection would be promoted, not hindered by disclosure which permits
members of an organization to know with whom they are associating and
affords them the opportunity to make an intelligent choice as to whether
certain of their associates who are Communists should be allowed to
continue their membership.
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 583-84 (1963)
(White, J., dissenting).
Members of Congress also needed help in avoiding concealed manipulation:
Present-day legislative complexities are such that individual members of
Congress cannot be expected to explore the myriad pressures to which they
are regularly subjected. Yet full realization of the American ideal of
government by elected representatives depends to no small extent on their
ability to properly evaluate such pressures. Otherwise the voice of the
people may all too easily be drowned out by the voice of special interest
groups seeking favored treatment while masquerading as proponents of the
public weal.
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The crucial perceived failure of the marketplace of ideas was the
ability of Communists to convey ideas to the public without labeling
their origins. The Supreme Court lamented that "through communist-front organizations they are able to obtain the support of
persons who would not extend such support knowing of their true
nature." 221 Such effective dissimulation posed "a threat to ...
the effective, free functioning of our national institutions," and the
solution was to be found in the capacity of the marketplace: "to
bring foreign-dominated organizations out into the open where the
public can evaluate their activities informedly against the revealed
222
background of their character, nature and connections."
In recent terms, similar arguments have influenced the Court's
decisions upholding required disclosure of political contributions, 223 praising identification of political advertisers, 224 and

United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954) (upholding a federal requirement
that lobbyists disclose and register their activities).
221 Communist Party of United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367
U.S. 1, 94 (1960); see also id. at 103 (sustaining a requirement that "Communist-action
organizations" register with the Attorney General). Compare CongressmanJohn S.
Wood's proposal in 1945 that news programs be distinguished from opinion
programs, and that the place of birth, nationality, and political affiliations of
commentators on news programs be open to public inspection. See GOODMAN, supra
note 38, at 175-76.
222 Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. at 97, 103; ef. THE PRESIDENT's
COMMnrrEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 215, at 53 ("The federal government...
ought to provide a source of reference where private citizens and groups may find
accurate information about the activities, sponsorship, and background of those who
are active in the market place of public opinion.").
Under the legislation adopted at the height of the McCarthy period, the
information is brought to attention, not just to light. Mail sent by a registered
organization was required to be stamped to show it was disseminated by a Communist
Action organization. See Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, ch. 1024, tit. 1,
§ 10, 64 Stat. 996 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.S. § 789(1) (1991)) (Subversive
Activities Control Board ceased operation in 1973 as unfunded).
223 In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Court upheld the required
disclosure of the identity of contributors to political campaigns in part on the ground
that "[t]he sources of a candidate's financial support also alert the voter to the
interests to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive." Id. at 67. The Court's
approval of a requirement that independent expenditures be registered rested entirely
on registration's effect of "increas[ing] the fund of information concerning those who
support the candidates." Id. at 81.
P24 Acknowledging that "when individuals or corporations speak through
committees, they often adopt seductive names that tend to conceal the true identity
of the source," the Court has spoken approvingly of mechanisms designed "to make
known the identity of supporters and opponents of ballot measures." Citizens
Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 298 (1981). Although the Court
struck down a cap on contributions to ballot proposition committees, the Justices
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225
sustaining identification requirements for charitable solicitors.

These cases suggest that the same words from different sources
should be accorded different weights, and perhaps different
meanings. The ability to conceal this information from the public,
in this view, is a means of manipulation by which speakers gain their
objects without public consent.
This emphasis on origin accords with our everyday experience
as lawyers and citizens. Witnesses are impeached or accredited by
showing their background, and the weight .of opposing counsel's
assurances may depend on counsel's character. Our reaction to a
request to sign a petition might well differ depending on whether
it was circulated by Ralph Nader, Jerry Falwell, or Lyndon Larouche,
and an attempt to pass off Nader's petition as Falwell's or vice versa
would constitute outright fraud.
Still, the First Amendment generally does not permit the
government to erect mechanisms to sift true ideas from the false in
public discourse. While concern with eliminating falsehood has
been an element in the development of the constitutional law of
libel, our tradition has equally affirmed that "'there is no such thing

were unanimous in their presupposition that measures employed to identify and
publicize the identities of contributors were appropriate. See id. at 299-300, 303
(Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 308-09 (White, J., dissenting) ("[Ilnformation
concerning who supports or opposes a ballot measure significantly affects voter
evaluation of the proposal.").
225 Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 800 (1988) ("[T]he State
may itself publish detailed financial disclosure forms it requires professional
fundraisers to file."). Justice Scalia rejected the contention that solicitors should be
required to reveal their status:
[W]here core First Amendment speech is at issue, a state cannot impose a
prophylactic rule requiring disclosure even where misleading statements are
not made.... [W]here dissemination of ideas is concerned, it is safer to
assume that the people are smart enough to get the information they need
than to assume that the government is wise or impartial enough to make the
judgment for them.
Id. at 804 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
Justice Rehnquist's dissent, by contrast, concludes that disclosure of facts to
prospective contributors is "directly analogous to mandatory disclosure requirements
that exist in other contexts such as securities transactions." Id. at 811 (Rehnquist,J.,
dissenting). Justice Rehnquist's enthusiasm for identification extends as well to a
requirement that door-to-door canvassers register with the police "for identification
only." Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 611 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). The Hynes majority struck down the requirement on vagueness grounds,
but was itself ambiguous as to whether a more precise version would be sustained.
Id. at 620-21 n.4. The Court also failed to resolve the issue with regard to
identification of the source of election materials in Hill v. Printing Indus., 422 U.S.
937 (1975) and Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969).
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as a false idea,'" under the First Amendment, in part because the
government should not be in the business of evaluating political
truth and falsehood. 22 6 There is something anomalous about
allowing the government to require disclosure as a means of
avoiding manipulation by ideas flying false colors. 227 Moreover,
to the extent that the speaker consciously declines to identify herself
and believes that anonymity is a part of the message she wishes to
convey, requirements of revelation effectively prohibit communication of that message.
Our history also shows that anonymity does not necessarily
entail either bad faith or deception. Justice Black pointed out in
Talley v. Califomia,228 that "the Federalist Papers, written in favor
of the adoption of our Constitution, were published under fictitious
names. It is plain that anonymity has sometimes been assumed for
the most constructive purposes. " 229 Talley seems to stand for the

principle that it is not disclosure, but political privacy, that is
fundamental to our political system. In reversing the conviction of
a California pamphleteer seeking to initiate a boycott of a discriminatory employer, the Court struck down a requirement that
handbills bear the identity of their author, without any concrete
20
showing of dangers of retaliation against that writer.
226 Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (quoting Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974)); cf. Milkovich v. LorainJournal Co., 110 S. Ct.
2695, 2706 (1990) (statements of opinion on matters of public concern which do not
contain
provably false factual connotations are fully protected).
2 27
Although the identity of the author of a statement is a matter of "fact,"
anonymity does not misrepresent the "fact." Moreover, the "fact" is relevant not as
an aid tojudgment itself, but as a means of determining the accuracy of the ideas that
.the author disseminates.
v
228 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
229 Id. at 65. It is not clear whether the anonymity of the Federalists was real or
a pose designed to preserve civility in other spheres.
[Tihe demarcation between public and personal remained so delicately thin
that the gentry had to buffer it with additional layers, one of which was
public debate through pseudonyms ....
Although the authors behind these
masks were often quite obvious, the persona of a pseudonym still released
them from a degree of responsibility for their statements, and hence
extended another measure of protection against revenge.
ROBERT H. WEIBE, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN SOcIETY 100-01 (1984); cf.DREW R.
MCCOY, THE LAST OF THE FATHERS, 46-47 (1989) (suggesting that Madison did not
tell Jefferson of his co-authorship of The FederalistPapers in part because it attacked
Jefferson's position in Notes on the State of Virginia).
Particularly where the anonymous pieces appeared in partisan newspapers, the
possibility of public deception was probably minimal.
230 Talley, 362 U.S. at 65. The chord was struck again three years later, when the
Court in Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963),
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Professor Post has recently proposed that Talley should be read
as exemplifying an affirmative preference for anonymous speech in
the public sphere. In his view, the law should not consider the
origins of the ideas and proposals we evaluate. At least as a
"regulative ideal," "many of the criteria... which ultimately derive
from that context must be 'bracketed' out.... [S]peakers [should
be able to] divorce their speech from the social contextualization
which knowledge of their identities would necessarily create in the
minds of their audience." 23 '
On this view, arguments in the
public arena should be entitled to stand or fall on their own merits,
232
rather than on the identity of their proponents.
In addition to the social theorists upon whom Professor Post
relies, 23 3 the proposal has a certain intuitive appeal. Many law

capped a series of cases which established at least a presumptive right to "protection
of privacy of association in [political] organizations." Id. at 544. While taking note
of the hostility towards the NAACP that surrounded demands for its membership
records, the Court grounded its holding in a general right to privacy that encompassed "all legitimate organizations." Id. at 556; see also id. at 545-46 ("The interests
here at stake are of significant magnitude, and neither their resolution nor impact is
limited to, or dependent upon the particular parties here involved.").
Gibson enunciated a "privacy of association in organization" defeasible upon a
showing of a "substantial relation between the information sought and a subject of
overriding... state interest." Id. at 544, 546. The majority implicitly rejectedJustice
White's argument in dissent that disclosure furthered First Amendment interests in
accurately identifying participants in the marketplace of ideas.
The reach and vitality of Talley's principle, in light of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1 (1976), which upheld campaign finance disclosure requirements, have been a matter
of disagreement in the lower courts. The most recent cases, relying on the precedent
of The Federalist Papers and the broad language of Talley, have struck down
identification requirements for campaign literature. See e.g., Wilson v. Stocker, 819
F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1987); Rosen v. Port of Portland, 641 F.2d 1243, 1251 (9th Cir.
1981); People v. White 506 N.E.2d 1284 (Ill. 1987); State v. N.D. Educ. Ass'n, 262*"
N.W.2d 731 (N.D. 1978). But see State v. Acey, 633 S.W.2d 306 (Tenn. 1982); Messerli
v. State, 626 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1981).
231 Post, supra note 197, at 640.
252 One who takes Professor Post's view might avoid the conflict between Talley
and Buckley by contrasting the "public discourse" in Talley, on one hand, with
"contributions" in Buckley, on the other, which might be said to constitute "action"
rather than "discourse." The gambit fails, however, for two reasons. First, the leaflet
in Talley was not simply the advancement of the abstract principle of racial equality,
but a concrete and directed solicitation to boycott the target stores. Second, many
of the expenditures in Buckley seem as purely discursive as one can get.
23 Professor Post roots this conception in the theories ofJurgen Habermas and
Alvin Gouldner. Habermas' position, as I understand it, is that the abstraction from
the contexts of experience and action is appropriate, as a heuristic device, to achieve
a "discourse" from which "all motives except the cooperative search for truth are
excluded."

JURGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 107-08 (Thomas McCarthy

trans., 1975). The problem in a less than ideal speech situation, like the political

1991]

SUNLIGHT, SECRETS, AND SCARLET LETTERS

schools, after all, believe that anonymous grading is more conducive
to fair evaluation, and scholarly journals rely on anonymous peer
reviews to mute biases. Ultimately, however, the approach Post
suggests reaches too far, for reliance upon the identity of a speaker
is often an appropriate part of political practice.
Even in the relatively pristine environment of the academy, the
costs of anonymity to rational discourse can be significant. The
identity of the speaker conveys information that improves the
quality of discussion. An assertion by Carl Sagan regarding
astronomy claims more credence than one by the neighborhood
auto mechanic, not by virtue of Sagan's social position, but because
of his proven judgment. If we do not know who is making an
assertion, we must evaluate it from first principles, a burdensome
approach indeed.
In one dimension, the identity of a speaker is a proxy for
previous communications. Sagan could preface each remark with an
account of his entire previous corpus, but, even in an academic
seminar, it seems simpler just to sign his name. Conversely,
identification makes other communications available to listeners.
When evaluating an argument of Richard Posner regarding
"efficiency," it is useful to be able to refer to his other work.23 4
arena, where participants are motivated by considerations other than a search for the
truth, is whether abstraction from identity will in fact aggravate the defects. What, in
other words, is the "second best" speech situation? See Bruce Ackerman, Why
Dialogue, 86J. PHIL. 5, 8 (1989) ("[T]he world of practical politics does not seem at
all close to anybody's idea of an ideal speech situation. Politicians do talk a lot, but
it is not unduly cynical to suppose they mean less of what they say than other folk.")
Gouldner links "rationality" to an attempt to sever secular authority from
communicative authoritativeness. Post, supra note 197, at 140. This may or may not
be inconsistent with "earned" authoritativeness. (There is nothing irrational about
believing Carl Sagan more than Eliot (either George or T.S.) when it comes to
astronomy, and the reverse when it comes to poetry.) But it certainly does not
support a regime of optional anonymity, since speakers will not take advantage of
anonymity precisely when their secular status is most distorting.
Professor Post seems to concede that Habermas and Goulder are not "descriptive," but rather should be regarded as a "regulative ideal." Id. at 640. The question
is whether, in the real world, the proposed rule of optional anonymity takes practice
further from the ideal. In private communications, Professor Post suggests that my
discussion improperly slips from contextualization to expert authority. My "slip" is
dictated by the structure of reality. A principle of anonymity cuts off knowledge of
both the context and the speaker's qualities of mind, soul, and expertise.
2s4 Compare this effect with the views ofJeffersonian lawyerJohn Thomson, an
advocate of identification in lieu of legal suppression. Thomson argued that once a
writer proved unreliable he "'would forever after be deprived of giving currency to
his calumnies.'" NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN 98 (1986)
(quoting JOHN THOMSON, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE LIBERTY AND LICENTIOUS-
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Equally important is a second dimension of a speaker's identity,
its representation of life experience.
Not all data relevant to
decision-making is susceptible to proof within the confines of a
seminar. The price a work of art will fetch at auction, the effect of
currency manipulation on world monetary markets, and the
likelihood that an argument will persuade the Supreme Court are
all matters of judgment, where the training and record of the
proponent are crucial to her persuasiveness. So, too, perceptions
and value judgments are informed by life experiences. An account
of the impact of affirmative action on black self-image may take on
different meanings depending on whether the account is provided
by Justice Scalia or Justice Thomas; a man's description of the
effects of separate seating of men and women in a religious service
legitimately has an import different from a woman's account.
To the extent that practical wisdom and experience are proper
elements of decision-making, anonymity is less desirable even in
principle. When what is at issue is a choice of values, a decisionmaker who affirmatively desires to hear the voices of a variety of
constituencies and to grapple with the perspectives of groups of
which she is not a member 23 5 will be impossible unless the identities of the speakers are known.
As an ideal for the world as we know it, the prospect of speech
abstracted from speaker is still more problematic outside the
academy. Real political discourse is neither costless nor disinterested.23 6
We regularly observe communications substantially less

NESS OFTHE PRESS 84 (reprint 1970) (1800)); see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111

S. Ct. 2513, 2523 (1991) (Souter, J., dissenting) (contending that the identity of the
source of a news leak regarding an opposing candidate was important to Minnesota
voters because "[t]he propriety of his leak ... could be taken to reflect on his
character, which in turn could be taken to reflect on the character of the candidate
who had retained him as an advisor").
235 For advocacy of the necessity of legal decision-makers seeking to take seriously
alternative perspectives, see Lynne N. Henderson, Legality andEmpathy, 85 MIcH. L.
REV. 1574 (1987); Martha Minow, The Supreme Cour 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice
Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REv. 10 (1987); Martha Minow & Elizabeth Spelman, In
Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597, 1648-50 (1990).
236 The time and energy that Americans can devote to public affairs is dwarfed by
the information with which they are confronted. Although it is barely plausible that
an academic seminar could start from first principles in each discussion, the prospect
of facing each evening's news with the same task is a recipe for paralysis. The regular
tendency of the public to use chosen "opinion leaders" as proxies may be the only
option for coping with information overload that preserves the possibility of public
choice in any form. This suggests that "divorce from context" is not a plausible ideal.
Still, the Talley principle does not mandate anonymity, but simply permits it. So
few speakers appear to take advantage of the permission that, realistically, the
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candid and disinterested than those of an academic seminar. If
public discussion carries with it the prospect of gain and the danger
of material loss to the participants as individuals, as any discussion
of moment does, the reliability of assertions and the impact of
proposals may be closely correlated to the speaker's interests. An
analysis of tobacco-linked cancer deaths sponsored by the Tobacco
Institute is rationally evaluated on a different basis than one
sponsored by the Surgeon General. Similarly, we can expect a
proposed tax change sponsored by the Business Roundtable to have
a different distributional impact than one proposed by the AFLCIO.
Abstracting from authorship is a willful sacrifice of relevant, and
perhaps vital, information. If anonymity can be invoked at will by
the speaker, the Talley principle may sacrifice freedom as well, for
the speaker may use anonymity strategically to induce the listener
to act in accord with the speaker's will. Selective silence can
manipulate preferences as effectively as speech and the Talley
23 7
principle may be seen as facilitating that manipulation.
Talley, therefore, cannot rest on an a priori dismissal of the
virtues of disclosure. Rather, a right to anonymity must be
defended on the basis of a realistic evaluation of the dangers it
seeks to avoid and the dangers it poses. Absent the Talley principle,
some messages may never enter the marketplace of ideas at all. As
we saw in section I, public identification with the unorthodox may
bring with it substantial, and occasionally insupportable, pressures.
Moreover, a citizen with a prudent concern for the future and a
knowledge of history may feel these pressures even in times of
23 8
relative tolerance.
prospects of drowning in a sea of anonymous information are slim.
2 7

Cf State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547,553 (Ga. 1990) (upholding antimask statute

as applied to KKK as a means of avoiding terrorism); Frank H. Easterbrook, Privacy
and the Optimal Extent of Disclosure Under the Freedom of Information Act, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 775, 786, 787 n.50 (1980) (arguing that the refusal to disclose embarrassing
information improves the position of the person compiling at the expense of those
with whom she deals); Anthony T. Kronman, The Privacy Exemption to the Freedom of
Information Act, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 727, 739 (1980) (discussing the power of an
individual to disclose selectively embarrassing facts about himself as one of the
interests protected by exemptions from FOIA); Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Secrecy and
Reputation, 28 BuFF. L. Rav. 1, 11-17, 43-44 (1979) (discussing privacy as the
concealment of discreditable facts about oneself to enhance reputation).
238 Four years ago, a speaker at the University of Pennsylvania Law School's
placement conference suggested that students omit affiliations with the ACLU from
their resumes. My skepticism concerning the accuracy, if not the legitimacy of that
advice, has waned somewhat after seeing use of the epithet "card carrying member
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In addition to avoiding the "chilling effects" of disclosure, the
Talley principle may improve the quality of public evaluation of
discourse. In general, the messages that benefit from the Talley
principle are those whose messenger are greeted with skepticism or
hostility by the public. The Surgeon General is unlikely to claim the
benefits of anonymity, although the CIA may do so. Popular
speakers need no shelter. 23 9 The Talley principle will, therefore,
be counter-cyclical. Unpopular minorities or powerless majorities
will be the primary beneficiaries, and disclosure requirements are
likely to have a disparate impact on the unorthodox. The memory
of the McCarthy era suggests that the hostility that greets unorthodox views are extreme and irrational. In terms of accurate and
undistorted decision-making, allowing messages the opportunity to
escape intolerance and start afresh on their merits is appealing, and
may be worth the cost of the manipulation permitted by Talley.
On the other side of the scale, the interests that purport to
justify disclosure, at least in the case of political discourse, are
probably exaggerated. The arguments for the necessity of disclosure were formed at a period in which marketing manipulation was
thought to be substantially more efficacious than it now appears to
be.2 40 It seems unlikely that our media-saturated electorate will
be duped into self-destruction by nefarious forces hiding behind
"institutes" or "coalitions." Talley is right, not because disclosure is
valueless, but because anonymity is more valuable.

of the ACLU" in political discourse.
239 But even a popular speaker may seek anonymity to speak in a discreditable or
inconsistent fashion. In this regard, consider the current proposals to require
identification of the sponsors of negative campaign advertisements.
240 The presuppositions regarding how easily voters may be misled have been
largely undercut. See YUDOF, supra note 218, at 74-78 (describing the decline of the
bullet theory); David D. Sears, Book Review, 52 PUB. OPINION Q. 262-65 (1988)
(reviewing RICHARD E. PETTY & JOHN T. CACIOPPO, COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION: CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL ROUTES TO ATTrITUDE CHANGE (1986) (presenting

the theory of message elaboration-when recipients care, they are not misled)); cf
Jeremy Cohen et al., PerceivedImpact of Defamation, 52 PUB. OPINION Q. 161, 169-70
(1988) (finding that mockjurors assume that others are affected by propaganda more
than they are themselves).

1991]

SUNLIGHT, SECRETS, AND SCARLET LETTERS
B. The Virtues of Being Known: Purificationby Publicity

Disclosures not only inform their recipients, they expose their
subjects. There is a tradition that regards this exposure as a
beneficial and purifying process. The willingness to "stand up and
be counted," or to subject oneself to the rigors of debate on a
difficult moral decision, may be a guarantor of seriousness of moral
purpose. Thus, the early defenses of the investigations of the
McCarthy era dismissed entirely the claims of witnesses to constitutional protection. They called such claims "a fallacy essentially
based upon the idea that the Constitution protects timidity....
There is no restraint resulting from the gathering of information by
Congress ... which does not flow wholly from the fact that the
speaker is unwilling to advocate openly what he would like to urge
24 1
under cover."
The argument was far from an isolated aberration. Justice Clark
argued in dissent that the statute struck down in Talley "makes for
242
the responsibility in writing that is present in public utterance."
Courts have maintained elsewhere that disclosure creates public
pressure or a sense of vulnerability to legitimate legal sanctions that
deters antisocial conduct. 243 It is an article of faith that the
241

United States v.Josephson, 165 F.2d 82,92 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S.

838 (1948); see also, e.g., Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 249 (D.C. Cir.) ("[I]t
is suggested that since the pressure of unpopularity affects only sensitive or timid
people, there need be less concern, on the theory that democratic processes must
necessarily contemplate rugged courage on the part ofthose who hold convictions...
on government."), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948); cf.JAMES A. WECHSLER, THE AGE
OF SUSPICION 279 (1953) ("I have no brief for anybody who refuses to testify before
a congressional committee; no matter how foolish or fierce the committee, an
American ought to be prepared to state his case in any public place at any time.");
Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., Standardsfor CongressionalInvestigations, 3 RECORD OF THE
Ass'N OF THE BAR OF N.Y. 93, 102 (1948) ("The democratic process is an open
process in which we ... sacrifice a large measure of privacy.... Congressional
investigations are only one ... example of ourbelief that exposure is the surest guard
not only against official corruption ... but against private malpractices, divisive
movements, and antisocial tendencies in the body politic. . . .").
242 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 71 (1959) (ClarkJ., dissenting).
243 See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 110
(1982) (O'ConnorJ., dissenting) (arguing that the requirement of a full and verifiable
reporting of expenditures is important to deter vote buying); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589, 598 (1977) (noting that maintenance of files produces a "reasonably expected
deterrent effect on potential violators"); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976)
("disclosure requirements deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of
corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of
publicity"); Burroughs & Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 548 (1934)
("Congress reached the conclusion that public disclosure of political contributions,
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public character of votes by legislators and judges are relevant to
their likely responsiveness to appropriate constraints. Although
there may be a federal privilege to inform the government of
violations of law, 244 anonymous accusations are distrusted because
they are thought particularly prone to abuse. 245 Some now claim
that the impact of disclosure on the difficult decision of abortion
should be viewed as a legitimate means of ensuring morally serious
24 6
choices.
The claim that the prospect of disclosure has a salutary effect on
the decisions of citizens can be grounded in both classical liberalism
together with the names of contributors... would tend to prevent the corrupt use
of money to affect elections."); Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 72 (1928)
("[P]ublic files will operate as an effective or substantial deterrent from the violations
of public and private right .... ").

244 See Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 463 (1900); In re Quarles, 158 U.s.
532, 535 (1895).
245 See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171
(1951) ("The plea that evidence of guilt must be secret is abhorrent to free men,
because it provides a cloak for the malevolent, the misinformed, the meddlesome and
the corrupt to play the role of informer undetected and uncorrected."). But see
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60-61 (1987) ("Relatives and neighbors who
suspect [child] abuse also will be more willing to come forward if they know that their
identities will be protected. Recognizing this, the Commonwealth ... has made a
commendable effort to assure victims and witnesses that they may speak to the...
counselors without fear of general disclosure.").
24' The attitude is exemplified byJudge Gee's comments in Mississippi Women's
Medical Clinic v. McMillan, 866 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1989) (declining to grant an
injunction against "right to life" counseling outside of abortion provider). AsJudge
Gee viewed the matter:
The clinic wishes potential clients to be shielded from hearing advocacy with
which it disagrees so that they will obtain abortions. But obtaining
abortions is not in issue; the availability of abortion services at MWMC
continues. The clinic's real complaint is that the choice has been made
more difficult because of adverse information communicated to potential
patients. Yet making choices more difficult is not the same as eliminating
the right to choose. In fact, in a polity where the people are sovereign,
informed choice enhances responsible decision-making.... "[a] difficult
choice meant to accept difficult consequences in the form of suffering,
disapproval of others, ostracisdh, punishment and guilt. Without this,
choice was believed to have no significance."
Id. at 796 & n.9 (quoting ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 228
(1987)).
This attitude may underlie both parental notice and husband notice requirements
imposed as preconditions for abortions. For recent discussions of the parental notice
requirement, see Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990); Ohio v. Akron Ctr.
for Reprod. Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990). For the most recent discussion of the
spousal notice requirement, see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS
24,792 (3d Cir. Oct 21, 1991), petitionfor cert. filed, Nov. 7, 1991.
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and in the civic republican tradition.

Each source, however,

implicitly limits the scope of these salutary effects to particular types
of choices.
1. Liberalism and Disclosure
a. LiberalArguments for Disclosure
The liberal arguments for disclosure rest partly on incentives.
One incentive for responsible behavior associated with publicity is
the concrete benefit of a good reputation. In the area of speech,
when the identity of the speaker is known, future influence stands
hostage to current good behavior. Not only will listeners who have
been duped in the past be able to take measures to avoid being
misled in the future, but the speaker also knows that such measures
will be taken. Thus, the prospect of disclosure encourages the
speaker to speak in a way that keeps the respect of listeners whom
she wishes to persuade or do business with in the future.
The constraints of publicity reach beyond calculations of
concrete gains or losses, because citizens regard the respect of their
fellows as a good in itself. As Bentham remarked in his plea for
publicity of judicial proceedings:
[U]nder the auspices of publicity, the original cause in the court
of law, and the appeal to the court of public opinion, are going on
at the same time. So many by-standers as an unrighteous judge (or
rather a judge who would otherwise have been unrighteous)
beholds attending in his court, so many witnesses he sees of his
unrighteousness;-so many ready executioners-so many industri247
ous proclaimers, of his sentence.
247 JEREMY BENTHAM, Rationale ofJudicial Evidence, in 6 THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 355 (John Bowring ed., 1962) [hereinafter BENTHAM,Judicial Evidence];see
also THE COLLECTED WORKS OFJEREMY BENTHAM, FIRST PRINCIPLES PREPARATORY TO

A CONSTITUTIONAL CODE 56-76,279,283-98 (Philip Schofield ed., 1989) [hereinafter
BENTHAM, FIRST PRINCIPLES] (arguing for a "tribunal of public opinion" as

"counterforce" to potentially corrupt governmental power); id. at 80-83 (examinations
for public office should have maximum publicity); id. at 102-03 (opposing bicameral
legislature because complication results in "want of transparency... [by which] the
tutelary counterforce... [of] the popular or moral sanction... is diminished....
Complication is aJungle in which sinister interest has its lurking place."); cf. LORD
ACTON AND His CIRCLE 166 (Abbot Gasquet ed., 2d prtg. 1968) ("Every thing secret
degenerates, even the administration ofjustice; nothing is safe that does not show
how it can bear discussion and publicity.").
Bentham's enthusiasm for publicity as a means of assuring conformity with
public norms extended beyond the surveillance of public officials. See JEREMY
BENTHAM, The Panopticon Versus New South Wales, in 4 THE WORKS OF JEREMY
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The effect is not limited to the prospect f ostracism or explicit
social pressure by one's peers. The classic liberal argument for
disclosure suggests that the prospect of observation alters the
quality of judgment. The sense of being exposed to public view
spurs us to engage in the actions of the person we would like to be.
Exposure as the author of an action or statement links it to our
identity; the broader the exposure, the more indissoluble the link
and the harder it is to disavow the action. Long before the findings
of modern social psychology regarding the norm-reinforcing effect
of public observation, 248 John Stuart Mill opposed secret ballots:
The best side of their character is that which people are anxious
to show, even to those who are no better than themselves. People

will give dishonest or mean votes from lucre, from malice, from
pique, from personal rivalry, even from the interests or prejudices
of class or sect, more readily in secret than in public. And cases
exist ... in which almost the only restraint upon a majority of
knaves consists in their involuntary respect for the opinion of an
249
honest minority.
Even when public opinion or prevailing norms are ultimately
flouted, the impact of publicity can improve the nature of decisions.
In Mill's words:
Nothing has so steadying an influence as working against pressure.... Even the bare fact of having to give an account of their
BENTHAM

173 (John Bowring ed., 1962).

248 See, e.g., Buss, supra note 192, at 93 (reviewing literature on norm-reinforcing

effects of observation); id. at 67-69 (discussing the norm re-enforcing effects of the
presence of mirrors); Philip G. Zimbardo, The Human Choice: Individuation,Reason
and Orderversus Deindividuation,Impulse, and Chaos, in 17 NEB. SYMP. ON MOTIvATION
237, 270 (WilliamJ. Arnold & David Levine eds., 1969) (anonymous and unidentifiable subjects tend to act more aggressively); see also Hans L. Zetterberg, Compliant
Actions, 2 AcTA SOCIOLOGICA 179 (1957) (stating that where visibility is high, actions
will quickly converge toward a norm).
249 JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATiVE GOVERNMENT 164

(Currin V. Shields ed., 1958) (London, 1861). The effect of publicity sought by
nineteenth-century liberals reached beyond the particular decision to which publicity
was applied. It was thought, as well, to form the habits and character of the decisionmakers. Thus, Bentham would allow exceptions to his principle of publicity in
particular cases because
[U]nder a judge trained up (as it were) from infancy to act under the
controul of the public eye, secrecy in this or that particular cause will be
comparatively exempt from danger: the sense of responsibility, the habit of
salutary self-restraint, formed under the discipline of the public school, will
not be suddenly thrown off in the closet.
BENTHAM, JudicialEvidence, supra note 247, at 369.
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conduct is a powerful inducement to adhere to conduct of which
at least some decent account can be given....

Publicity is

inappreciable even when it does no more than prevent that which
can by no possibility be plausibly defended-than compel deliberation and force everyone to determine, before he acts, what he shall
250
say if called to account for his actions.
In American constitutional law, the argument that transparency
perfects judgment is voiced most often in the concern with secrecy
in government. As Justice Frankfurter commented:
The plea that evidence of guilt must be secret is abhorrent to free
men, because it provides a cloak for the malevolent, the misinformed, the meddlesome, and the corrupt to play the role of
informer undetected and uncorrected....
Man being what he is cannot safely be trusted with complete
immunity from outward responsibility in depriving others of their
rights.... Secrecy is not congenial to truth-seeking and self2 51
righteousness gives too slender an assurance of rightness.
250 MILL, supra note 249, at 162; cf. Immanuel Kant, Eternal Peace, reprinted in
CARLJOACt7M FRIEDRiCH, INEVITABLE PEACE 241,277 (1948) ("[I]t is possible to call

the following statement the transcendentalformulaof public law: 'All actions which
relate to the right of other men are contrary to right and law, the maxim of which
does not permit publicity.'"); BENTHAM, JudicialEvidence, supra note 247, at 357
("Publicity therefore draws with it, on the part of the judge ... the habit of giving
reasons from the bench.... In legislation, in judicature, in every line of human
action... giving reasons is, in relation to rectitude of conduct, a test, a standard, a
security, a source of interpretation.").
When Kant agrees with Mill and Bentham on a proposition, one might think that
proposition is tightly linked to modern liberalism.
51Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171 (1951)
(citation omitted); see also Press-Enterprise Corp. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501,508
(1984) (remarking that openness gives assurance that standards of fairness are being
observed and deviations will become known); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948)
(footnotes omitted) (describing "the guarantee to an accused that his trial be
conducted in public" as "a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as
instruments of persecution. The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to
contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on
possible abuse ofjudicial power.").
The conventional American wisdom is that of Woodrow Wilson:
I, for one, have the conviction that government ought to be all outside and
no inside .... Everybody knows that corruption thrives in secret places and
avoids public places, and we believe it a fair presumption that secrecy means
impropriety.
... Government must, if it is to be pure and correct in its processes,
be absolutely public in everything that affects it.
WOODROW WILSON, THE NEW FREEDOM 76, 84 (William E. Leuchtenburg ed.,

Prentice-Hall 1961) (1913).
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In a democratic system, governmental acts should, by definition,
respond to public sentiments. Transparency to public review
facilitates that responsiveness; it reinforces the duties government
has already undertaken. 252 The disclosures with which the scarlet
letter problem is concerned, however, are disclosures concerning
individuals, not government. The question, therefore, is whether
this liberal preference for exposure can be applied with equal force
to individual actions.
b. Liberal Limits on Disclosure
John Stuart Mill, though sensitive to the tyranny of public
opinion, 253 pressed the argument for transparency one step
beyond the state. He argued against the secret ballot on the ground
that the vote of an individual citizen should itself be responsive to
the public. Mill viewed an elector's vote as a "[public] trust"; and,
he asked rhetorically, "if the public are entitled to his vote, are not
they entitled to know his vote?" 254 The secret ballot constitutes
a half-way house of individual rights that are, on liberal premises,
arguably public. It is thus a useful laboratory in which to observe
the interaction between anonymity and responsibility.
Granting the citizen's obligation to cast a ballot in accordance
with judgment rather than interest, 255 there are often practical
reasons to support the accepted wisdom that the secret ballot is a
cornerstone of democracy. 25 6 Mill conceded that where the
252 Even with regard to government, however, Bentham and Frankfurter contend
for disclosure in judicial matters that are responsive to the rule of law, not public
opinion.
253 See Mill, On Liberty, supra note 114, at 478-79; supra note 143 and accompanying text.
254 MILL, supra note 249, at 154. Mill elaborated that an elector is "bound to give
it according to his best and most conscientious opinion of the public good." Id. at
155.
255 One could challenge Mill's conception of the franchise as a trust, and stop the
discussion immediately. Voting in the United States, after all, is not a legal duty, and
electioneering is rife with appeals to interest. See, e.g., Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S.
45, 56 (1982) ("So long as the hoped for personal benefit is to be achieved through
the normal processes ofgovernment... it has always been, and remains, a reputable
basis upon which to cast one's ballot."); cf. McCormick v. United States, 111 S. Ct.
1807 (1991) (holding that it is not extortion for a legislator to accept political
contributions, even if the legislator's vote may be influenced thereby).
256 See WESTIN, supra note 5, at 24 (arguing that the secret ballot "ensure[s]
maximum freedom for political choice"); see also UNIvERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS art. 21.3 (declaring the guarantee of the secret ballot, or equivalent free
voting procedures, is a basic human right).
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probability of bribery or coercion was great, secret ballots were the
lesser evil, but contended that, "the power of coercing voters has
declined and is declining.., a much greater source of evil is the
selfishness or the selfish partialities of the voter himself."257 In
circumstances where the empirical preconditions of independence
are absent, a secret ballot will clearly emerge as a second best
solution.
Objections to publicity go beyond the force of potentially
coercive circumstances. The appropriate standards of judgment in
matters of public trust are themselves contested. Although Mill
champions a claim for judgments defensible in the public spotlight,
the liberal heritage recognizes a conception of judgment rooted in
Protestant tradition, which holds that deep moral decisions are best
made in private confrontation with the actor's conscience. 258 In
Historically, the secret ballot was introduced in the U.S. in the 1880s under the
banner of reducing bribery and intimidation of voters (and arguably as a means of
breaking the power of political machines). See L.E. FREDMAN, THE AUSTRALIAN
BALLOT: THE STORY OF AN AMERICAN REFORM ix (1968). In the South, it also
constituted a means of disenfranchising often illiterate black voters, who needed
assistance denied by ballot secrecy. See J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF
SOUTHERN POLITICS, SUFFRAGE RESTRICTIONS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE
PARTY SOUTH 1880-1910, 51-56 (1974).
257 MILL, supra note 249, at 157-58.
258 ee, e.g., RONALD BEINER, POLITICAL JUDGMENT 56-58 (1983) (discussing the

importance of autonomy in the Kantian conception ofjudgment-"The autonomy of
judgment requires that it exclude accommodation to the judgment of the public.");
BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., PRIVACY: STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY 283
(1984) ("Christianity itself ... included a tradition of private contact with the [D]eity
unmediated by any ecclesiastical and bureaucratic mechanism."); MAX WEBER, THE
PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 104-09,147 (Talcott Parsons trans.,
1958) (describing the significance of the "inner testimony of the Spirit in reason and
conscience").
There has been a recent revival of interest in the version of this tradition of "selfreliance" linked with Thoreau and Emerson, which regards judgment as primarily
individual rather than communal, and served ultimately by self-discovery and
reflection. See, e.g., NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, ANOTHER LIBERALISM: ROMANTICISM AND
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF LIBERAL THOUGHT 103-24 (1987) (arguing that Thoreau
gives heroic individualism a place in liberal thought); George Kateb, Democratic
Individualityand the Meaningof Rights, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 183, 19091,195 (Nancy L. Roseblum ed., 1989) ("The Emersonians work in their own manner
with the idea that the highest relationship is an unmediated relationship between each
individual and the most important thing, which must be nonsocial.. . ."); see also
STEVEN H. SHiFFRN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY AND ROMANCE 78, 93-94,
141, 143 (1990) (discussing the importance of Emerson and the independent spirit
in the American tradition).
The preference for private and autonomous judgment may be connected, as well,
with a preference for guilt rather than shame as a constraint on moral action. Cf.
DEREK L. PHILLIPS, TOWARD AJUST SOCIAL ORDER 213-18 (1986) (noting that guilt
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this tradition, just as the citizen should not be tempted to be false
to her conscience by threat or bribe, she equally should not be
259
traduced by a temptation to "go along" with the majority.
Thus, Justice Frankfurter, hardly a proponent of unbridled
individualism, announced, "I do not suppose it is even arguable that
Congress could ask for a disclosure of how union officers cast their
ballots at the last presidential election," 260 and was joined by
Justice Harlan in writing that, "the inviolability of privacy belonging
to a citizen's political loyalties has [an] overwhelming importance to
the well-being of our kind of society." 261 On this view, even if the
discussion of public issues is a public act, the ultimate judgment of
the citizen is a private one, to be reached between the citizen and
her conscience.

262

Even abstracting away the possibility of coercion in the absence
of secret ballots, the choice that liberal premises present between
the responsibility of public disclosure and the authenticity of private
reflection in voting is unclear. Resolving the question requires a
contested choice between alternative conceptions of political
judgment.
In some areas, however, the question is not close. Under liberal
premises, not all exercises of right are matters of public trust. The

relies on sanctions internal to the individual, while shame relies on external
sanctions); WILLARD GAYLIN, FEELINGS: OUR VITAL SIGNS 46-58 (1979) (discussing
guilt and contrasting it with shame by reference to The Scarlet Letter).
259 Cf JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 33, 69 (1980).
(noting the "coercive effect" of a voice vote and the possibility of "conformity through
intimidation" in the absence of a secret ballot, despite her initial preference for "face
to face" democracy).
260 American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 419 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in part).
261 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring in the result); cf Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 237 (1976) (Burger, J.,
dissenting) ("[S]ecrecy and privacy as to political preferences and convictions are
fundamental in a free society.").
262 Cf Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 545 (1965) ("[T]elevised jurors cannot help
but feel the pressures of knowing that friends and neighbors have their eyes upon
them. If the community be hostile to an accused, a televised juror ... may well be
led 'not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the State and the
accused'"); id. at 566-68 (Warren, CJ., concurring) ("The even more serious danger
is that neither the judge, prosecutor, defense counsel,jurors or witnesses would be
able to go through trial without considering the effect of their conduct on the viewing
public.... No one could forget that he was constantly in the focus of the 'all-seeing
eye.'"); id. at 595 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("A trial in Yankee Stadium ... would be
a substantially different affair from a trial in a traditional courtroom ... . [T]he
witnesses, lawyers,judges, and jurors in the stadium would [not] be more truthful,
diligent, and capable of reliably finding facts and determining guilt or innocence.").
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border between the public and the private has' an irreducible
importance in liberal thought, and the enterprises confided to the
sphere of private choice can properly claim immunity from public
observation. For Mill, concern for preserving possibilities of
experimentation justifies shielding private realms from unenlight2 63

ened public opinion.

The objection to disclosure in these areas need not rest only on
a fear of a benighted public. If, as many modern liberals maintain,
the realm of private identity should be judged and controlled by
standards of creativity and authenticity radically different from the
standards of solidarity appropriate to political action, 264 the
compulsory exposure of choices of intimate self-definition to public
scrutiny results in their corruption, not purification. If diversity of
social fabric is an affirmative good-leading as it does to a wider
array of options among which citizens can choose to establish their
lives-the conformity-inducing effects of disclosure are to be
avoided. Particularly where anonymity protects the formation of
communities that can provide mutual support to fragile and
unorthodox identities, compulsory disclosure is pernicious. Liberal
analysis suggests, therefore, a line in matters of disclosure drawn
between subjects of self-definition and subjects of public trust.

263 See supra note 143 and accompanying text. Even Bentham suggested that the

principle of utility-maximization counseled limitations on disclosure where
the mischief produced is produced-not by the act itself, but by the
disclosure of it. In this case are comprehended all those [instances] in
which, for want of sufficient maturity in the public judgment, or by the
influence of some sinister interest, the sentiment of antipathy has, in the
breasts of the people considered as members of the Public Opinion
Tribunal, turned itself against this or that act the nature of which upon the
balance is not of a pernicious nature.
BENTHAM, FIRST PRINCIPLES, supra note 247, at 290. He gives as examples religious
intolerance and hostility to "eccentricity of any sensual appetites, the sexual for
example, by which no pain in any assignable shape is produced any where." Id.
264 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 1-30
(1980); CHARLES E. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXTY, 69-74, 123-24
(1987); THOMAS NAGEL, Ruthlessness in PublicLife, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 75, 82-85
(1979); RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONYAND SOLIDARrrY, 34,65-69,91-92,14143 (1989); Thomas Nagel, Moral Conflictand PoliticalLegitimacy, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.

215 (1987).
Larmore concedes, as Rorty does not, the possibility that the public and private
might be regulated by the same ideals, but takes the position that in modern
pluralistic societies, this would require an agreement on regulative ideals unlikely to
arise without massive coercion.
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2. Authenticity, Virtue, and Community
The secret exercise of the franchise and other personal rights
can be approached from a different angle, by utilizing more
communal conceptions ofjudgment. An ideal of decisions made in
personal confrontation can be premised on the claim for salutary
psychological effects of such confrontation. As Professor Mansbridge articulates the argument:
There is no logical reason why individuals who meet face to face
should not see most human relations in terms of conflict ....
Experience teaches us, however, that in practice face-to-face
contact increases the perception of likeness, encourages decision
making by consensus, and perhaps even enhances equality of
status.... [I]t seems to increase the actual congruence of interests

by encouraging the empathy by which individual members make
one another's interests their own. It also encourages the recognition of common interest by allowing subtleties of direct communi26
cation. 5
Obviously, the possibilities for such interaction are limited
where communication or voting is anonymous.
Disclosure of
judgment is necessary to enter into the processes of mutual
accommodation.
This empirical argument is subject to rebuttal by the force of
circumstances. Attracted though she is to the ideal of personal
interaction, Professor Mansbridge concludes her own empirical
266
study skeptical of the ideal's validity for large political entities.
265 MANSBRIDGE, supra note 259, at 33. See BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG
DEMOCRAcY: PARTIcIPATORY PoLricS FOR A NEW AGE 178-90 (1984) (discussing the
functions of "strong democratic talk" and personal confrontation in encouraging
"mutualism").
Although he does not play out the implications of his theory, I rather suspect
that Professor Ackerman's view of dialogue as a pragmatic imperative for liberal
citizens who seek to come to terms with one another's world views would require a
degree of self-revelation at least sufficient for the participants in dialogue to identify
each other's value commitments in the effort to find common ground on public
questions. See Ackerman, supra note 233, at 5, 12. The requirement would be
stronger in analyses that value political dialogue for its qualities of interpersonal
recognition. Cf HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 324 (1986) (stating that
"[i]n human relations the important thing is... to experience the 'Thou' truly as a
'Thou"-an attitude requiring complete existential openness and availability).

266 See MANSBRIDGE, supra note 259, at 274 (concluding that mass meetings result

in "anonymity without even the guarantee of representation"); id. at 291 ("the lesson
of this volume for a small collective is that when a group grows larger and more
diverse it must find a substitute for the discussion and genuine persuasion"); id. at
293 ("the larger the polity, the more likely it is that some individuals will have
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Her final judgment is that the rejection of "adversary" procedures
in favor of "unitary" ones, relying on empathy and mutual adjustment, is a plausible ideal only in communities small and homogeneous enough to avoid deep conflicts of interest. Unitary processes
tend to obscure conflict in such a way that the initially disadvantaged become even more so ....

[F]reedom is also in jeopardy.

When the assumption of common interest makes conflict illegitimate, a polity may no longer tolerate dissent.
The depressing conclusion is that democratic institutions on
a national scale can seldom be based on the assumption of a
26 7
common good.
A second rejection of the role of private and sheltered conscience finds a home in the normative demands of the strand of
civic republican thought that attended the formation of our own
polity.2 68
This strand has found new favor in contemporary

conflicting interests" and where interests conflict, "a democracy encompassing those
interests
must employ adversary procedures").
2 7
1

Id. at 295.

A third approach, which could inform a less individualistic view of the issue,
is feminism. I am not adept enough with feminist analysis to venture a full-blown
exposition of a feminist approach to the disclosure problem. But I am likewise
reluctant to ignore what is becoming a major scholarly voice. I suspect a feminist
analysis would point initially toward a preference for publicity in decision-making.
Cf CATHERINE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 93-102 (1987) (taking a
position skeptical of privacy as value); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights
and Politics: Perspectivesfrom the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 638
(1986) (maintaining that privacy is linked with nonfeminist concerns). Feminist
analysis tends to value connection, concrete contexts, and empathetic interaction. See,
e.g., KATHY E. FERGUSON, THE FEMINIST CASE AGAINST BUREAUCRAcY 159, 171-74,
196-205 (1984) ("Women's moral judgments are closely tied to feelings of empathy
and compassion for others, and more directed toward the resolution of particular
'real life' problems than toward abstract hypothetical dilemmas."); Katharine T.
Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 836-67 (1990) (analyzing
feminist methods of "doing law," including the use of feminist practical reasoning and
consciousness-raising); Deborah L. Rhode, FeministCriticalTheories, 42 STAN. L. REV.
617, 621 (1990) ("Critical feminism's most common response to questions about its
own authority has been reliance on experiential analysis."); Robin West,Jurisprudence
and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 28 (1988) ("For women, the creation of value, and
the living of a good life, therefore depend upon relational, contextual, nurturant and
affective responses to the needs of those who are dependant and weak.... ."). Any
ability to distance political judgment from personal interactions would tend toward
the abstraction and linearity of a stereotypically "male" analysis.
Mansbridge's conclusions, however, suggest a countervailing feminist concern
analogous to Mill's acceptance of the secret ballot as a second best alternative. A
feminist analysis under current conditions should be wary both of the distributional
consequences of disclosure between women and men, and the possibility that "public"
judgment would be patriarchal. If under current conditions, women are more likely
to respond to peer pressure than men in decision-making groups comprised of
268
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constitutional commentary; recent years have seen a luxuriant
profusion of constitutional theorizing rooted in a tradition that
conceives of values as shaped in the public sphere, instead of being
individually chosen. 269 Such theories claim that sound judgment
is irreducibly the result of social interaction. They are certainly
consistent with, and indeed may underlie, the original American

women and men, men may gain a disproportionate advantage from a procedure that
allows such pressures to be brought to bear. Cf BRAITHWAITE, supra note 144, at 9294 (reviewing literature suggesting that, under current cultural conditions, women are
more vulnerable to shaming than men); JANET SHIBLEY HYDE & B.G. ROSENBERG,
HALF THE HUMAN EXPERIENCE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN (1976) (women tend to

be more vulnerable to social pressure than men); DEBORAH TANNEN, YOUJUST DON'T
UNDERSTAND: WOMEN AND MEN IN CONVERSATION 158 (1990) (discussing research
indicating that women's conversational style tends to avoid direct confrontation);
Trina Grillo, The MediationAlternative: ProcessDangersfor Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545,
1600-07 (1991) (suggesting that women's "ethic of care" and "connection" puts them
at a disadvantage in mediation proceedings, and that women may experience
compelled personal engagement as "psychic rape"). So too, to the extent that public
pressures are likely to incorporate patriarchal values, private decision-making may be
preferred.
Some feminists have supported the need for privacy and solitude as a particularly
important element of the project of reclaiming autonomy for women. See ANITA L.
ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY 36, 46-47, 51-52,
57, 71-75 (1988); see also JEAN BETHKE ELsHTAIN, PUBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN:
WOMEN IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT 217, 222, 321-22, 326, 335-36, 351
(1981) (arguing for the importance for feminist analysis of retaining realm of privacy);
Ruthann Robson, Lfting Belly: Privacy,Sexuality & Lesbianism, 12 WOMEN'S RTS. L.
REP. 177, 196 (1990) (maintaining a position of ambivalence toward view of privacy
as a26lesbian
doctrine).
9
See e.g., MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 160-68 (1988) ("The recent attention to 'public values' in
constitutional theory may foreshadow[] a revival of [the republican tradition].");
Morton J. Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American ConstitutionalThought,
29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 68 (1987) ("[T]he republican synthesis enables us to see
the deeper roots of what previously were deemed anomalous positions.... [It also]
promotes the concept of an autonomous public interest.... ."); Frank Michelman,
Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1505-07 (1988) (suggesting a version of "civic
republican" constitutional theory protective of individual rights); Cass R. Sunstein,
Beyond the RepublicanRevival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1542 (1988) (discussing the role civic
republicanism could play in reforming areas of public law); see also WILLIAM M.
SULLIVAN, RECONSTRUCTING PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 181-84 (1982) (discussing civic
republicanism and its goal of an "inclusive community").
My colleague Professor Fitts has demonstrated that the new civic republicans
have not come to terms with the empirical realities that undercut their prescriptions.
See Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A PoliticalParty Perspective on Civic Virtue
Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1612-45 (1988). My
colleague Professor Goodman has suggested that their claims to historical pedigree
may be tenuous. See Frank Goodman, Mark Tushnet on Liberal ConstitutionalTheory:
Mission Impossible, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2259, 2263, 2293-2318 (1989) (reviewing
TUSHNET, supra).
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270
practice of open and personalized voting procedures.
On this view, the vision of the autonomous conscience is a
chimera. Good decisions follow from good character, and good
character is both formed and evidenced by a willingness to submit
one's opinions to the realm of the political. The modern exemplar
of this thinking is Hannah Arendt who has commented on the "gulf
between the sheltered life in the household and the merciless
exposure of the polis," and noted that in classical democracy the
"virtue of courage" became "one of the most elemental political
71
attitudes" and the "political virtue par excellence."
This argument works in two directions. First, publicity assures
the quality of debate by acting as a check on the qualities of the
debaters. Requiring participants in a public debate to stand up and
1

270

For example, one strand of opposition to the secret ballotin the United States

ran as follows:
"Here the people are upon an equality, and at the ballot-box are freemen
and equals. It has never heretofore been regarded as a crime for one
citizen peaceably to discuss with his neighbor at the polls the merits of
various parties and candidates and to compare views and to inform each
other, if they desired, how they intended to vote."
FREDMAN, supra note 256, at 43-44 (quoting Governor Hill of N.Y.); see also MARK A.
KISHLANSKY, PARLIAMENTARY SELECTION: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHOICE IN EARLY
MODERN ENGLAND 180-91 (1986) (detailing the even more socially conditioned and
organic nature of early English elections).
Modern enthusiasts for civic republicanism have opposed the secret ballot as
draining the sense of public responsibility:
[O]ur primary electoral act, voting, is rather like using a public toilet: we
wait in line with a crowd in order to close ourselves up in a small compartment where we can relieve ourselves in solitude and in privacy of our
burden, pull a lever, and then, yielding to the next in line, go silently home.
Because our vote is secret-'private'-we do not need to explain orjustify it
to others (or indeed, to ourselves) in a fashion that would require us to
think, publicly or politically.
BARBER, supra note 265, at 188.
271 HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 33 (1958); cf. Stanley I. Benn,
Privacy, Freedom and Respect for Persons, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY 1, 25 (J. Roland
Pennock &John W. Chapman eds., 1971) ("the case for privacy begins to look like
a claim to the conditions of life necessary only for second-grade men in a secondgrade society," and the independent man "does not hesitate to stand and be counted.
... Socrates did not ask to be allowed to teach philosophy in private").
A claim for the virtue of courage as central to democracy is scarcely foreign to
our constitutional tradition. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The FirstAmendment and the Ideal
of Civic Courage: The BrandeisOpinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 653, 680-89 (1988); see also LEARNED HAND, THE SPIrr OF LIBERTY 216 (Irving
Dilliard ed., 1952) ("I believe that that community is already in the process of
dissolution ... where faith in the eventual supremacy of reason has become so timid
that we dare not enter our convictions in the open lists, to win or lose.").
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be counted acts as a screen for political participants. It assures us
that the arguments expressed flow from citizens of good character,
for only those with the courage to face public scrutiny will participate in public debate. Second, publicity improves the character and
judgment of the citizenry.
Open participation in public life
exercises and develops the virtue of courage. It instills in the
participants the firmness of character necessary to evaluate properly
arguments made by others and to reach decisions without undue
timidity. In Arendt's view, the political faculty ofjudgment matures
272
only in confrontation with others.
Decisions made publicly are also thought to be more valuable,
authentic, and human than those of the isolated individual. In
Arendt's words, "[e]very activity performed in public can attain an
excellence never matched in priva[te;]

. . . for excellence, by

definition, the presence of others is required." 273 A public action
is more real, more vivid, and more significant. 274 It is only by
publicly avowing a position that we are able to make it our own. A
claim for anonymity, therefore, becomes not only a claim at odds
with virtue, but a claim that seeks to truncate the discussion by
which both our own values and the public's are formed. Private
conscience is a less appropriate basis for governance than publicly
275
achieved insight.
Even accepting the vision of publicly formed political values as
an appealing one, an advocacy of openness rooted in that vision has
internal limits that mirror the limits that emerge from liberal
analysis. The ideal of open participation presumes that the primary
impact of public revelation on the self arises strictly in discursive
persuasion. 276 The memory of the McCarthy era should suggest
272 See GEORGE KATEB, HANNAH ARENDT: POLITICS, CONSCIENCE AND EVIL 38

(1983).

273 ARENDT, supra note 271, at 44.

274 See id. at 50, 52, 57-58, 180.
275 See KATEB, supra note 272, at 27, 37 (individual "conscience" is excluded from
political judgment); cf. BARBER, supra note 265, at 166-67, 188 (concluding that
political judgment must form the basis for principle); Glenn Negley, Philosophical
Views on the Value of Privacy, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 319, 321 (1966) (citing
Hegel's distinction between moralitat-referring to individual privatejudgment-and
sittlicheit-defined in terms of duties that are in turn defined by corporate
institutional order).
276 See, e.g., KATEB, supra note 272, at 21 ("[T]ruly political action... must involve
the relations of equals; it must proceed by persuasion, not coercion.., it cannot deal
with interests .... "); cf. ARENDT, supra note 271, at 182 (decrying the advancement
of certain people through a "perverted form of 'acting together'-by pull and pressure
and tricks of cliques").
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that in the third-best world of politics as we know it, revelation
carries with it the danger of boycott, the specter of browbeating, the
lure of wealth, and the threat of ostracism, as well as the promise of
mutual persuasion. There is room for doubt, therefore, whether the
promise of purification through disclosure rooted in the republican
conception is, on balance, any better adapted to this world than the
claims for purification of dialogue through anonymity adumbrated
by Professor Post.277 The distortions introduced by privacy may
be less profound than those introduced by fear and manipulation.
For the civic republican, as for Mill, the desirability of exposure will
necessarily be a function of external circumstances.
Leaving aside empirical questions, the civic republican shares
another insight with Mill. Most modern American civic republicans
believe that people who throw themselves into the cauldron of
278
public discourse are not entirely constituted by that discourse.
277 In personal communication, Professor Post has emphasized that his advocacy
of decontextualization is a regulative ideal only for the state and not for participants
in public discourse. In these matters, however, the state cannot be neutral; if the
state is barred from requiring disclosure, the information will often be unavailable to
the citizenry.
278 See, e.g., MICHAELJ. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMiTs oFJUsTIcE 150 (1982)
(discussing the strong theory of community as a "mode of self-understanding partly
constitutive of the agent's identity," hence enabling members to "conceive their
identity... as defined to some extent by the community of which they are a part")
(emphaiis added); id. at 181 (describing virtue of friendship as deliberation on the
"description[] of the person I am"); Alasdair MacIntyre, The Virtues, the Unity of a
Human Life, and the Concept of a Tradition, in LiBERALIsM AND ITS CRITICS 142-43
(MichaelJ. Sandel ed., 1984):
I am never able to seek for the good or exercise the virtues only qua
individual ....
I am someone's son or daughter ....
cousin or uncle; I am
a citizen of this or that city, a member of this or that guild or profession ....
[T]he fact that the self has to find its moral identity in and through
["
its membership in communities ... does not entail that the self has to
accept the moral limitations of the particularity of those forms of communi-

ty.
There are, to be sure, communitarians who see as an ultimate goal the total
effacement of any boundaries between public and private, down to the prospect of
"group decisions about reproduction." Alan Freeman & Elizabeth Mensch, The PublicPrivate Distinction in American Law and Life, 36 BuFF. L. REv. 237, 257 (1987).
Freeman and Mensch claim that the existence of a private sphere entails objectionable
contradictions.
For them it is inextricably bound up with alienation, power
hierarchies, and a lack of accountability for important aspects of society. See id. at
250-55. Many of the claimed links are to my mind at best contingent, and it is
difficult to square such visions with any traditions or plausible revision of American
constitutional law. Most importantly, as Mensch and Freeman tacitly admit, absent
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A republican who retains a separation between citizen and state
must contemplate character substantially formed, sheltered, and
nurtured in private spheres. 279 Thus, along with her celebration
of the public, Arendt recognizes that, "[t]he full development of the
life of hearth and family into an inner and private space we owe to
the extraordinary political sense of the Romans who... understood
that these two realms could exist only in the form of coexistence." 28 0 "A life spent entirely in public, in the presence of
others becomes .

.

. shallow. While it retains its visibility, it loses

the quality of rising into sight from some darker ground which must
remain hidden if it is not to lose its depth in a very real, nonsubjective sense." 28 1 Although there is doubt as to where the

reconstruction of social processes more radical than any that has been observed in the
modern world, elimination of realms of privacy is likely to lead to oppression rather
than human flourishing. See id. at 255-57.
279 Thus Aristotle, for example, rejected the Platonic prescription for maximizing
the unity of the polls: "we ought not to achieve this [unity]: it would be the
destruction of the polis." ARISTOTLE, POLITICS § 1261a.15 (Ernest Baker trans.,
1946). His rejection rested both on the grounds that a state of excessive unity would
lack the resilience and resources of a more diverse polity and on the belief that such
unity would be inconsistent with the goal of fostering real friendship. See id.
§§ 1261a.25-1262b.20.
The goal for Aristotle is a community in which arises "an association of
households ... in a good life, for the sake of attaining a perfect and self-sufficing
existence." Id. § 1280b.31-.40; see also ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS § 1171a.15.20 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962) ("[T]o be a friend of many people is impossible if
the friendship is to be based on virtue or excellence and on the character of our
friends."); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LuCK AND ETHICS
IN GREEK TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 353 (1986) ("Aristotle argues at length that
[Plato's concept of unity] destroys personal separateness, an essential ingredient of
human social goodness .... [And that to] make it one in the Platonic way is to
eliminate the bases of political justice and of philia, two of its central goods.").
280 ARENDT, supra note 271, at 54; see also Hannah Arendt, Reflections on Little
Rock, 6 DISSENT 45, 55 (1959) (children "are first of all part of the family... they are,
or should be, brought up in that atmosphere of idiosyncratic exclusiveness which
alone makes a home ... strong and secure enough to shield its young against the
demands of the social and the responsibilities of the political realm"); id. at 53
(marriage must remain "private business," and government must "safeguard the rights
of every person to do as he pleases within the four walls of his own home").
281 ARENDT, supra note 271, at 63. Arendt recognized not only the instrumental
value of private life as the basis for public involvement, but the intrinsic value of
experiences of love and self-realization that could not be realized in public view. See
id. at 46, 218; cf. EISENSTADT & RONIGER, supra note 187, at 282-84 (arguing that
intimate relations of friendship presuppose publicly recognized realms sheltered from
the "glare of public life").
Arendt is acutely sensitive to the political pathologies of total exposure. See
HANNAH ARENDT, TOTALITARIANISM 129-34 (1951) [hereinafter ARENDT, TOTALITARIANISM] (describing systems of constant surveillance, mutual denunciation, and
recording of relationships characteristic of totalitarian regimes, and their effects on
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boundaries should be drawn, most "republican" legal theorists
would concede, with Arendt, that a "distinction between things that
should be shown and things that should be hidden" 28 2 is necessary to form and preserve the citizens who can constitute a true
republic. 28 3 Privacy in the polling booth may be debatable;
privacy in the confessional, the diary, or the bedroom is not.
It is hard to dispute the civic republican vision of the self as
constituted and realized through social action. Such a vision,
however, need not efface the distinction between individual and
society or cast the individual's self-definition to the mercy of social
forces. A society like ours, which is rich in a variety of social roles
and overlapping communities, provides the forum for realization of
an ideal that allows the citizen to choose the self she wishes to
develop from among the plurality of identities offered.28 4 The
availability of these possibilities provides a space for human agency
and renewal as well as a bulwark against tyranny.

the character of the populace). In Arendt's view, however, the process of separation
of private and public carries dangers of its own extreme. Her diagnosis of Eichmann
was that "[h]e has driven the dichotomy of private and public functions... so far that
he can no longer find in his own person any connection between the two." HANNAH
ARENDT, THEJEW AS PARIAH 234 (1978); see also ARENDT, TOTALITARIANISM, supra,at
36 ("Nothing proved easier to destroy than the privacy and private morality ofpeople
who thought of nothing but safeguarding their private lives.").
282 ARENDT, supra note 271, at 64.
283 See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 269, at 1535 ("Just as property rights ...
become in a republican perspective, a matter of constitutive political concern as
underpinning the independence and authenticity of the citizen's contribution to the
collective determinations of public life, so is it with the privacies of personal refuge
and intimacy."); Seidman, Fourth Amendment, supra note 187, at 109-10 (arguing for
privacy on basis of republicanism); cf.SeylaBenhabib,LiberalDialogueVersusa Critical
Theory of DiscursiveLegitimation, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE, supranote 258,
at 155 ("[A]II human societies live with a boundary between the public and the
private; there will alwaysbe a realm that we simply will not want to share with others
and that we will wish to be protected from the intrusion of others."); C. Keith Boone,
Privacy and Community, 9 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 1, 17 (1983) ("[P]rivacy must be
viewed.., as ... a condition of and contributor to the self-social dialectic."); id. at
21-22 ("As a condition for the free cultivation and exercise of all rights, privacy is
Cerberus at the gates of the house of rights, intrinsic to the community of free
persons.").
Thus, in his otherwise admirable article, Rubenfeld is mistaken in supposing that
the "republican vision" is necessarily at odds with claims of a protected sphere of
"personhood." SeeJoel Rubenfeld, Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REV. 737, 761-67
(1989).
284 See, e.g., DIANA T. MEYERS, SELF, SOCIETY, AND PERSONAL CHOICE 95 (1989)
("Though people cannot choose directly to change their constitutive characteristics,
they can choose to place themselves in situations and to act in ways designed to bring
about such changes.").
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This ideal requires that the citizen have available more limited
communities than society as a whole. The self formed in private
dialogue within a consciousness-raising group is likely to be
different from the self formed in a nuclear family, an NAACP

chapter, a Catholic church, or one formed in confrontation with the
285

national news media.
Given the preference of contemporary civic republicans for
decentralization, 286 it is unlikely that many would defend on
grounds of civic virtue a regime that forces citizens to forge their
identities in dialogue with the national public. Yet compelled
publicity undermines the possibility of establishing less than totally
inclusive communities.
A community defines itself in part by sharing secrets and where
disclosure is the rule, there are no secrets. In the absence of
informational privacy, involvement in an unorthodox community
allows no shelter from the threat of social and economic sanctions.
The dialogue of the consciousness-raising group becomes no less a
matter of public record than the proceedings on the floor of
Congress. 287 The option of shaping the self in the exchange of
confidences is no longer available. Such a result is inappropriate as
a matter of social structure and individual freedom; it is no288more
attractive to the sensible communitarian than to the liberal.

285 See EISENSTADT & RONIGER, supra note 187, at 285-86 (arguing that "opposi-

tionary orientations" in "informal relations" tend to evolve into forms that "go
beyond the glare of public life into the realm of privacy"); JAMES C. SCoTT,
DOMINATION AND THE ARTS OF RESISTANCE: HIDDEN TRANscR'Ts 118, 120 (1990)

(in order to resist domination, "the subordinate group must carve out for itself social
spaces insulated from control and surveillance"-resistance requires "sequestered
social milieu.., composed entirely of close confidants who share similar experiences
of domination").
286 See TUSHNET, supranote 269, at 12-17, 245-46, 314-17; Michelman, supra note
269, at 1531; MichaelJ. Sandel, Morality and the Liberal Ideal,NEW REPUBLIC, May 7,
1984, at 15, 17; Sunstein, supra note 269, at 1578-79.
287 One reader of this manuscript questioned whether anyone seriously
contemplated requiring disclosure of the minutes of consciousness-raising groups.
In fact, during the Nixon Presidency, the FBI and federal prosecutors, while pursuing
two fugitives, engaged in extensive grand jury inquiry into the lesbian and feminist
communities in Lexington, Kentucky, Hartford, Connecticut, and New Haven,
Connecticut. See DONNER, supra note 5, at 384; RICHARD HARRIS, FREEDOM SPENT

318-49 (1974). During the McCarthy era, quite analogous disclosures were required
regarding discussions in leftist organizations. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360
U.S. 109, 114 (1959) (involving discussions of the Haldane Club); cf. NAvASKY, supra
note 44, at 128-42 (discussing the role of a Hollywood psychotherapist in encouraging
patients to "name names" to the FBI and HUAC).
288 The importance of nonpublic sub-communities for the formation of identity
has emerged explicitly as an element of constitutionally protected liberty in recent
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3. Common Ground

The force of claims to anonymity turns on their factual setting
and the subject threatened with disclosure. For both liberals and
civic republicans, disclosure can claim substantial virtues. Yet, for
both groups, the presence of coercive circumstances saps the force
of arguments for openness. Thus, in a flawed political world,
anonymity is often a second-best strategy. If the insights of both
liberalism and civic republicans are to be taken seriously, courts
cannot abandon the concrete analysis of the situations in which
claims of anonymity are exerted. Doctrine must leave open an
opportunity for citizens to focus the attention of courts on the real
and concrete coercion of compelled disclosure.
In addition, both liberal and republican analyses point toward
a more abstract set of distinctions. Not all liberals would adopt the
claim that privacy of conscience is inappropriate in matters of
public trust. But even for those who do, Mill's analysis suggests that
when the constitutional rights at issue are instead conceived of as
matters of personal authenticity, the observation that publicity is
likely to constrain becomes an argument against publicity, rather
than one in its favor. So, too, the republican insight that even the
public self requires roots in private realms guggests that one should
look carefully at attempts to require disclosure of matters that shape
the soul.
Thus, a right to procreative choice, rooted in individual
autonomy rather than public duty, is rightly said to be one that
should be exercised "without public scrutiny and in defiance of the
contrary opinion."289 Cognate to the right to receive information
and form private opinions is a right to be free of "inquiry into the
contents of [one's] library." 290 A citizen is not obliged to shape

years. See New York State Club Ass'n v. New York, 487 U.S. 1, 18 (1988) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (affirming rights of "intimate" clubs to restrict membership); Board
of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987) ("freedom to

enter into and carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a fundamental
element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights"); Roberts v. United StatesJaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 619-20 (1984) (constitutional protection for personal affiliations
"safeguards the ability independently to define one's identity that is central to any
concept of liberty," the hallmark of such affiliations being "seclusion from others");

id. at 635-36 (O'ConnorJ, concurring) (asserting that an association is "expressive,"
and thus constitutionally protected, when its activities are "intended to develop good
morals, reverence, patriotism, and a desire for self-improvement").
289 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 655 (1979).
290 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969); see also, e.g., United States v.
Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 42-48 (1953) (holding that a congressional committee was
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herself in the mold of public opinion. Given the function of
religious freedom in underwriting private autonomy, it seems
unlikely that the Free Exercise Clause would permit publications of
the names of church members against their will.2 91 The closer
the constitutional exercise comes to the shaping of the self, the less
compelling becomes the argument for publicity in a society in which
the self is thought to be autonomous from the state. 29 2 The
challenge is to define legal doctrines that incorporate these insights.
III. SEEKING SUNLIGHT AND AVOIDING SUNBURN:
BALANCING AND ITS ALTERNATIVES
We have seen in Sections I and II that the "scarlet letter"
problem has several characteristics:
- predictable impacts on constitutional rights are intensely
sensitive to empirical conditions;
- it involves conflicts between high-level values of constitutional

without power to exact certain information regarding the purchase of books of a
political nature); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301,305-07 (1965) (protecting
an individual's First Amendment right to receive Communist political propaganda
without being listed in government files). But cf Osborne v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1691,
1695-97 (1990) (relying on evils attending production of child pornography to
prohibit possession).
291 See Catholic Conference of United States v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc.,
487 U.S. 72, 79-80 (1988); Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32-34 (1984)
(upholding judicial limitations on the dissemination of information obtained in
pretrial discovery).
292 This is the source of the difficulty in analyzing parental notification
requirements in the abortion and birth control contexts, as the plurality recognized
in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2942-44 (1990). We accept the notion
generally that the formation ofjuvenile identities is entrusted to their parents. In the
absence of a showing that parents will act adversely to their children's interests, or
that children are emancipated from parents, it seems to follow as a matter of course
that parents should have at least a voice in the choices that define their children's
sexual identities. A state intervention to require children to expose their choices to
parental supervision is thus consistent with a formation of identity autonomous from
the state. See id.; cf Arnold v. Board of Educ., 880 F.2d 305, 312-14 (11th Cir. 1989)
(action against school officials who sought to discourage a student from notifying
parents of abortion). To the extent that the child's sexual activity suggests that the
premise of parental control of identity is dubious, or to the extent that the family
itself is divided, the arguments for notice as placing identity choice outside of the
state's control begin to decay.
Notification of spouses, however, stands on a quite different ground, unless we
are willing to claim for the marriage relationship the same rights to identity-formation
that accrue in the parental contexts. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 1991 U.S.
App. LEXIS 24,792, at *75-93 (3d Cir. Oct. 21, 1991) (holding unconstitutional the
requirement that a husband be notified of wife's decision to undergo an abortion),
petitionfor cert.filed, Nov. 7, 1991.
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magnitude;
- it is often theoretically indeterminate; and
- the practical costs of mis-specification are great.
These characteristics suggest why courts have been pressed to
employ balancing methodologies when dealing with disclosure
problems. Ad hoc balancing, however, at least in the academy, has
been stigmatized as the unprincipled last resort of the constitutional
lawyer. 293 Before falling back on the strategy, therefore, I explore
the other methods that have been deployed to approach the control
of government-compelled dissemination of information.
The easiest "principled" response to a claim that a constitutional
limitation on government is indeterminate is to dismiss the
limitation. The danger of thirsting for clean answers in the arena
ofjudicial review is that the cleanest answer is to deny constitutional
protection. In the area of dissemination of information, two
analytical constructs have pushed in this direction: the argument
that the subjects of dissemination have waived their rights to object
to dissemination, and the contention that the effort to limit
government dissemination of information would be institutionally
inappropriate. As we will see, both of these arguments suggest
outer limits on the scope of rights against disseminating information. Both do little, however, to avoid the requirements of
incremental choice within those confines.
A second set of strategies focuses on establishing clear categories that will avoid the necessity for incremental choice. They
characterize a particular disclosure as legitimate or illegitimate by
evaluating the "intent" behind a government's action, or by defining
certain types of information as immune from disclosure. Here, too,
the constructs are instructive but not determinative. They provide
guideposts for incremental adjustment of competing interests, but
no a priori way of making the adjustment. Ultimately, balancing in
this area is unavoidable and, I will argue, proper.

For recent critiques of balancing as a constitutional methodology, see
TUSHNET, supra note 269, at 159-60, 183-85; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional
Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE LJ. 943 (1987); C. Edwin Baker, Unreasoned
Reasonableness: Mandatoiy ParadePermits and Time, Place, and MannerRegulation, 78
Nw. U. L. REV. 937 (1983); Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Community and the Judicial
Balance: TheJurisprudenceofJustice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1 (1987); Antonin Scalia, The
Rule ofLaw as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CI. L. REv. 1175, 1178-88 (1989); Laurence H.
Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: EqualJustice or Economic Efficiency, 98 HARV. L. REV.
592 (1985).
293
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Clean Answers That Abandon the Field
1. The Doctrine of Waiver

Courts faced with problems of disclosure have regularly relied
on prior consensual exposure by the citizen to seal the legality of
the government activities at issue. To the extent that a court can
rely on choices already made by parties before litigation, it can elide
the difficulties raised by the tension between the values of privacy
and those of disclosure.
The arguments in favor of waiver are threefold. First, when the
subject of disclosure has already disseminated or consented to the
dissemination of the information in question, no incremental harm
arises from further dissemination. 294 Second, when the subject
has failed to take precautions against disclosure, her moral claim to
nondisclosure is weakened, either because the carelessness manifests
the low value she places on privacy, or because she could not
reasonably expect others to retain as private what she has broadcast
to the world.2 95 Third, allowing a subject to disclose or claim

294 See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 111-12
(1982) (O'Connor,J, dissenting) ("Once an individual has openly shown [support for
a political organization] by campaigning... disclosure of the receipt of expenditures
is unlikely to increase the degree of harassment so significantly as to deter the
individual from campaigning for the party."); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 80-81
(1959) (rejecting the claim that dissemination of the guest register by a legislative
committee investigating "Communists" was outside the state's powers, because visitors
at a summer camp were recorded in register open to inspection by law enforcement
officers); Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J.) ("[T]here
is no contention ... that any of the appellants seek to maintain their anonymity in
exhibition of the films ....
[T]heir complaint is simply that they do not want already
extant public knowledge of their exhibition to be any more widespread than necessary
."); f California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 52-53 (1974) (holding that
no seizure of information regarding banking transactions occurs where "a large
number of banks voluntarily kept records of this sort before they were required to
do so").
295 This approach has tended to characterize discussion in Fourth Amendment
cases. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449-52 (1989) (aerial surveillance from
public airspace did not constitute a "search"); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,
40 (1988) (where defendants left garbage by the side of the road for collection, they
could not claim reasonable expectation of privacy, because the garbage was exposed
to "animals, children, scavengers and snoops"); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
213 (1986) (finding that aerial surveillance did not violate "reasonable expectation of
privacy" because "[any member of the public flying in [the] airspace who glanced
down could have seen" the material observed); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,74344 (1979) (reasoning that the pen register was not a search because "a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to [the
telephone company]"); United Stales v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (no legitimate
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privilege at a particular moment opens the door to manipulation.
As with any waiver doctrine, to the extent that the citizen's
waiver adversely affects the interests of others, the argument for
allowing the first citizen's waiver to control is weakened. 2 96 If, for

example, the chilling of First Amendment exercises resulting from
broad dissemination of membership lists of political organizations
redounds to the detriment of the political system generally, there is
reason to regard the waiver by the careless members as less than
dispositive. The chill cast upon political association by the redbaiting of the McCarthy era was not lessened by the fact that much
of the information came from public petitions or voluntary
witnesses.
At first glance, therefore, the arguments for waiver seem
stronger in areas of nonpolitical disclosure. The more "private" a
decision is, the more appropriate it seems for information regarding
that decision to be disposed of by individual choice. Those who
choose to expose their intimacies in public are taking advantage of
precisely the informational self-control that privacy affords.
At this point, however, memories of the McCarthy era should
again give us pause. Even with regard to predominantly selfregarding choices, one person's disclosure may affect the privacy of
others. In the 1950s, the willingness of many citizens to publicly
avow their anti-communism and reveal their prior associates made
it possible to stigmatize silent witnesses as "Fifth Amendment
Communists." Similarly, in other contexts, the waiver of anonymity
by some citizens may effectively expose the "private" but deviant
choices of others. Once the bulk of the conforming population
waives their right to privacy, the failure to waive privacy carries an
implication of nonconformity. We see a contemporary example of
the phenomenon in the urine sample competitions which periodically rage in political campaigns: once one candidate has waived her
expectation ofprivacy against government in financial records when information was
"voluntarily conveyed to banks"); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
("What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."); cf JuDITHJARvis THOMPSON, The
Right to Privacy, in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISKS: ESSAYS IN MORAL THEORY 117,
127 (1986) (arguing that the right to privacy is waived where subject "[takes] none of
the conventional and easily available steps... to prevent listening").
296 1 have periodically voiced this concern in other contexts. See Seth F. Kreimer,
AllocationalSanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a PositiveState, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 1293, 1387-95 (1984) [hereinafter Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions]; Seth F.
Kreimer, Government Economic Power and Free Speech: Can the State Buy Silence? 8 TEL
Avrv U. STUD. L. 265, 278-79 (1988).
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privacy and taken a drug test, the failure of her opponent to do the
same is taken to be a prima facie admission of drug use.
Moreover, the initial plausibility of the waiver doctrine is
undercut by the tendency of "waiver" arguments to take on a
dichotomous quality: courts that adopt a "waiver" theory most
often view it as a bursting bubble. Either a piece of information is
retained entirely in confidence or its constitutional privilege
explodes, and it is subject to universal dissemination. 297 The
difficulties here are twofold. First, to the extent that the right to
control of information is designed to guard against retaliation or
harassment, the level of harassment diverges radically depending on
the surrounding social conditions. Disclosure in one arena does not
entail and is not equivalent to disclosure in others. As the Court
noted in Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee,2 98 even
if supporters of a political party are already public to some degree,
"[mere] application of a disclosure requirement results in a dramatic
increase in public exposure." 299 The point was emphasized more
297 This dichotomous view allows even the smallest exposure to be characterized

as a complete waiver. See, e.g., Riley, 488 U.S. at 449 ("'"What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection."'" (quoting Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213 (quoting Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)))). Riley held that the interior of a greenhouse
protected from ground level observation, located on a property surrounded by a wire
fence, with a "Do not enter" sign, and covered with corrugated roofing, 10% of which
was missing, was "exposed to the public," insofar as a police helicopter flying over the
greenhouse at 400 feet could observe its interior. Id. at 450-51.
This view also manifests itself in the position that expectations of privacy cannot
attach to a reliance on rules of conduct or standard operating procedures that limit
or render unlikely subsequent disclosures by private parties. See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S.
at 743-44 (holding that telephone customers "assumed the risk" that telephone
numbers dialed would be discovered by government pen register when they revealed
the numbers to the telephone company); Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (holding that bank
depositor "takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will
be conveyed ... to the Government"); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752
(1971) (since "[ilnescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk
that his companions may be reporting to the police," no privacy interest is infringed
by warrantless wiring of police informants). Similar hair-trigger approaches attend
the "waiver" of attorney-client privileges, or the Fifth Amendment privilege.
298 459 U.S. 87 (1982).

299 Id. at 97 n.14. The Court has generally been more willing to acknowledge
gradations in disclosure in First Amendment cases than in Fourth Amendment cases.
See, e.g., CaliforniaBankers Ass'n, 416 U.S. at 55-57 (treatingACLU challenge to Bank
Secrecy Act as premature because of the absence of pending subpoena, rather than
invalid because of absence of expectation of privacy); Pollard v. Roberts, 238 F. Supp.
248 (E.D. Ark.) (enjoining subpoena of Arkansas Republican Party's bank records
because it violated First Amendment freedom of association), affd per curiam, 393
U.S. 14 (1968).
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recently in UnitedStates DepartmentofJustice v. Reporters Committeefor
Freedom of the Press,300 in the context of privacy exemption from
the disclosure requirements of the Freedom of Information Act:
In an organized society, there are few facts that are not at one
time or another divulged to another.... [I]nformation may be
classified as "private" if it is "intended for or restricted to the use
of a particular person or group or class of persons: not freely
available to the public." ... Plainly there is a vast difference
between the public records that might be found after a diligent
search of courthouse files ... throughout the country and a
computerized summary located in a single clearinghouse of
301
information.
The argument for waiver based on the harmlessness of subsequent
disclosures, therefore, blinks at the relevant realities when it rests
on something other than deliberate public dissemination by the
subject.
Second, if we view the strictures against disclosure as guarding
self-definition, the decision to define the self in confrontation with
a limited circle is quite different from the decision to define the self
in confrontation with the world at large. Privacy in this regard
should not be viewed as a bursting bubble, but as an umbrella.
Particularly as government's opportunity to cross-reference varied
bits of data increases, disclosure for one purpose should not be
tantamount to disclosure for an indiscriminate variety of others.
Once a court moves beyond the "bursting bubble" approach,
however, it confronts precisely the normative questions from which
the waiver approach sought to extract analysis. The existence vel
non of some disclosure is a relatively cleanly answered empirical
question. The question of the level of disclosure acquiesced in by
a particular "waiver" on the part of the citizen in question is less
clear-cut. The definition of the level of acquiescence can hardly be
a subjective one, for the judicial protection of privacy cannot vary
with the naivete, credulity, or paranoia of the citizen. On the other
hand, a definition of the scope of waiver based on the expectations
that "society is prepared to recognize as reasonable," (that is, an
individual must expect, because society does, that action x will result
in y level of disclosure and, therefore, by taking action x the
individual has consented to disclosure y), undercuts the initial claim
300 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
301 Id. at 763-64 (quoting WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

1804 (1976)).
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that there has been an actual, voluntary consent to the disclosure of
the information.
Equally important, relying on what "society is prepared to
recognize" brings us full circle to the requirement that the courts
define the realms of public and private, for society's expectations
are conditioned by the legal regime. In a setting where banks are
legally forbidden to convey information on depositors to the
government, opening a checking account is not a waiver of financial
privacy. In a regime in which the law allows such disclosure,
opening a checking account is a waiver. The conclusion that a
deposit in a checking account "waives" financial privacy is thus itself
an adjudication of the proper scope of expectations regarding the
public and the private. The waiver doctrine, therefore, cannot avoid
confronting the tension; it can only bury it.
Finally, as with any area of individual choice, there may be
reasons for paternalist intervention. Initially, the waiver doctrine
confronts the problem of market power. The government has no
competitors, so it is likely to be able to extract waivers illegitimately.
In one sense, a registration of one's fingerprints as a condition of
obtaining a drivers license is a free exchange of information for a
benefit. In another sense, it is simple compliance with bureaucratic
0 2
fiat, since there is nowhere else to go for the license.3

302 Admittedly, the prices demanded by the subjects of disclosure even in a
competitive market are often quite low. Consumers seem to be perfectly willing to
provide vast quantities of personal information to credit grantors and insurance
companies as a condition of obtaining services without any substantial guarantees of
confidentiality. See, e.g., Rothfelder, supra note 2, at 74 (Robert H. CourtneyJr., a
manager at IBM, sent researchers out to a New York street to ask passersby if they
thought modern technology was invading privacy. Nearly 90% said yes, according
to Courtney. The next day, on the same street, his group offered a credit card with
a favorable interest rate. The application asked for a Social Security number,
information about other credit cards, and bank-account numbers and balances.
About 90% of the people filled it out without hesitating, leaving no spaces blank.);
Implanted Sensors to Measure Our Likes and Dislikes?, PRIVACYJ., Jan. 1987, at 3 (In
1987, two out of three American families offered $20 per month by a market research
company to log in every thirty minutes while watching television, and have all
purchases scanned for product codes, accepted the offer.)
This promiscuity of personal disclosure might be taken to indicate that
contemporary Americans simply have no particular interest in retaining information
about themselves as private, but this does not seem to be the teaching of public
opinion surveys on the subject. See, e.g., LOUIs HARRIS ET AL., THE EQUIFAX REPORT
ON CONSUMERS IN THE INFORMATION AGE 2 (1990) (46% of Americans were very

concerned about threats to privacy in 1990, while 31% were very concerned in 1978;
33% were "somewhat" concerned in both surveys; 52% of women very concerned in
1990 survey; 64% of blacks very concerned in 1990 survey); see also id. at 14 (30% had
refused to apply for a service or benefit because of excessive demands for informa-
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Second, even in the case of information revealed without
unconscionable inducements, our intuitions have not caught up with
our technology; we do not understand the scope of a disclosure into
an electronic environment. The vast ability of computerized systems
to communicate and synthesize data is not yet a part of public
consciousness. Thus, disclosure of a discrete piece of information,
such as a telephone number to a merchant, may seem innocuous,
and the implicit assurances of confidentiality are often accepted. 0 3 Reliance on waivers to sanction broad disclosure in such
situations is inappropriate.
Third, citizens often do not fully grasp the distributional
consequences of disclosure. Nondisclosure is insurance against the
future. Although today I may not care who knows about my ACLU
membership, I may dearly wish in twenty years that it be confidential. None of us knows what the value of an ability to start over will
be in twenty years. For most of us, it will be irrelevant, but for the
few who find themselves stigmatized by their past, it will be crucial.
As a society, we benefit from social insurance in this area.
2. "Words Aren't Laws"
Granting the existence and magnitude of the potential impact
of government disclosures, courts have nonetheless been tempted
to avoid the tension between the virtues of disclosure and those of
privacy by adopting the proposition that disclosure is not a matter
for judicial remedy under the Constitution. These analyses draw a
distinction between government disclosures and "sovereign"
government actions; disclosures on this view do not raise justiciable
30 4
issues without other exertions of state power.
tion); id at 18 (57% regarded demands for excessively personal information as a major
problem);James E. Katz & Annette R. Tassone, Public Opinion Trends: Privacy and
Information Technology, 54 PUB. OPINION Q. 125 (1990) (summarizing results of a
survey on public concern over privacy).
s3s "Confidentiality" may not be all that it appears:
Every mass surveillance agency which I have ever encountered insists that
its files are "confidential," that its personal data are held "in confidence."
All this means is that the information is used for some purposes but not for
others ....
Consumer credit reporting agencies in the United States are
committed to the principle of confidentiality, for example. But their reports
are available to any agency or individual who appears to be a grantor of
credit.
JAMES B. RULE, PRIVATE LIVEs AND PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE: SOCIAL CONTROL IN THE

COMPUTER AGE 333 (1974).
304

This argument differs from the "state action" contention canvassed above, see

116

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 140:1

Justice Reed, speaking for three dissenters in Joint Anti-Fascists
Refugee Committee v. McGrath,30 5 sounded this theme in the McCarthy era. He maintained that members of organizations listed by the
Attorney General as subversive "are in the position of every
exponent of unpopular views. ... 'A mere abstract declaration' by
an administrator regarding the character of an organization, without
the effect of forbidding or compelling conduct on the part of the
30 6
complainant, ought not to be subject to judicial interference."
A distinction between "legal" actions and mere "declarations" has
30 7
recurred regularly in Supreme Court opinions.
In the McCarthy era and its immediate aftermath, the Court had
few occasions to deal definitively with the justiciability of unadorned
dissemination of information. Despite the prevalence of information obtained by surveillance or "naming names," most of the cases
that reached the Court involved efforts to extract information
through the threat of sovereign force or attempts to attach the
stigma of disloyalty in the context of employment decisions. In
several other cases, the Court avoided the question of governmental
disclosures by adopting immunity doctrines rooted in separation of
powers concerns. 30 8 It was not until 1963 that the Court rejected

supra notes 149-72 and accompanying text, in two dimensions. First, it does not deny
that the disclosures are "state action" in the relevant sense, and hence subject to
constitutional norms. Second, it does not claim that the "private" consequences of
disclosure are irrelevant to constitutional analysis; once a "change in legal status" is
linked to the disclosure, private reaction is an appropriate part of constitutional
analysis. Compare Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-13 (1976) (rejecting an argument
based upon "a claim that the State may not publicize a record of an official act such
as an arrest") with Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 646-50 (1980)
(denying municipality immunity from liability for good-faith constitutional violations
resulting from harm to reputation associated with employment dismissal).
305 341 U.S. 123, 200-03 (1951) (ReedJ, dissenting).
306 Id. at 203 (citation omitted).
307 The approach did not originate with Justice Reed. See, e.g., Standard
Computing Scale Co. v. Farrell, 249 U.S. 571, 577 (1919) (holding that "specifications" for weights and measures, issued by a state official, do not constitute a law or
regulation and are thus exempt from constitutional prohibitions). Judge Easterbrook
is a current proponent. See United States v. Bush, 888 F.2d 1145, 1150 (7th Cir.
1989) ("Trying to distinguish 'mere' reputational injury from the kind Bush is
suffering will be difficult and unilluminating business.., to call on judges to draw
this line may be to send them on a fool's errand."); AmericanJewish Congress v. City
of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 134 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (government endorsement of religion not prohibited unless "coercive," but admitting that
endorsement to captive audience or children is coercive).
308 See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951) (holding that Civil
Rights statutes were not intended to make legislators personally liable for damages
to a witness injured by investigations of a committee exercising legislative power); cf.
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the proposition that a final decision to invoke force or terminate
employment was a prerequisite to judicial review. °
The most recent turn of doctrine, however, seems to return to
the hesitations of earlier years. In Paul v. Davis,31 0 Justice Rehn-

Methodist Fed'n for Social Action v. Eastland, 141 F. Supp. 729,731-32 (D.D.C. 1956)
(holding that a public statement of agency policy with respect to matters of wide
public interest is in the line of duty). See generally Comment, Court Refuses to Enjoin
Publication of Pamphlet Containing Defamatory Material, 70 HARV. L. REv. 723, 726

(1957) (discussing the scope and purpose of immunity for members of Congress).
For more recent invocations of separation of powers claims, see, for example,
Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 343-45 (1973) (RehnquistJ., dissenting) (censorship
of publications of parallel branch raises separation of powers concerns); Laird v.
Tatum, 408 U.S. 1,10-12 (1972) (no standing to challenge Army collection of political
intelligence where complainants were not "presently or prospectively subject to
regulations, prescriptions, or compulsions").
309 In Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963), the Court reviewed the
practice of the Rhode Island Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth of notifying
distributors of designated books and magazines that those items had been reviewed
by the Commission and declared objectionable for sale or display to youths under 18
years of age. See id. at 59-72. The notice was regularly accompanied by an assertion
that the Commission's decision had been forwarded to the Chief of Police of the
relevant municipality. See id. at 62 n.5. In striking down the practice as improper
administrative censorship, the majority observed:

It is not as if this were not regulation by the State of Rhode Island. The
acts and practices of the members ... of the Commission ... were
performed under color of state law and so constituted acts of the State
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ....
These acts and
practices directly and designedly stopped the circulation of publications in
many parts of Rhode Island ....
The Commission's notices, phrased
virtually as orders ... invariably followed up by police visitations, in fact
stopped the circulation of the listed publications ex proprio vigore ....
[T]hese blacklists... plainly serve as instruments of regulation independent
of the laws against obscenity.
Id. at 68-69; see also Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (striking
down a state statute providing for the public designation of "excessive drinkers" by
state agents);Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 424 (1969) (applying due process
constraints to a commission, whose purpose allegedly was "to find persons guilty of
violating criminal laws without trial or procedural safeguards, and to publicize those
findings," although no actual sanctions had been enforced against the appellant).
Justice Harlan's dissent in Bantam Books took the position that the Commission
should be free to "expregs its views on the character of any published reading or
other material.., and to notify publishers, distributors, and members of the public
with respect to its activities in these regards ... [so long as] dissemination of a
challenged publication is not physically or legally impeded." Bantam Books, 372 U.S.
at 77-80 (Harlan,J., dissenting); see also Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 441 (1960)
(defending the Civil Rights Commission against a due process challenge to its
investigations with the observation that "its function is purely investigative and factfinding.... [It] does not and cannot take any affirmative action which will affect an
individual's legal rights.").
s'0 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
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quist wrote for a majority that the dissemination by police of an
inaccurate allegation that a citizen was a "known shoplifter"
implicated no due process rights, because it was accompanied by no

status." 31 1
Justice Stevens, in Meese v.
upheld the government's effort to label films as "foreign

"alteration of legal
Keene,3 12

propaganda," in part because the Act "does not pose any obstacle
to appellee's access to the materials he wishes to exhibit. Congress
did- not
prohibit .... or restrain the distribution of advocacy materi1
als. "

The argument seems to be that government dissemination of
information unaccompanied by sovereign force is an inappropriate
basis for judicial intervention. But the theoretical case for a blanket
exemption from judicial scrutiny of government dissemination of
information is weak. As we have seen, and as the courts have
regularly recognized, words can be as devastating as material
sanctions. Even in the absence of directly coercive effects, the
government's efforts to convey information are not generally

31 Id. at 708-09; see Siegert v. Gilley, 111 S. Ct. 1789, 1794 (1991) (reaffirming
Paul v. Davis); see also Laird,408 U.S. at 11 (plaintiffs subject to military surveillance
program had no standing to challenge program because they were not subject to
"exercise of government power [that] was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in
nature"). Note, however, that the Court in Paul dealt substantively with the
challenged disclosures, and that it rejected on the merits a claim that the disclosures
breached a constitutionally protected "privacy" interest. See Paul,424 U.S. at 713.
The "legal status" test in Paul has created some distinctions that are intuitively
odd as methods of assuring interinstitutional comity. While unadorned publicly
announced accusation of discreditable characteristics will not make out a "deprivation
of liberty," when coincident with a firing, arrest, seizure of property, or dismissal of
criminal charges, such an accusation has been held constitutionally cognizable. See
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980) (firing); Gobel v. Maricopa
County, 867 F.2d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir. 1989) (arrest); Marx v. Gumbinner, 855 F.2d
783, 790 (l1th Cir. 1988) (dismissal of charges); Marrero v. City of Hialeah, 625 F.2d
499, 506 (5th Cir. 1980) (seizure of property). The federal courts have thus been
provided with a steady supply of litigation regarding government injuries to
reputation.
Some state courts have retained the earlier concern that the exposure to public
opprobrium is a trigger for due process protections under their state constitutions.
See In re Bagley, 513 A.2d 331,338 (N.H. 1986). At least one court has suggested that
opprobrium which has an impact on other protected rights is outside of the scope of
Paul. See Bohn v. County of Dakota, 772 F.2d 1433 (8th Cir. 1985).
312 481 U.S. 465 (1987).
315 Id. at 480; see also Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia,
J.) (The "line of permissibility.., fails.., between the disparagement of ideas...
and the suppression of ideas through the exercise.., of state power. If the latter is
rigorously proscribed ... the former can hold no terror."); cf. Bowen v. Roy, 476
U.S. 693, 699 (1986) (method of listing in internal government records cannot be
cognizable infringement of free exercise of religion).
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exempt from constitutional constraint. 3 14 Moreover, responding
to dissemination of information is not a task for which the judiciary
is inherently unsuited; courts regularly adjudicate claims based on
15
governmental publicity.3
The best defense of the "sovereign force" requirement for
reviewing government disclosures rests on institutional considerations.' 1 6 From SEC reports to Centers for Disease Control
bulletins to press conferences, dissemination of information is a
large part of contemporary government practice. Clearly, government cannot be barred by the First Amendment from commenting
adversely on its critics. 3 17 Nor can it be responsible for providing
314 See, e.g., County ofAlleghenyv. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 598-602(1989) (enjoining

display of creche which could be "fairly understood" as an endorsement of
Christianity); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42-43 (1980) (striking down display of
copy ofTen Commandments in classroom as violative of the Establishment Clause);
Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 403-04 (1964) (striking down practice of listing
race of candidates on ballot as violative of the equal protection clause).
If the sole function of constitutional prohibitions was to constrain the
government's monopoly on coercive violence, informational sanctions might stand on
a different ground from material sanctions. Consider, for example, the claims of
Justice Kennedy: "without exception, we have invalidated [only] actions that further
the interests of religion through the coercive power of government." County of
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 660 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Constitutional constraints,
however, also embody mechanisms for self-governance and aspirations for the good
society,
which can be effectively undercut by dissemination of information.
315 For example, Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973), decided "in the shadow
of Constantineau,"declined to confer civil immunity upon the public printer for the
dissemination of congressional documents which named individual school children
as examples of inadequate education in alleged violation of common law and
constitutional rights to privacy. See id. at 324; cf. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S.
111, 132 (1979) (no absolute immunity for allegedly libelous statements of senator
outside of speech and debate clause). Similarly, under administrative law doctrines,
unauthorized adverse federal agency publicity can be enjoined upon a showing of
irreparable injury. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,295-316 (1979); Ernest
Gellhorn, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1380, 1432-35
(1973); Robinson B. Lacy, Adverse Publicity and SEC Enforcement Procedure, 46
FORDHAM L. REvIEW 435,441-46 (1977); see also infranotes 328-30 and accompanying
text.
316 See YUDOF, supra note 218, at 303-06; Ted Finaman & Stewart Macaulay,
Freedom to Dissent: The Vietnam Protestsand the Words of Public Officials, 1966 WIs. L.
REV. 632, 688-92; cf. EMERSON, supra note 167, at 699-708 ("judicial restriction can

hardly be considered a viable device for the protection of private expression against
abridgement by government expression," unless government expression can be
considered "action").
317 See Keller v. State Bar, 110 S. Ct. 2228,2235 (1990) ("Government officials are
expected as a part of the democratic process to represent and to espouse the views
of a majority of their constituents ....
[I]t would be ironic if those charged with
making governmental decisions were not free to speak for themselves in the
[policymaking] process.").
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notice and hearing before any functionary utters a harsh word about
a citizen. And, at the federal level, concerns of interbranch comity
raise hurdles to unilateral judicial efforts to censor executive and
legislative messages.318

These concerns, even at their strongest, suggest a judicial role
significantly less constrained than the total abdication suggested by
Justice Reed. To begin with, the government does not have free
access to all information. During the McCarthy era, subpoenas were
necessary to obtain much of the information that became fodder for
red-baiting. Today, despite an increasingly transparent environment, private control over information often necessitates the threat
of legal sanctions for the government to obtain information it later
seeks to disclose.
Intervention in these circumstances falls within a classic judicial
role grounded in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Efforts to
subpoena materials for dissemination, to require reports, to obtain
a search warrant, or to compel a witness to answer objectionable
questions on pain of contempt or dismissal from government service
are each clearly "sovereign," and subject to judicial review. When
information is in protective private hands, a challenge that seeks
either to prevent government access to the information or to
impose a constitutional nondisclosure obligation as a condition of
access to the information raises no institutional difficulties.
Thus, in Whalen v. Roe,3 19 a case reviewing New York's requirement that physicians report prescriptions of controlled drugs
to a central state data bank, the Court upheld the regulation, while
recognizing an "individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters."3 20 Lower courts recognize that this interest
318 See McMillan, 412 U.S. at 343-45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that
separation of powers forbids the granting of injunctive relief for government libel);
Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1313-14 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J.) (suggesting
practical and constitutional difficulties in judicial efforts to limit statements by
executive or legislative branches); Methodist Fed'n for Social Action v. Eastland, 141
F. Supp. 729, 731 (D.D.C. 1956) (noting that nothing in the Constitution authorizes
anyone to prevent Congress from publishing any statement).
During the McCarthy era, similar concerns had impelled the Supreme Court to
read an absolute immunity for state legislative investigations into § 1983. See Tenney
v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378-79 (1951). More recent cases have characterized
legislative immunity in terms of the intent of the framers of § 1983, but Spallone v.
United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990), intimates a return to the earlier conceptions. See
id. at 633-34.
319 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
320 Id. at 599-600, 605-06 (concern for privacy met by precautions against
disclosure); see alsoNixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,457-59 (1977)

1991]

SUNLIGHT, SECRETS, AND SCARLET LETTERS

applies with different force to different varieties of information. 2 1 In recent cases where courts have approved a particular
governmental effort to obtain intimate information by compulsion,
approval is predicated upon the existence of "effective provisions
for [the] security of the information against subsequent unauthorized disclosure." 22 So, too, when the information in question
is the product of unconstitutional sovereign action, courts regularly
23
order its destruction or sealing.A
("[A]t least when government intervention is at stake, public officials, including the
President are not wholly without constitutionally protected privacy rights in matters
of personal life unrelated to any acts done by them in their public capacity.").
321 CompareTrade Waste Management Ass'nv. Hughey, 780 F.2d 221,231 (3d Cir.
1985) (criminal records information not protected by constitutional privacy right) with
United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577, 581 (3d Cir. 1980)
(medical records generally entitled to protection; "highly sensitive" records entitled
to still greater protection). See also Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Phila., 812
F.2d 105, 110 (3d Cir. 1987) ("Most circuits appear to apply an 'intermediate standard
of review' for the majority of confidentiality violations, with a compelling interest
analysis reserved for 'severe intrusions' on confidentiality.").
322 Westinghouse Ele¢. Corp., 638 F.2d at 579 (locked cabinets, data destruction,
regulatory prohibition of disclosure); see also FraternalOrderof Police, 812 F.2d at 118
("It would be incompatible with the concept of privacy to permit protected
information and material to be publicly disclosed."); In re Search Warrant (Sealed),
810 F.2d 67, 72 (3d Cir. 1987) (District Court protective order and grand jury
secrecy); cf Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 n.7 (1989)
("While this procedure permits the Government to learn certain private medical facts
... there is no indication that the Government does not treat this information as
confidential ....
Under the circumstances, we do not view this procedure as a
significant invasion of privacy."); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,80-81
(1976) ("The added requirements for confidentiality, with the sole exception for
public health officers.., assist and persuade us in our determination" that recordkeeping and reporting requirements applied to abortion providers are constitutionally
valid.).
323 Indeed, even during the McCarthy period, federal courts granted the
expunction of federal personnel records regarding improper loyalty decisions. See,
e.g., Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363,370-71 (1957) (finding that expunction of records
is a permissible remedy); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 348-49 (1955) (allowing
expunction of federal personnel records).
For more recent examples of required destruction, see, for example, Patterson
v. FBI, 893 F.2d 595, 103-04 (3d Cir. 1990) (FBI's offer to expunge allegedly illegal
surveillance records effectively met constitutional challenges); Haase v. Sessions, 893
F.2d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (after grant of TRO prohibiting distribution, the FBI
and other agencies agree to return journalists' notes illegally seized by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service at border, and to destroy all records
regarding them); Smith v. Nixon, 807 F.2d 197, 203-04 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (ordering
destruction of logs of illegal wiretaps); Committee in Solidarity with the People of El
Sal. v. Sessions, 705 F. Supp. 25 (D.D.C. 1989) (effort to seal FBI records of
surveillance of political opponents of U.S. policy in Central America), aff'd, 929 F.2d
742 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
For arrest records expunction, see, for example, United States v. Friesen, 853
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Much disclosure, however, falls outside of the area in which the
government is acting in a clearly "sovereign" fashion. Information
often makes its way into government custody by direct observation,
analysis, or inquiries directed to acquiescent third parties. 324 If
disclosures of information obtained without "sovereign" exertion
are immune from judicial interference, an agency which disseminates records of its own observations acts under no constitutional
constraint. Under such a regime, the price of dealing with a
governmental or nongovernmental bureaucracy as a consumer,
(rather than as a trading partner who can insist on assurances of
confidentiality), is naked vulnerability to dissemination.3 25 Moreover, as the Fourth Amendment constraints on direct observation
by government are relaxed, even those who have no direct dealings
with the government become increasingly subject to unlimited
surveillance and disclosure. The range of observation techniques
free from judicial supervision has increased regularly in recent
years, leaving ever more limited opportunities to assert constitution3 2
al concerns. 6

F.2d 816, 818 (10th Cir. 1988) (expunction is within power of the court upon proper
showing); Reyes v. Supervisor of Drug Enforcement Admin., 834 F.2d 1093,1098 (1st
Cir. 1987) (upholding the expunction of arrest record); Tatum v. Morton, 562 F.2d
1279,1282-83 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (expunction ofarrest of attendants at peaceful Quaker
prayer vigil outside White House violates First Amendment); Sullivan v. Murphy, 478
F.2d 938, 966-67 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (expunction of mass arrest of"May Day" protesters
of U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia violates Fourth Amendment).
324 See, e.g., Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 96-97 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (availability of bank records to law enforcement on informal basis); In re
Request of Rosier, 717 P.2d 1353, 1355 (Wash. 1986) (availability of names, addresses,
and electronic usage of customers on request); People v. Chapman, 679 P.2d 62, 65
(Cal. 1984) (availability of name and address of unlisted telephone subscriber to
police on request); David Burnham, IRS Buys Company's List ofNames, Incomes to Track
Tax Evaders, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 27, 1983, at 3 (purchase of mailing lists by
IRS). An ironic version of this problem occurred in United States v. AT&T, 567 F.2d
121 (D.C. Cir. 1977), in which Congress sought AT&T's records ofthe FBI's previous
requests for assistance in wiretapping. See id. at 123.
325 With regard to third-party disclosure, the larger an entity is, the more possible
it becomes to maintain records on the premises, where government snooping can be
resisted. But the larger the entity, the larger the informational footprint that the
government can pick up from other sources. The savings and loan is more vulnerable
than the corner loan-shark, or the welfare recipient.
326 Aerial monitoring, amplification, data matching, beepers, and mail covers
provide information to the government without, under current doctrine, constituting
"searches" subject to initial judicial authorization. See supranotes 295, 297 (discussing
situations where privacy is held to be "waived" and an individual is vulnerable to
disclosure); see also United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285-86 (1983) (allowing
beepers because beepers are not "searches").
The prospect of dissemination that adversely affects constitutional rights, or the
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Although some of the material disseminated by the McCarthyites
was a product of government compulsion, much more was obtained
by government informers or friendly witnesses. Therefore, the
absence of sovereign force does not imply the absence of a power
to pillory, which, left uncontrolled, imperils our liberties. Concerns
of institutional comity, however, suggest that judicial intervention
must also be constrained. The challenge is to craft an appropriate
doctrine, not to abandon the field.
Implicit in this analysis is an argument that courts should rely on
nonconstitutional doctrines to protect against broad disclosures. At
the federal level, a variety of statutes,3 27 most notably the Privacy
Act of 1974,828 place limitations on promiscuous disclosure of

absence of adequate safeguards against dissemination, may allow a subject to enjoin
the collection of information as a means of guarding against disclosure. Even if an
injunction is legally available, practical difficulties limit the effectiveness of efforts to
prevent dissemination, for such efforts require knowledge of the acquisition or
accumulation of the data in question.
Once accumulation is acknowledged, a plaintiff may be able to require the
destruction of records as a means of preventing dissemination. If a citizen does not
know that files are being prepared about her, however, she can neither enjoin their
compilation nor mandate their destruction. The importance of limiting dissemination
from the outset is suggested by the situation of the plaintiffs in Committee in Solidarity
with the People of El Salvadorv. Sessions. Although the FBI agreed to seal the records
of its illegal investigation of the Committee, plaintiffs were unsuccessful in obtaining
relief preventing secondary and tertiary dissemination of records about them through
third parties and information networks who obtained the information before its
sealing. See Sessions, 738 F. Supp. at 546-47.
527 See, e.g., 13 U.S.C. §§ 8, 9 (1988) (census and survey data); 18 U.S.C. § 1905
(1988) (income tax return, trade secrets, confidential information); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(1)(c) (1988) (prohibiting disclosure of contents of intercepted wire, oral or
electronic communication, except to investigative or law enforcement officers); 18
U.S.C. § 3578 (1988) (criminal conviction records); 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (1988) (tax
return information); 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1988) (criminal identification information); 28
U.S.C. § 534(b) (1988) (FBI agreement to share rap sheets subject to cancellation if
"dissemination is made outside the receiving departments or related agencies"); 39
U.S.C. § 410 (1988) (disclosure by Post Office); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, 2000e-8(e)
(1988) (EEOC investigative data); 42 U.S.C. § 1306 (1988) (restricting the disclosure
of information in the possession of the Department of Health and Human Services).
328 Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(q) (1988). Specifically, see 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (prohibiting disclosure by federal
agencies of indentifiable "records" about "individuals" without written consent);
§ 552a(e)(7) (prohibiting federal agencies from maintaining records "describinghow
an individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment unless expressly
authorized by statute, or ... within the scope of an authorized law enforcement
activity").
The Privacy Act contains an exception for disclosures pursuant to the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA), but FOIA in turn provides exceptions for protection of
privacy. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(c) (exempting law enforcement records from FOIA
disclosure "to the extent that production of such materials... could reasonably be
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information about citizens., 29 Courts construing such statutes
should view themselves as implementing constitutional as well as
statutory concerns for privacy in broadly construing statutes against
disclosure. 33 0 This role satisfies the general canon that statutes
be construed in accord with constitutional concerns, 31 while
alleviating difficulties of institutional competence. 33 2 So, too,
where disclosures are shadowed by constitutional concerns, courts
should narrowly construe statutory authorizations for disclosures.333

expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy"); § 552(b)(6) (exempting
from FOIA "personnel and medical and similar files disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy").
329 For a survey of state statutes, see Project, GovernmentInformationand the Rights
of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REv. 971, 1243-77 (1975).
-33 See, e.g., United States Dep't ofJustice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the
Press, 489 U.S. 749, 770 (1989) (construing the FOIA privacy exemption broadly in
light of constitutional concern with "threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation
of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data banks"); Perkey v.
Department ofMotor Vehicles 721 P.2d 50, 55-56 (Cal. 1986) (construing California's
Information Practices Act, in light of California constitutional protection of privacy,
to prohibit public inspection of fingerprints required for drivers licenses).
331 See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 491 U.S. 440, 466 (1989);
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568,
575 (1988); Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854 (1985); Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574, 592-93 (1983); United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 27 (1980);
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 499-501 (1979); International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749 (1961); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & PHILLIP P.
FRIcKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 676-89

(1988); William N. EskridgeJr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation,137 U. PA. L.
REV. 1007, 1020-22 (1989); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of

PlenaryPower Phantom ConstitutionalNorms andStatutory Interpretation,100 YALE L.J.
545,561-64 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Law andAdministrationAfter Chevron, 90 COLUM.

L. REV. 2071, 2111-14 (1990).
The Supreme Court's recent flamboyant disregard of this norm in Rust v.
Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991), in all probability reflects less a weakening of the
norm than a weakening of the commitment to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
332 The statutes provide authority for intervention, and also allow Congress to
overrule the Court's intervention if it encroaches too extensively on the interests of
other institutions.
333 See, e.g., Britt v. Naval Investigative Serv., 886 F.2d 544, 545 (3d Cir. 1989)
(construing "routine use" exception to Privacy Act protections narrowly; disclosure
for employment purposes not compatible with collection for purposes of criminal
investigation by different agency); Covert v. Harrington, 876 F.2d 751, 756 (9th Cir.
1989) (collection of information for security clearance purposes is incompatible under
PrivacyAct with disclosure for criminal investigation of subsequent actions); Mazaleski
v. Treusdell, 562 F.2d 701, 713 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (derogatory information
concerning a federal employee's dismissal not compatible with disclosure to
prospective employer); Menardv. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971) (enjoining
dissemination of FBI records, on the basis of narrow construction of statute
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If the sticking point is inter-branch comity, the option of
crafting common law protections should not be ignored, since the
common law also offers opportunity for legislative modification.
Although the Supreme Court has suggested that the First Amendment may cast doubt on the authority of courts and legislatures to
impose liability on private individuals and media defendants for
harmful disclosures, 33 4 no similar limitation applies to the liability
of public employees for their official actions.33 5 Thus, for example, in Doe v. McMillan,3 3 6 the Court entertained a suit against the
Public Printer and the Superintendent of Documents, under a
common law privacy theory, to prevent the dissemination of
derogatory information about children in the schools of the District
of Columbia. Rejecting a claim of official immunity, the Court held
that the federal officials "enjoy[ed] no special immunity from local
laws protecting the good name or the reputation of the ordinary
citizen."3 3 7 Similarly, a number of courts have relied on the
Federal Tort Claims Act038 to incorporate state law obligations of
33 9
nondisclosure rooted in statute and common law.
authorizing dissemination).
The same principle should apply to narrow construction of statutes authorizing
government agencies to gather sensitive information for which there is no protection
against dissemination. Cf United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 46 (1953),(narrowly
construing investigative charter of House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities);
FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1924) (Holmes, J.) (narrowly
construing investigative authority of agency in light of constitutional doubts
concerning the power to require witnesses to disclose private facts); Harriman v. ICC,
211 U.S. 407,419-22 (1908) (Holmes,J.) (same). But cf United States v. Morton Salt
Co., 338 U.S. 632, 647-54 (1950) (broadly construing the FTC's investigative power).
334 See, e.g., Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 643 (1990) (holding that Florida's
prohibition of grandjury witnesses from disclosing their own testimony is unconstitutional); Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (striking down a damage
judgment against a newspaper for publishing the lawfully obtained, though illegally
released, name of a rape victim).
335 See FloridaStar, 491 U.S. at 534 ("To the extent sensitive information is in the
government's custody, [the government] has even greater power to forestall... the
injury caused by its release. The government may... extend a damages remedy
against [itself] or its officials where the government's mishandling of sensitive
information leads to its dissemination.").
336 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
337 Id. at 324; see also McSurely v. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(finding a common law cause of action against congressional investigators for invasion
of privacy), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1005 (1985).
338 Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
339 See, e.g., O'Donnell v. United States, 891 F.2d 1079, 1086 (3d Cir. 1989)
(relying on Pennsylvania's statutory obligations of psychiatric confidentiality in
deciding whether the disclosure of the plaintiff's psychiatric records constituted
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Still, the net woven by such statutory and common law protection is more strainer than bulwark. In the end, faced with the
censorial efforts of the Meese Commission, the Rhode Island
Commission, or HUAG, courts will be driven to evaluate the impact
of disclosures and their justifications. Where the information is
obtained without coercion, judges may balance with a heavy thumb
on the government's side of the scales.
Nonetheless, where
plaintiffs can prove an impact on constitutionally protected rights,
or a disclosure of intimate information without legitimate justifica340
tions, courts should steel themselves to intervene.
C. Clean.Answers That Set Boundaries
If courts cannot legitimately abandon constitutional scrutiny of
government dissemination of information, principles might be
developed that identify a more limited field of inquiry. Courts can
seek a set of theoretically determined categories that place disclosures clearly inside or outside of the constitutional pale. The two

negligent conduct under the Federal Tort Claims Act); Doe v. DiGenova 779 F.2d 74,
88 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (noting that an action may lie under the Federal Tort Claims Act
for the disclosure of psychiatric records based on District of Columbia statutory and
tort law theories).
340 See, e.g., Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Soc'y of Friends v. Tate,
519 F.2d 1335, 1338 (3d Cir. 1975) (concluding that the prospect of uncontrolled
dissemination of information gathered through political surveillance gives plaintiffs
standing to challenge surveillance). But see Wade v. Goodwin, 843 F.2d 1150, 1152
(8th Cir. 1988) (holding that plaintiff who alleged he was erroneously included in
publicly disclosed list of "survivalists" had no standing to challenge program
compiling such lists), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 854 (1988).
Although Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), suggests that plaintiffs have no
standing to challenge the mere accumulation of information gathered through
noncoercive means, see id. at 6, 13-14, Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987), held that
dissemination of information shown to have a concrete effect confers justiciability.
See id. at 472; cf. Riggs v. City of Albuquerque, 916 F.2d 582, 583-84 (10th Cir. 1990)
(holding that lawyers and political activists who had been targeted for allegedly
unconstitutional surveillance had standing to challenge surveillance program which
released files to the press), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1623 (1991); Presbyterian Church
(U.S.A.) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 521 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that church had
standing to challenge program of surreptitiously recording church services); Alliance
to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 627 F. Supp. 1044, 1051, 1057 (N.D. Ill. 1985)
(granting damages to plaintiff for surveillance coupled with dissemination), vacated
without opinion, 840 F.2d 920 (7th Cir. 1988).
So, too, Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), leaves open the possibility of
particular challenges, by treating on its merits the possibility of a prohibition on
dissemination of peculiarly intimate information, even if not coercively obtained. See
id. at 713 (considering, and rejecting, a claim that the right of privacy prohibited
dissemination of record of arrest).

1991]

SUNLIGHT, SECRETS, AND SCARLET LETTERS

prominent efforts in this field are boundaries based on the
government's intent in disclosure and boundaries based of the
nature on the information disclosed. Ultimately, neither effort
proves clear enough to avoid incremental evaluation in the bulk of
cases.
1. Intent As a Boundary
As a rule today, government actions aimed at the suppression of
constitutionally protected activities are infirm.34 1 At an early
point in its review of McCarthy era investigations, the Supreme
Court seemed ready to invoke a general principle forbidding
disclosures designed to suppress constitutionally protected activities.
There was, the Court asserted, "no congressional power to expose
42
for the sake of exposure."
Efforts to utilize this principle to shield free speech and
association during the McCarthy era, however, ran aground on the
Court's unwillingness to look behind benign purposes professed for
341 See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3118-22 (1990); United
States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2408-10 (1990); Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
420 (1989); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 811-13
(1985); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,281-87 (1977);
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-82 (1968).
342 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178,200 (1956). The Watkins opinion cited
with approval judge Edgerton's dissent in Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948), which condemned the investigations of HUAC
for attempting "purposely to burden forms of expression [which] it [cannot] punish."
Id. at 256 (Edgerton, J., dissenting), cited with approval in Watkins, 354 U.S. at 203
n.40. Watkins also asserted, however, that "a solution to our problem is not to be
found in testing the motives of committee members .... Such is not our function.
Their motives alone would not vitiate an investigation which had been instituted by
a House of Congress if that assembly's legislative purpose [were] being served." Id.
at 200. Ultimately, the Court relied on the asserted vagueness of the congressional
authorization for HUAC inquiries to strike the subpoena at issue. See id. at 201-02.
Earlier efforts to rely on invidious purposes to attack legislative investigations
had fallen afoul of the contemporaneous doctrine that "itwas not consonantwith our
scheme of government for a court to inquire into the motives of legislators." Tenney
v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951). Today's fashion allows courts to inquire
extensively into governmental "purposes" in evaluating constitutional challenges. See,
e.g., supranote 341 and accompanying text; see also Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 5660 (1985) (conducting an inquiry into the legislative purpose of statute providing for
a one minute period of silence in all public schools); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S.
222, 232-33 (1985) (conducting an inquiry into the historical circumstances
surrounding disenfranchisement of persons convicted of certain crimes); Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) ("ITihe invidious quality of a law claimed to be
racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory
purpose.").
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investigations manifestly directed toward punishing First Amendment activities. 34 3 This result is not merely the artifact of judicial
reticence of a particular era. As our exploration of the virtues of
sunlight above suggests, those who seek to expose actions to public
view can almost always claim facially benign motives. 44 In its
more clear-sighted moments, however, the Court has accorded
protection against exposure in the absence of findings,345 or even
allegations,3 4 6 of invidious intent on the part of the govern-

34 See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 133 & n.33 (1959) (upholding
conviction of graduate student for failing to answer questions regarding his
membership in the Haldove Club or the Communist Party, while declining to "inquire
into the motives of committee members" despite committee statement that the
purpose of the hearings was to "demonstrate to the people of Michigan the fields of
concentration of the Communist Party in the Michigan area, and the identity of those
individuals responsible for its success"); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 78-81 (1959)
(upholding requirement that summer camp disclose list of attendees, since it was
deemed relevant to determining the number of subversives in the state); see also
HARRY KALvEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 509
(Jamie Kalvin ed. 1988) ("After Uphaus it is indelibly clear that any challenge keyed
to the absence of a genuine legislative purpose will lose.").
344 This is the burden of Dean Stone's critique of Judge Posner's analysis in
Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir. 1984). See
Geoffrey R. Stone, The Reagan Administration, The FirstAmendmen=4 and FBI Domestic
Security Investigations, in FREEDOM AT RISK: SECRECY, CENSORSHIP AND REPRESSION
IN THE 1980s, 272, 286 (Richard 0. Curry ed., 1988) ("The FBI's investigations of the
Communist party, the Socialist Workers party and the NAACP were not motivated
by an 'improper' desire to suppress legitimate dissent.... The real 'evil' of the FBI
investigations was.. that they were the product of exaggerated fears, badjudgment,
and insensitivity
to... constitutional rights.").
345 See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 767-68 (1986) (striking down requirement that physicians make available for
public inspection personal information relating to their female patients who chose to
abort their pregnancy); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigative Comm., 372 U.S.
539, 546, 551 (1963) (refusing to compel disclosure of membership records of
NAACP, since there was no showing of a "substantial relationship to overriding and
compelling state interest," which is an "essential prerequisite to the validity of an
investigation which intrudes into the area or constitutionally protected rights of
speech, press, association and petition"); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-87
(1960) (striking down a statute requiring all teachers to submit a list of organizational
affiliations to the school board); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524-25
(1960) (invalidating an ordinance requiring disclosure of membership lists because
a "significant encroachment upon personal liberty" requires a "subordinating interest
which is compelling"); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-63
(1958) (invalidating court order requiring disclosure of membership lists in light of
"practical [if unintended] effect" of disclosure).
146 See Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 88 (1983)
(refusing to apply requirement to identify campaign contributors and disbursements
to the Socialist Workers party); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960) (striking
down a prohibition against distributing anonymous leaflets).
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ment.
This practical under-inclusiveness of an intent-based focus is
matched by its theoretical defects. One difficulty, always present
when "intent" is a constitutional variable, 348 is the identity of the
party that must harbor the "intent" in question. If the avowed
motives of a single decision-maker are at issue, the "intent"
approach may allow courts to avoid policy-laden case-by-case
decision-making.
Similarly, the announcement by the Meese

Commission that it sought to catalyze antipornography protests left
little doubt regarding the "intent" behind its proposed identification
of wayward chain stores.3 49 In most cases, however, unconstitutional motives will not be clearly avowed by the single relevant
decision-maker. Divining the "intent" of a corporate body will
require courts to compare the government body's actions with those
that would be taken by a "pure" agency untainted by invidious
intent. The "intent" in question is not an individual motive but a
corporate metaphor. Courts must infer invidious corporate "intent"
from divergences between the actions actually taken and those in
which a "pure" body would have engaged.
This intent analysis articulates no more of boundary than does
a balancing approach, and lacks the signal advantage of the latter.
In a court balancing interests, plaintiffs may address two issues: the
credibility and weight of the government's justifications and the
magnitude of the harm to their own constitutionally protected
interests. For a metaphorical corporate intent inquiry, the discussion focuses only on the first of the two: whether the purported
justification should be treated as sufficiently weighty or rational to
count as the "real" purpose. In this analysis, almost any disclosure
has potentially plausible justifications. The temptation to defer to
the government's always-plausible analysis of public need will often
be overwhelming.
A second defect of using intent as a boundary is the difficulty of
discerning the nature of the proscribed "intent." Even when it was
clear that the government could not prohibit abortions, seeking to
347

My review of the cases in this area constrains me to differ from the conclusion

of my colleague, C. Edwin Baker. Professor Baker believes that the principle that
"the first amendment [outlaws] government action undertaken for the purpose of
penalizing.., speech" explains the results in the above cases. See BAKER, supranote
167, at 245-46.
348 See, e.g., Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions,supranote 296, at 1333-40 (discussing
the problems inherent in discerning the motives of multi-member legislatures).
349 See Playboy Enters. v. Meese, 639 F. Supp. 581, 582 (D.D.C. 1986).
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persuade women to choose childbirth over abortion was held to
embody a legitimate intent. 50 So, too, although the government
is not entitled to directly suppress "adult entertainment," the intent
to preserve a community from objectionable adult theaters or to
uphold public morality against nude dancing, is legitimate. 5 1
Seeking to harm one's political opponents by disseminating
information is a time-honored tradition, made even more respectable if the information purveyed is accurate. The "intent" behind
an effort to expose a congressional candidate's membership in a
whites-only lodge does not differ from the "intent" behind similar
efforts regarding a grocery store manager. And the intent to
highlight the candidate's sexual practices within marriage may not
differ materially from the goals of the two other disclosures. Yet
the perception that official inquiries and disclosures in each area
should be treated alike seems grossly misguided.
This observation suggests that protection be limited to "nonpublic figures" or "nonpublic information." 3 52 Once the court
has identified a constitutionally mandated private sphere of
information, however, the question arises why an innocent violation
of that sphere is constitutionally defensible. If women are protected
against public dissemination of their reproductive choices because
those choices are peculiarly private,3 53 analysis of the "intent" of
the government in compelling that disclosure seems superfluous.
2. Boundaries Based on Character of Information
This last defect in the "intent" approach suggests a final basis on
which to draw boundaries in this area: the attempt to characterize
specific types of information as privileged against government
disclosure. If certain varieties of information are per se inappropriate for public dissemination by the government, the Court need not
be drawn into a fine calibration of practical effects and government
justifications. Courts can, moreover, minimize interference with the
o50
See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
473-74 (1977).
351 See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2471 (1991); City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986).
352 See infra notes 368-91 and accompanying text. Indeed, arguably the Watkins
formulation was parasitic on a definition of a private sphere that the government
could not seek to "expose for the sake of exposure." Watkins v. United States, 354
U.S. 178, 200 (1956).
5
3 See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 766-67 (1986).

1991]

SUNLIGHT, SECRETS, AND SCARLET LETTERS

functioning of government by leaving the great bulk of governmental communications untouched and limiting examination to
disclosures that deal with the protected sphere.
a. Constitutionally Shielded Activities

i. Deterrent Effects
Certain types of activities, as an incident of their substantive
constitutional protection, may claim privilege against exposure. All
factions on the Court acknowledge that disclosure of information
can carry judicially cognizable adverse consequences. A constitutional prohibition against state interference with an activity-whether
worship, reproduction, or speech-entails a prohibition on government disclosures that eventuate such interference. Thus, the courts
have predicated the legitimacy of government inquiries into the
identities of persons who engage in activities protected by the First
Amendment on an undertaking or requirement of nondissemination
by the government that would guard against adverse consequences. 54 Courts have similarly recognized possible adverse consequences as a ground for striking down requirements of public
disclosure of participants in constitutionally privileged activities.3 55 As a first approximation, one might draw a boundary
between government disclosures regarding constitutionally protectSee, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 695, 700 (1972) (noting the
"characteristic secrecy of grand jury proceedings"); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S.
36, 52-53 (1961) (noting that bar answers will not be made public); ef. Seattle Times
Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36-37 (1984) (requiring nondisclosure of identity of
religious sect's members as condition of discovery); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
491 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that there were no indications that
the school board would disclose organizational affiliations); Marshall v. Bramer, 828
F.2d 355, 360 (6th Cir. 1987) (requiring nondisclosure of KKK membership list as a
condition of discovery); Adolph Coors Co. v. Movement Against Racism and the Klan,
777 F.2d 1538, 1540, 1542 (1lth Cir. 1985) (noting that disclosure of identity of antiKKK activists who made showings of harassment and assault by KKK would be
"constitutionally excessive," but disclosure of dates and states of meetings three years
earlier was permitted in light of improbable future retaliation).
355 See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 88
(1982) (exempting minor political party from contributor disclosure requirements);
Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960) (finding that requiring NAACP
to disclose membership lists would abridge freedom of association); NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S 449, 466 (1958) (providing immunity from state
scrutiny of civil rights group's membership list). See generally Black Panther Party v.
Smith, 661 F.2d 1243, 1265-68 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (cataloging cases concerning political
privacy), vacated, 458 U.S. 1118 (1982).
354
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ed activities and all other disclosures, on the ground that there can
be no constitutional objection to disclosures that have no impact on
the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.
Even if scrutiny is limited to information with a nexus to
independent constitutionally protected rights, approaches relying on
deterrent effects must still confront the problem of balancing. As
we have seen, the probable impact of disclosure is dependent on a
variety of contextual factors, including market structure, social
climate, geography, and the particular rights at issue. On the other
side of the scale, the persuasiveness of the governmentjustifications
for disclosures vary as well. Requirements that marriage licenses be
publicly recorded, or voter registration roles be publicly available,
for example, seem amply justified, even if they will deter some
constitutionally protected marriages or voters.
Protection based simply on deterrent effects neither requires
nor provides clean boundaries between the public and the private.
This is not a reason to abandon examination of the concrete impact
of government disclosures on constitutional rights.
It does,
however, suggest that balancing is not avoided by a focus on the
deterrent impact of disclosures. Courts that face claims for strategic
protection of confidentiality based on deterrence have and must

examine the magnitude of the harms and benefits of disclosures. 36

ii. Privacy as an Element of the Right
A related analysis would derive the realm of the private from the

logic behind the particular constitutional rights at issue. Rather than
provide strategic protection as a way of avoiding deterrent effects,
a right of privacy would be rooted in the constitutional framework
itself. Courts would distinguish certain aspects of intimate activity,
thought, and association that are, as a part of their constitutional
essence, immune from inquiry and dissemination by the government, wholly apart from any tangible impact of their disclosure.
The inquiries of HUAC and the loyalty boards into personal
beliefs, and the publication of private associations, offended the
freedom of conscience at the root of the First Amendment quite

356 See Brown, 459 U.S. at 96-98 (considering harm to contributors); Buckley v.

Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 71-72 (1976) (noting potential impact on minor parties); cf.
Branzburg,408 U.S. at 693-94 (comparing the benefits derived from forcing reporters
to reveal the identity of their sources in criminal investigations with concerns about
impeding the "flow of news" about crime).
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apart from any demonstrable impacts on political activities. The
failure of the courts to recognize this fact constituted a major
tragedy of the McCarthy era. More recently, the Court has held that
the right to reproductive autonomy protected under Roe v.
Wade, 57 which is rooted in a concept of privacy, is constitutionally protected from government exposure.3 5 8 The Court has properly entertained these challenges to required disclosures even in the
absence of concrete showings of deterrence. Similarly, there have
been intimations that the free exercise of religion is intrinsically
entitled to a cloak of anonymity,3 59 and suggestions that government inquiries into the contents of one's library,3 60 or the character of one's vote,3 61 are constitutionally illegitimate. The "freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and
ideas" has been held to encompass "protection of privacy of
association."362 It is reasonable to infer that government publication of family intimacies would interfere with the protection of
357 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
358

See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gyenecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 766 (1986); see also Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 144-45 (1976) (reviewing
a statute in whichjudicial bypass of parental consent for minor's abortion must assure
anonymity); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79-81 (1976) (requirement
of statistical reports on abortion permissible where held in confidence); cf. Ohio v.
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972, 2979 (1990) (holding that the
confidentiality of minors' identity met constitutional standards).
359 See Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 38 (approving a protective order in the
interest of freedom of religion); cf People v. Phillips, (Court of General Sessions, City
of New York (1813)), discussed in Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understandingof FreeExercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1409, 1410-11, 1504-06
(1990) (arguing that there is a constitutionally compelled privilege against disclosing
Catholic confession).
360 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (noting that the First
Amendment means that "a State has no business telling a man... what books he may
read"); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 306-07 (1965) (striking down
requirement that post office be notified of addressees requesting to be delivered
"communist political propaganda"); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 46 (1953)
(holding that Congress cannot demand list of people purchasing political books).
361 See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 266 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) ("In the political realm.., thought and action are presumptively immune
from inquisition by political authority."); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382, 419 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("I do not suppose it is even
arguable that Congress could ask for disclosure how union officers cast their ballots
at the last presidential election .... ").
362 Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 544 (1963);
see also DeGregory v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 825, 829 (1966) (an "'overriding and
compelling state intereste" is required for "'intrusion into the realm of political and
associational privacy protected by the First Amendment'" (quoting Gibson, 372 U.S.
at 546)).
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"those relationships, including family relationships, that presuppose
'deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other
individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of
thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal
aspects of one's life,'" which have been held to be protected by the
63
First Amendment.3
The difficult task is identifying those activities that qualify for
the shield. Our earlier discussion of the secret ballot suggests two
dimensions of distinction. First, it is important to discern whether
the acts in question have direct and tangible consequences outside
of the personality of the right-holder. To the extent that an act is
largely self-regarding, the arguments in favor of publicity are
weakened substantially. A. self-regarding act cannot be said to
require publicity to allow others to protect their interests. An act
that constitutes a personal privilege rather than a public trust
cannot be subordinated to a Millian requirement of publicity as a
guarantor of good judgment. 3 64 Second, within the sphere of
self-regarding activities, the closer the nexus between a constitutional right and the definition of the self, the greater the argument in
favor of constitutional protection of anonymity.
Under a liberal view of the Constitution, in which individual
liberty is the end of constitutional protection, the argument is
straightforward. Self-regarding activities crucial to personal identity
call forth no social justifications for disclosure, since there is no
need for our fellow citizens to protect themselves from those
activities. At the same time, such activities implicate a right to
choose the selves we wish to be, a crucial element of the autonomy

363 Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l. v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987)
(quoting Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984)); see also City of
Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 23-24 (1989) (noting that the right of association
protects "intimate human relationships"); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619 ("[T]he constitutional shelter afforded such relationships reflects the realization that individuals draw
much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with others. Protecting these
relationships from unwarranted state interference therefore safeguards the ability
independently to define one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty.").
4 The conclusion could follow either from a belief that no rights are held as
matters of public trust, rejecting Mill's claim regarding voting and associated public
acts, or from a conclusion that the particular right in question carries with it no
obligation of public trust. It seems to me that, for a wide range of constitutionally
protected activities, it is simply implausible to characterize them as matters of public
trust. It is inconceivable, for example that the right to attend religious services must
be exercised in a 'responsible" fashion, or that there is a legitimate public interest in
guaranteeing the exercise of good judgment in the selection of the contents of a
citizen's library.
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constitutional protections safeguard.
Even on a more communal or "republican" conception of the
Constitution, compelled disclosure of many self-defining activities
is problematic as long as we take seriously the republican ideal of
the citizen. The right to attend religious services, the right to
procreative autonomy, and the right to one's own thoughts in
reading and discourse are crucial to forming the free citizens who
interact in the public arena. One can easily imagine autonomous
citizens who submit their votes to public scrutiny and debate. It is
more difficult to characterize as citizens those who subject their
365
personal libraries or bedrooms to public review.
On these dimensions, rights of association occupy a middle
ground. Although association, by definition, cannot be wholly selfregarding, participation in many groups is self-constituting. We
define ourselves as much by our friends, families, and fellow
congregants as we do by our libraries. Involvements of this sort
seem eminently immune from compelled public scrutiny on both
liberal and republican premises.
Many constitutionally protected associations are directed
outward. 6 6 Political parties, social movements, and publishing
partnerships all seek to affect lives of those outside of their
membership. When such groups claim constitutional protection
from disclosure, the question is whether disclosure is consistent with
their constitutionally protected functions. The more seriously we
take the importance of providing sanctuaries that nurture political
identities that swim against the majoritarian tide, the more powerful
will be the claims to associational privacy. On the other hand, the
more we conceive of associational rights as simply facilitating the
exercise of personal rights to public participation, the less protec67
tion such groups can claim from compulsory public scrutiny.
The same arguments, however, cannot be made with respect to those who
facilitate constitutionally protected activities for profit (publishers, doctors, etc.).
Although a citizen can realize her personality through her work, the basis for
constitutional protection is not the intrinsic quality of the work, but its connection
to other constitutionally protected rights. There is no constitutional right to be a
doctor or a printer. Their claims must arise from the deterrent effects of publicity.
366 There are associations that cannot, under current constitutional law, claim
constitutional protection. See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 224-28
(1961) (criminal conspiracies); Garcia v. Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 384
F. Supp. 434, 437-40 (W.D. Tex. 1974) (health maintenance organizations), aff'd
mem., 421 U.S. 995 (1975). Since they are not constitutionally protected, they cannot
claim derivative protection against disclosure.
367 Thus, it seems to me that cases like Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation
16'
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b. Intimate Information
The protection of anonymity for those participating in activities
claiming constitutional protection does not exhaust the set of
constitutional boundaries. A second informational category, the
intimate character of the information revealed, relies on a separate
constitutionally protected expectation of nondisclosure. Although
there is no constitutional right to engage in gay or lesbian sexual
activity, official publication of the fact of sexual activity is constitutionally problematic.-6 8 And although the status of testing positive for the HIV virus does not itself reveal any protected activities,
official dissemination of a list of AIDS carriers to the carriers'
3 69
neighbors raises constitutional concerns.

Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1962), (and dicta in Roberts v. United StatesJaycees,
468 U.S. 609 (1984)), point appropriately toward protection from disclosure as a
matter of constitutional right.
The decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), to allow required disclosure
can be explained on the ground that monetary political contributions are unlikely to
form a political identity. A requirement that political canvassers or office workers
register for public scrutiny should be treated quite differently. See Hynes v. Mayor
of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 616-23 (1976) (holding that an ordinance requiring that
advance notice to be given to the police by any person desiring to canvass or solicit
door to door was unconstitutionally vague); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 538-43
(1945) (holding unconstitutional a statute requiring labor organizations to register
before soliciting membership).
So, too, requiring disclosure of ownership for publishers seems to impact on
commercial activities that are not related to the formation of a dissident's identity.
See Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288, 313-16 (1913) (upholding the
requirement that ownership be disclosed to Postmaster General under penalty of
exclusion from mail services). Compare Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263 (1986) (holding the Federal Election
Campaign Act unconstitutional as applied to nonprofit corporation urging readers
to vote "pro-life") with Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 681
(1990) (upholding the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting a nonprofit
corporation from using corporate funds to endorse or oppose candidates for state
office).
368 Note that the characterization is "problematic," not forbidden. If gay or
lesbian sex is criminalized, a prosecution will necessarily entail public notice of the
corpus delicti. On the other hand, where the state has not in fact made the act
illegal, posting a list of the sex practices of private citizens would seem dubious even
if the information was obtained without illegal searches.
369 See, e.g., Inmates v. Cuomo, No. 90-CV-252, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1488, at *8
(N.D.N.Y. 1991) (entering protective order regarding identity of HIV positive
inmates); Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 384-85 (D.NJ. 1990)
(holding that the sensitive nature of medical information about AIDS requires
compelling state interest before disclosing information about AIDS infection of
citizen); Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs., 125 F.R.D. 646, 650 (D.S.C. 1989)
(permitting veiled deposition regarding source of AIDS-infected blood); Rodriguez
v. Coughlin, No. Civ-87-1557E, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15,898, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. 1989)
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Here again, the experience of the McCarthy era provides
guidance. The rhetorical question that embodied Senator McCar-

thy's moral failure was uttered in an exchange with Joseph Welch,
counsel for the Army, on national television. After McCarthy had
gratuitously disclosed the long-buried membership in the National
Lawyers Guild of an associate at Welch's law firm, Welch responded: "Little did I dream you could be so reckless and so cruel as to
do an injury to that lad ....
I fear he shall always bear a scar,
needlessly inflicted by you .... Have you no sense of decency, sir?
At long last, have you left no sense of decency?" 70 The boundary
of intimate information is predicated on the proposition that the
Constitution requires the government, in disseminating information,
to maintain a sense of decency.
This approach is not foreign to the courts. Even as Justice
Rehnquist, in Paul v. Davis,371 forged a new line of precedent to
reject the claim that disclosures adversely affecting reputation
automatically constituted deprivations of liberty, he tacitly acknowledged limits on government disclosure in "sphere[s] contended to
be 'private.'" 372

The next year, in Whalen v. Roe, 373

a unani-

(suggesting that the requirement that HIV positive inmate wear distinctive clothing
may violate right to privacy); Doe v. Coughlin, 697 F. Supp. 1234, 1235-43 (N.D.N.Y.
1988) (stating that segregation of inmates with AIDS may violate right to privacy);
Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874, 875-77 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (holding that disclosure
of prisoner's HIV positive status to nonmedical prison personnel and prison
population presented a triable issue of violation of constitutional rights), affid mem.,
899 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1990); Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., 500 So. 2d 533,535
(Fla. 1987) (denying discovery of identity of blood donor in AIDS liability case);
Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 554 A.2d 954, 957-60 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)
(finding that protective order limiting newspaper access to discovery material in case
involving an AIDS patient to be constitutional); cf. St. Hilaire v. Arizona Dep't of
Corrections, No. 90-15344, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 11,620, at *7 (9th Cir. 1991)
(disclosure of HIV positive status of inmate to prison population would violate
constitutional rights) (dictum).
370 COOK,, supra note 41, at 517-18; see also DAvID H. BENNETT, THE PARTY OF
FEAR, 308-10 (1988) (recounting the exchange); FRIED, NIGHTMARE, supra note 36, at
139 (same).
Another aspect of the McCarthy era points in the same direction:
the
offensiveness of HUAC's demand that former Communists publicly name their
friends who had been associated with Communist activities. The requirement is today
widely thought to be objectionable not because friendship is constitutionally
protected, but because the government forced dishonorable and polluting behavior
on its citizens.
371 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
372 Id. at 713 (rejecting challenge based on a claim that "the State may not
publicize a record of an official act such as an arrest").
373 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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mous Court seemed to recognize a constitutional interest in
"avoiding disclosure of personal matters," 74 and in Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services, 375 a majority of the court reiterated Whalen's allusion, commenting that "at least when Government
intervention is at stake, public officials including the President are
not wholly without constitutionally protected privacy rights in
matters of personal life unrelated to any acts done by them in their
public capacity."376 Although the Supreme Court has not revisited the subject, the consensus in lower courts seems to be that
constitutional hurdles, albeit modest ones in many cases, stand in
377
the way of promiscuous government disclosure of "intimate" information.
37 4 Id. at 599. The Court found that in light of New York's stringent controls on
dissemination of information, requiring reports regarding prescription drug usage
does not "pose a sufficiently grievous threat to ... establish a constitutional
violation." Id. at 600; cf Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (striking
down birth control ban, in part because of need to protect the "sacred precincts of
martial bedrooms" from government intrusion). As Justice Stewart's concurrence
noted, the opinion in Whalen stopped short of formally announcing the dimensions
of any constitutional privilege against disclosure, and indeed pretermitted the issue
of the constitutional status of the New York program in the absence of internal limits
on disclosure. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 607-08.
The limits on general disclosure and the protections provided to the confidentiality of information obtained by the government figured prominently in a number of
lower court cases that upheld the acquisition of information over privacy claims. See
e.g., Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 193-95 (4th Cir. 1990) (upholding the
constitutionality of questionnaire to city police department employee regarding
personal details where questionnaire kept in locked filing cabinet with only four
persons having access and indicating that wider distribution of information would
alter analysis); Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia, 812
F.2d 105, 118 (3d Cir. 1987) (enjoining questionnaire of police officers pending
establishment of appropriate safeguards of confidentiality); Taylor v. Best, 746 F.2d
220, 225 (4th Cir. 1984) (noting that privacy interest was weakened by prison
psychologist's promise of confidentiality); Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554,
1562-63 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that financial disclosure law allowing public
inspection of certain public employees' files did not impair their constitutional rights
where mechanism was available to assert privacy rights), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1017
(1983); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 580 (3d Cir. 1980)
(finding adequate safeguards to maintain confidentiality of employee medical
records).
s75 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
376 Id. at 457; see id. at 529 (Burger, J., dissenting) (arguing that government
inspection of private papers implicated "interests ... of the highest order, with
perhaps some primacy for family papers"). As in Whalen, the Court emphasized the
precautions against disclosure that attended congressional designation of former
President Nixon's records for custody and inspection by government archivists, who
would prevent "undue dissemination of private materials." Id. at 458.
37 See, e.g., ACLU v. Mississippi, 911 F.2d 1066, 1070 (5th Cir. 1990) (allegations
of"homosexuality, child molestation, illegitimate births, and sexual promiscuity,...
financial improprieties, drug abuse, and extreme political and religious views"
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The constitutional underpinnings of this protection of intimate
collected to harass civil rights activists); Igneri v. Moore, 898 F.2d 870,873-78 (2d Cir.
1990) (financial disclosure by political party chairpersons); Flanagan v. Munger, 890
F.2d 1557, 1570 (10th Cir. 1989) (protection against disclosure available for "highly
personal or sensitive" information in personal files); Shields v. Burge, 874 F.2d 1201,
1210 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that confidentiality strand of right to privacy might
protect personal records); Davis v. Bucher, 853 F.2d 718:720 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding
that privacy right against disclosure of intimate details exists, but plaintiff prisoner
has reduced claim); Eisenbud v. Suffolk County, 841 F.2d 42, 44-47 (2d Cir. 1988)
(upholding state statute requiring financial disclosure by appointed county
employees); Klein Indep. School Dist. v. Mattox, 830 F.2d 576,580-81 (5th Cir. 1987)
(privacy interest in college transcript outweighed by public interest in qualifications
of school teachers), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988); Pesce v.J. Sterling Morton High
Sch. Dist., 830 F.2d 789, 795-98 (7th Cir. 1987) (right to confidentiality in counseling
relationship outweighed by necessity of reporting child abuse); Fraternal Order of
Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 109 (3d Cir. 1980)
(requiring safeguards of medical records); Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 838-40
(10th Cir. 1986) (disclosure of drug use by fire fighters did not implicate aspect of
personal identity, hence did not state a claim); Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491,
493-96 (9th Cir. 1985) (privacy interest against disclosure of intimate details overcome
by prison staffing requirements, including cross-sex surveillance); Slayton v.
Willingham, 726 F.2d 631, 635 (10th Cir. 1984) (police exhibition of "highly sensitive,
personal, and private" photos of plaintiff violated privacy rights); Thorne v. City of
El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 469 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding inquiry into sex life of
applicant for police force unconstitutional), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 979 (1984); Barry
v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1561-63 (2d Cir.) (finding public employees'
privacy interests in their filed financial records not violated by city disclosure law),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1017 (1983); Denver Policemen's Protective Ass'n v. Lichtenstein,
660 F.2d 432, 435 (10th Cir. 1981) (allowing discovery of police investigative files,
including statements understood to have been confidential); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d
705, 714-15 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (disclosure of logs of illegal wiretaps); Fadjo v. Coon, 633
F.2d 1172, 1176 (5th Cir. 1981) (dissemination of material discovered in police
investigation); United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d
Cir. 1980) (medical records); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1135 (5th Cir. 1978)
(disclosure of financial information about public officials raises constitutional privacy
claim but privacy interests are overcome by interest in deterring corruption), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Shirshekan v. Hurst, 669 F. Supp. 238, 242 (C.D. Ill.
1987) (finding allegation of malicious dissemination of "background investigation"
makes out privacy claim); B.J.R.L. v. Utah, 655 F. Supp. 692, 699-700 (D. Utah 1987)
(challenge to disclosure of fact that plaintiffs were the mothers of illegitimate
children, that mothers had received welfare, and that child plaintiffs were born out
of wedlock); Falcon v. Alaska Pub. Offices Comm'n, 570 P.2d 469, 478-80 (Alaska
1977) (disclosure of lists of patients of doctor who holds public office raises no
privacy claims, but recognition of particular claims of intimacy and embarrassment
must be provided for in statutory scheme, e.g., contraceptives, venereal disease,
psychiatry); see also supra note 369 (AIDS cases); cf Tavoulareas v. Washington Post
Co., 724 F.2d 1010, 1019-23 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (corporate privacy rights), vacated and
remanded, 737 F.2d 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc). But see Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d
836, 839-49 (1st Cir. 1987) (contours of confidentiality right not clearly enough
established to overcome good faith immunity of prosecutor who disclosed plaintiff's
psychiatric record);J. P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1087-91 (6th Cir. 1981) (doubting
the existence of privacy right against disclosure).
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information are not entirely clear. Both the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments seem,-at least in their modern incarnations, 378 to
govern the acquisition, not dissemination, of information, in their
references to "searches," "seizures," and compulsory "self-incrimination." One Fourth Amendment approach, hinted at in some cases,
would judge a "search" to be "unreasonable" where insufficient
precautions were taken to prevent the subsequent dissemination of
information deemed to be within a "reasonable expectation of
privacy."3 79 A second approach would analyze each subsequent
disclosure of information outside the normal course of law
enforcement as a separate search.3 80 But even if either reading
were to be accepted, it would not deal with the dissemination of
information generated by the government without constitutionally
38 1
defined "searches."
The only plausible basis for protection against such disclosures
seems to be in the substantive protection of "liberty" under the due
Protection is based on a recognition that
process clauses.38 2

378 There was a time when it was thought that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
combined to preserve a "private sphere" of protected items and information against
government intrusion and dissemination. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
622-28 (1886). This approach has since been eroded. See Note, Formalism, Legal
Realism, and ConstitutionallyProtected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,
90 HARV. L. REv. 945, 964-85 (1977).
379 See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 n.7 (1989)
(in Fourth Amendment challenge, while drug testing procedure "permits the
Government to learn certain private medical facts.., there is no indication that the
Government does not treat this information as confidential, or that it uses the
information for any other purpose. Under the circumstances, we do not view this
procedure as a significant invasion of privacy."). But see Western States Cattle Co. v.
Edwards, 895 F.2d 438, 442 (8th Cir. 1990) (in the case of commercial information,
reasonableness of search is considered at the time it is conducted-subsequent
disclosures are irrelevant).
380 See Oziel v. Superior Court, 273 Cal. Rptr. 196, 207 (Ct. App. 1990)
(dissemination of videotape of search of appellant's home to news media implicated
protections against searches and seizures-"each separate examination of the
videotapes.., would constitute a search of Oziel's home.").
381 A variety of coercive means of obtaininginformation are outside of the Fourth
Amendment (for example, subpoenas and record-keeping requirements) and
government generates vast quantities of information without any coercion (for
example, government health records and welfare records).
382 Whatever the fate of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court seems
inclined to retain the practice of recognizing nontextual rights. The rules for
recognition of substantive due process rights seem to be developing a strongly
historical component. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2115
(1990) (plurality opinion) (jurisdiction based upon physical presence comports with
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't
of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2852-53 (1990) (liberty interest in refusing life-sustaining
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being subjected to observation in certain intimate details can be
painful, and a conviction that acknowledgement of certain informational preserves is necessary for human dignity.
As a boundary, however, the protection of intimate information
against disclosure suffers from a number of defects. First, there is
fuzziness regarding subjects (or environs) that call forth constitutional protection. It is easy enough to say that certain types of
bodily functions, certain personal communications, and certain
aspects of personal psyche, physiology, and physique are not,
without the consent of the subject, topics of public conversation in
polite society. This judgment is the burden of the common law
privacy tort, which relies heavily on "reasonable expectations of
privacy" and "offensiveness" to "reasonable persons" of the
disclosure of particular information.3 8 3 It is less clear how these
concededly fluid societal norms could be embodied cleanly in
384

constitutional law.

Fourth Amendment doctrine has at times adopted the proposition that there are particular "intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or
surveillance."3 8 5 These intimations have been freely mixed with
historical inquiries about "expectations of privacy that society has
long recognized as reasonable" 386 and quasi-sociological analysis

medical treatmentbased on common law tradition); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S.
110, 118-30 (1989) (unitary family protected by tradition).
In terms of tradition, a protection for personal intimacies is firmly rooted. The
traditional definitions of "life, liberty, and property" included "reputation," see
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-83 (1977), and there are strong traditions of
protection for intimate details of personal life. Cf Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S.
1, 17 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (the right of bodily privacy is deeply rooted
in Anglo-American tradition); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 252
(1891) (Holmes, J.) ("The inviolability of the person is as much invaded by a
compulsory stripping and exposure as by a blow. To compel any one, and especially
a woman, to lay bare the body... is an indignity, an assault and a trespass ...
").
383 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1965); Robert C. Post, The
Social Foundationsof Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L.
REV. 957, 978-1008 (1989) (discussing the tort of public exposure).
384 For a discussion of privacy norms in different periods ofAmerican history, see
DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 18-21 (1972); DAVID SEIPP,
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 101-15 (1978).
s85 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984); see also Florida v. Riley, 488
U.S. 445, 452 (1989) (aerial surveillance not a "search" where "no intimate details
connected with the use of the home or curtilage were observed"); Dow Chem. Co. v.
United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986) (aerial photography "not so revealing of
intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns" under Fourth Amendment); cf
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (Fourth Amendment protects
"sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life").
386 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989); see also
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regarding the "expectation of privacy.., that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable.' 387 If Fourth Amendment experience
is any indication, courts seeking to protect intimate information
from disclosure must derive constitutional protection from social
88
expectations neither dichotomous nor stable.
After such derivation, the expectation of confidentiality looks
less like a sharp cliff than a series of gradual slopes, based on the
social expectations, functions of identity formation, and history
surrounding particular types of information. The intimate character
of cholesterol test records seems greater than those of eye color, but
less than those of psychiatric treatment. Interests that might
warrant disclosure of a college transcript would be clearly insufficient to justify release of nude pictures. Courts that adopted the
confidentiality norm as a matter of constitutional law, therefore,
adopted a casuistic "we know it when we see it" approach to
distinguishing among nude photographs, psychiatrists reports, arrest
389
records, college transcripts, and reports of financial assets.
Needed constitutional distinctions are not limited to identifying
protected types of information. For any given type of information,
not all modes of disclosure are equal. Conveying information to a
single government official clearly differs from broadcasting it to the
public at large. Informing a relatively wide audience of a particular

Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178 n.8 ("Fourth Amendment's protection ... [is] based upon
societal expectations that have deep roots in the history of the Amendment."); United
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280-85 (1983) (discussing the "traditional expectation
of privacy within a dwelling and the reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile").
387 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967); see also Skinner, 489 U.S. at
616-18 (holding that society recognizes reasonable expectation of privacy from bodily
intrusions, including blood and urine testing); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,
39-43 (1988) (holding that society does not recognize as reasonable an expectation
of privacy in trash left for collection in a public area); United States v. White, 401
U.S. 745, 748-54 (1971) (discussing Katz and "justifiable" expectations of privacy).
388 Cf Riley, 488 U.S. at 452-69 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring; Brennan,
Marshall, Stevens, Blackmun,JJ., dissenting) (noting that whether aerial surveillance
at 400 feet is an invasion of reasonable expectations of privacy is a function of
whether members of the public travel with sufficient regularity at that altitude, and
that a change in travel patterns would change nature of privacy right).
In the FOIA context, the Court seeks to avoid the necessity of deriving particular
privacy norms by treating any information which is "personal in character" in the
sense of referring to identifiable individuals and not being freely available, as subject
to the privacy exemption. See Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for
Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 776-80 (1989); Department of State v.
Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 600-02 (1982).
.8.See supra note 377.
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intimate detail may be less harmful to the subject of the disclosure
than informing a particular sensitive individual.3 9 0 Functional
evaluation of the "importance" of a particular claim of privacy,
therefore, requires more than abstract categorization.
Finally, the importance of government interests is not constant
for a given class of information. Informing neighbors of a citizen's
diagnosis as an AIDS carrier differs from informing her spouse. A
medical prognosis may be relevant to an employer and not relevant
to the general public.
The intimacy of the particular information and the nature of the
disclosure are relevant variables in an incremental evaluation of the
interests favoring and opposing dissemination of information. The
prospect of defining abstractly a zone of private information
constitutionally privileged seems dim, 391 while the importance of
protecting against dissemination remains imperative.
CONCLUSION:

BACK TO BALANCING

In reviewing government disclosures of information, courts need
not engage in ad hoc constitutional balancing in every case. In
some definable classes of cases, constitutional review is unnecessary.
When the subject of disclosure has already disseminated the
information to the same audience, with the same degree of salience
that the government seeks to achieve, no balance is required, since
any right to anonymity has been waived. If the government receives
information voluntarily from private sources, claims for anonymity
are often better made at a sub-constitutional level, either as
390 Cf. McSurely v. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (disclosure to
husband of premarital affairs of wife); Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp.
376,382-91 (D.NJ. 1990) (disclosure to neighbors ofAIDS infection, of which spouse
already knew); Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 668-70 (Ct.
App. 1984) (denying recovery for the publication of sexual orientation of prominent
member of San Francisco gay community alleged to cause harm as a result of
conveyance to subject's mother, brothers, and sisters).
391 A strategy not examined here is to use procedural rather than substantive
limitations to constrain government disclosures. See, e.g.,Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 135-42 (1951) (holding that the Attorney General's
arbitrary designation of plaintiff as a "Communist" exceeded the authority derived
from an Executive Order). Under current doctrine, Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
(1976), limits the availability of this route to situations involving a disclosure
accompanying a change in "legal status." Id. at 699-712. But cf. In re Bagley, 513
A.2d 331, 338 (N.H. 1986) (construing "change in legal status" broadly). An effort
to extend the protection to "harmful" disclosures throws the courts back on the same
necessity for distinguishing among the types of disclosure canvassed above.
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statutory interpretation or as invocations of more generally
applicable common law principles.
Conversely, the topic of disclosure can sometimes provide
shortcuts that establish a constitutional claim. Certain constitutional protections should carry with them a protection against
compulsory public exposure of their exercise. Both liberal and
republican analyses suggest that the right to join political groups,
the right to privacy of beliefs, the right to religious exercise, the
right to intimate association, and the freedom of reproductive
autonomy should be protected by constitutional bulwarks that do
not depend on the concrete proof of the particular deterrents
associated with compelled disclosure.
Although these theoretical boundaries constrain the necessity
for balancing, they do not eliminate it. In one class of cases, epitomized by the question of anonymous participation in public debate,
disclosures impact upon constitutionally protected activities, yet
claims of an absolute right to anonymity are theoretically unpersuasive. For that class, an evaluation of the practical impact and
proposed justifications may settle an otherwise intractable theoretical debate.
A second class of cases concern those activities that may not
claim a right to nondisclosure because of their intrinsic importance,
yet facilitate the exercise of constitutional rights, and are particularly vulnerable to the deterrent impact of publicity. Deterrence is
especially important when the exercise of a constitutional right by
one citizen depends on the cooperation of third parties. For
392
example, in Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee,
the majority recognized that, although the exercise of renting a hall
to political parties is not an enterprise that commands intrinsic
constitutional protection, the ability to perpetuate a party is, and
compelled disclosure of the recipients of funds from a stigmatized
party could eliminate the party's ability to purchase the necessities
of political existence. Similarly, doctors who perform abortions
cannot invoke independently a fundamental constitutional right, but
compelling their public identification substantially interferes with
the rights of their patients. 393 Such arguments cannot be sensibly
392 459 U.S. 87, 95 (1983).

393 See American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 613 F.
Supp. 656, 670-72 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Doe v. Casey, 464 F. Supp. 487, 499-500 (E.D. Pa.
1978), aft'd, 623 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1980); cf. Acorn Invs. Inc., v. City of Seattle, 887
F.2d 219,224-26 (9th Cir. 1989) (striking down compelled disclosure ofshareholders
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evaluated in the abstract; the level of expected harassment is crucial,
and that level is intimately dependent on context. The circumstances of disclosure must be closely examined.
In a third group of cases, disclosures concern intimate information not related to constitutionally protected activities. Promiscuous
disclosure of such information constitutes a powerful governmental
sanction that assaults the dignity and undermines the independence
of the population. Memories of the impact of McGarthyite
exposures suggest that such power should not be left unconstrained.
Still, the nature of the impact on the individual is likely to differ
incrementally depending on the precise data in question, and the
importance of legitimate interests in disclosure varies contextually.
If we are to limit dissemination, there is no alternative to comparing
the actual harm done with the level of government justification.
The inescapability of residual ad hoc balancing should not
trouble us unduly. At the same time that many academics have
come to view balancing as a sign of intellectual flabbiness, courts
have retained shameless allegiance to the method. Perhaps this an
example of a cultural lag between the era when many judges were
trained, when balancing was regarded as a hallmark of an admirable
realism, and the present. It seems equally probable, however, that
the gap is attributable to a difference between the academic and the
judicial enterprise. In a classroom, the response "you balance"
effectively ends the Socratic dialogue on the plane of theory. As
one recent graduate perceives the matter: "There is nothing like a
good balancing test for avoiding rigorous argument."3 94 But
courts are not in the business of rigorous argument for its own sake;
they are in the business of deciding cases justly, of embodying their
95
vision of justice.3
In that enterprise, there is much to be said for balancing in the
in adult entertainment emporium); Genusa v. City of Peoria, 619 F.2d 1203, 1215 (7th
Cir. 1980) (striking down compelled disclosure of shareholders in adult bookstore).
394 Rubenfeld, supra note 283, at 761. A balancing test also limits the impact that
traditional or theoretical legal scholarship may have on judicial decisions. If
everything turns on the facts, it is trial lawyers, not traditional legal academics, who
will determine the outcome of cases. Academics who focus on data, on the other
hand, may have substantially greater power when the courts confront the particulars
of each case.
395 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 133 (1990)
("[l]t is a mistake to suppose that the bestjudge is the judge who most resembles the
best law professor, or that the best judicial opinion is the one that most closely
resembles an excellent law-review article."). Judges also may be less concerned with
justifying a counter-majoritarian position than with using it wisely.
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area of disclosure. Even in times of sober reflection, when a court
is confronted with a call for principled and clear responses, the
easiest bright-line test is one which closes the door on the plaintiff.
When a court is confronted with the choice of "all or nothing,"
counter-examples pile high quickly; the choice will often be
"nothing." The history of the "scarlet letter" problem is littered
with such gambits. s9 6 Only when courts keep open a line of
escape have they been willing to address the tensions between
privacy and disclosure on their merits.
Conversely, although some scholars have argued in favor of a

constitutional architecture of clean and predictable principles, on
the ground that such principles are likely to be stronger protections

in times of intolerance, 3 97 such principles tend to break, rather
than bend, under political pressure. A balancing test that allows the
court to bow to popular winds at least leaves in place the possibility
of springing back when the winds abate. A "principled" accommodation to popular pressure would have to be overruled 98

Balancing is resilient in another dimension: under a balancing
regime, lower courts are not tightly bound by "principled" rejection
of claims by the Supreme Court. They are free to hear and

vindicate claims closely analogous to those recently rejected by
emphasizing factual differences in the case at hand. Nor are they
bound to a "principled" adoption of claims, for everything turns on
the facts.

Assertions of rights thus begin rather than end the dialogue.
396 For a discussion of the door-closing doctrines, see supra notes 294-315 and
accompanying text.
397 See Blasi, supra note 29, at 466-506.
398 Thus, if one suspects that the outcome in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.

214 (1944), was tragically foreordained by the unwillingness of the Court in time of
war to confront executive military authority on a massive scale, one might prefer the
approach ofJustice Black, who acceded to claims of overriding militaryjustification
while emphasizing both the magnitude of those claims and the civil rights they
overrode, to that ofJusticeJackson, who would have refused, on a "principled" basis,
to review the constitutional objections to the Japanese-American relocation. Justice
Black's opinion left in place a strong objection to racial classification, which was
regularly invoked in later years when claims of "pressing public necessity" were
absent. See id. at 215-24 (Black, J.). Justice Jackson's opinion would have left the
court voiceless, both on the case before it and in the future. See id. at 242-48
(Jackson, J., dissenting).

Similarly, however little benefit McCarthy era Communists may have garnered
from the requirement of overriding justification, the recognition of their claims as
calling for governmentjustification left in place a structure that could be invoked by

the civil rights movement in the American South.
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The official faced with a claim that a proposed action violates a
citizen's rights will not feel constrained absolutely by "principle"
derived from apodictic judicial pronouncement. But neither is she
free to ignore the claims of "right," for a court is always available to
hear, not simply dismiss, the citizen's claims that her rights are not
outweighed by the force of governmental necessity.
This final characteristic provides perhaps the greatest appeal of
balancing, for it means that in every case the citizen will have an
opportunity to tell her story. Faced with a doctrine requiring her
to explore the situation at hand, the judge will not be able to
dismiss the case at the stage of abstract pleadings. The litigants will
have the opportunity to explore and explain their concrete situation
with the judge, as well as an obligation to address one another.
This opportunity to have their voices heard is of greater relevance
to private individuals than to academics. We can publish; they
perish silently.
Even if privacy claims predictably lose in most cases after
litigation, the shadow of the claim remains. Officials who take
seriously the rights enunciated by the courts, (or pressure groups
who can invoke those rights), will take into account the citizen's
interests in privacy when constructing government operating
procedures. When confronting a government demand for information under a balancing regime, a citizen retains the negotiating
ability to raise a privacy claim, and ultimately to go to court. A
claim that is too weak to prevail may be sufficient to induce a prelitigation dialogue, resulting in more protection than the government was initially inclined to grant.
This argument may appear to be premised on a naive optimism.
Still, in the end, this essay is about a reasonably well-ordered
society. If Big Brother were truly imminent, the puny bulwarks of
balancing would not matter much. But in that society, the scarlet
letter likely would be accompanied by the less genteel sanctions of
forcible repression. The charm of the tactic of exposure during the
McCarthy Era was that it purported to defer to democracy's ideals.
It is by invoking those ideals to judges and officials that we can best
call that tactic to account.

